MADAGASCAR: UN, AU, AND SADC ROLES, GOING FORWARD

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANTANANARIVO 000217 E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2014 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MA UN SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR: UN, AU, AND SADC ROLES, GOING FORWARD Classified By: AMBASSADOR NIELS MARQUARDT FOR REASONS 1.4 D AND E ¶1. (C) Summary: The UN, SADC, and AU are working to coordinate and harmonize next steps in resolving the Madagascar crisis. Elections within six months are their shared goal. SADC says it will not seat Ravalomanana at the upcoming SADC Summit, but TGV -- perceiving SADC bias in favor of his predecessor -- may be contemplating a formal withdrawal from SADC. The High Court (HCC) told SADC that it deliberately took a political decision "in the supreme interest of the nation" when it falsely declared the March 17 decrees to be constitutional, asserting that it did so under no/no duress. The AU distinguishes between the cases of Mauritania and Madagascar, seeing no "taking of power by force" here. The AU has "suggested" that Madagascar withdraw its offer to host the July Summit here. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Ambassadors/DCMs met for two hours on Thursday morning for briefings by AU Special Envoy Ablasse Ouedraogo (former Burkinabe foreign minister) and South African ambassador and remaining members of SADC delegation whose leadership (SADC ExecSec Tomas Salamao and the Swazi and Mozambiquan foreign ministers) departed Wednesday. Dipcorps attendence is waning both in level and number, as crisis fatigue (and a certain annoyance in certain quarters with the AU and SADC roles) apparently is setting in. Ambassador Marquardt was present throughout, many ambassadors (including the French) were represented by their DCMs, and the Germans, Algerians, Senegalese, and Moroccans were absent. The purpose was to report on the AU mission, which is now in its third week, and the SADC mission that came this week. ¶3. (C) The UN systems coordinator (UNDP Rep Xavier Leus) was present and circulated a copy of a March 25 dipnote adddressed to UNSYG Ban Ki-Moon from the new foreign minister informing the UN of the April 2-3 national meeting ("assise nationale") at which decisions will be reached on the following issues: 1) a calendar for elaborating a new constitution, electoral reform, political parties law, opposition statute, statute on former heads of state, and a law on communications; 2) defining how this work will be accomplished and launching a national reconciliation; 3) setting dates for a large national conference to do the work listed in (1) above; and 4) a calendar for presidential, senatorial, legislative, regional, and local elections. Dr. Leus told the embassador that he had advised the new foreign minister to consider a second dipnote explicitly requesting UNSYG involvement in these matters, if so desired; otherwise the UN would not step forward, he said. Senior Mediator Tiebile Drame appears willing to return as soon as possible, if invited, he said. ¶4. (C) The readout from the SADC mission consisted of reports on their meetings with HAT President Andry TGV Rajoelina, parliamentarians, the entire High Constitutional Court (HCC),and foreign minister Ny Hasina Andriamanjato. Rajoelina received them in presence of Andriamanjato and legal advisor Norbert Lala Ratsirihonona, but unlike diplomats' last meeting with TGV on March 19, only TGV spoke -- albeit reading from a prepared text. TGV said his task is to lead the country to elections within 24 months, less time if possible. SADC wants this done within six months -- but the South African hinted without elaboration that SADC may accept that this may not be feasible. TGV warned that "SADC should not complicate things here" and said that "we will announce an important decision vis-a-vis SADC" on Thursday afternoon. The South African ambassador suggested this might portend that TGV will announce Madagascar's intention to withdraw from SADC, as a blocking move against the perception here that Ravalomanana is cozying up to SADC (and/or vice versa) and that he may even be seated or otherwise accommodated at the upcoming Summit in Swaziland. (Note: The pro-TGV press is having a field-day assailing King Mswati's democratic credentials and, through this tack, SADC's credibility as a guarantor of anything but protection for those in power, including Mugabe.) ¶5. (C) TGV explained to the SADC delegation that Madagascar's entry into SADC five years ago was motivated by Ravalomanana's personal desire for commercial advantage for his company Tiko, which was unfair to other Malagasy companies. Dr. Leus commented that some of the "old" (read French) companies in Madagascar had enjoyed their long-standing market positions before Ravalomanana arrived and thus recently had supported TGV and were probably advising the new team to revert to the status quo ante of high tariff walls and other protections that favored them. The South African noted that SADC withdrawal would, in any case, only become effective one year after notification. There was also an open question whether SADC would act on a withdrawal notice coming from a government not recognized by SADC. The scenario of Ravalomanana appearing at the upcoming summit was discussed; Ouedraogo said that Salamao had told him privately that it was "out of the question" for Ravalomanana, who in SADC eyes voluntarily resigned, to be seated. ¶6. (C) The HCC, for their parts, told SADC that they had "consciously taken a political rather than a legal decision" in ruling that both of last week's decrees -- one signed by Ravalomanana, the other by the ephemeral military directorate -- were constitutional. The HCC acknowledged that in no way were these decrees constitutional, frankly described the dilemma they faced in making a legal vs. a practical decision, and said that in the end they opted for the course that best protected "the supreme interest of the nation." They advised SADC, for the good of Madagascar, not to challenge these decisions. They also said that they had not/not made their decisions under duress, but repeated their deep conviction that their actions were in the best interest of peace and reconciliation for the nation's people. They asked for understanding that they had been given a situation they they did not feel competent to handle. "Fire is easier to start than to extinguish," they reportedly concluded. ¶7. (C) The AU's Ouedraogo said he had explained the AU position to a similar set of audiences (after coordination with Salamou). He advised the foreign minister to send a formal note to Addis withdrawing Madagascar's offer to host the next Summit in July; "this will save us all a lot of trouble," he said, and allow the AU to select "an alternate location" (the Libyan ambassador managed not to salivate visibly at this point). Ouedraogo made reference to press reports on Qaddhafi's alleged recent phone calls to both TGV and Ny Hasina but said he was not privy to their content (again, silence from the Libyan). Ouedraogo said he explained to his interlocutors recent AU actions vis-a-vis Mauritania in the wake of the "taking of power by force" that occurred there. Asked whether the AU sees the two cases in the same light, Ouedraogo said, "No, while both involved a clearly unconstitutional transfer of power contrary to the 2000 Lome Declaration and thus triggering similar consequences, in Madagascar -- unlike in Mauritania -- the AU is not asserting that power was taken by force." He said Ravalomanana has alleged in a phone call to Jean Ping that he had signed his decree on March 17 "with a gun to my head." However, Ouedraogo said that he simply did not believe this version of events, and that he was unaware of any evidence of direct force used to unseat Ravalomanana. He said from his conversation with the generals on the erstwhile military directorate before the explosive March 17 meeting at the Episcopat (which Ouedraogo also attended) that the generals had made it clear to him that they did not wish to retain power and were prepared to pass it immediately "to whomever"; force therefore had not been part of their decision to do so several hours later, he concluded. MARQUARDT