MADAGASCAR: MFM AND THE NEW OPPOSITION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANTANANARIVO 000203 SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/E - MBEYZEROV PARIS FOR RKANEDA LONDON FOR PLORD E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2018 TAGS: PGOV MA SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR: MFM AND THE NEW OPPOSITION REF: ANTANANARIVO 195 Classified By: AMBASSADOR NIELS MARQUARDT FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D. ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On March 20, Ambassador Marquardt met with Manandafy Rakotonirina, president of political party MFM and former special advisor to ex-President Ravalomanana. In Rakotonirina's view, this week's events amounted to a coup d'etat, and he is now working with the former president's party, Tiako i Madagasikara (TIM),and the FJKM (Protestant) Church to mount an opposition alliance to the new government of Andry Rajoelina. Like the opposition he has now replaced, he has several legitimate grievances against the new government which will resonate with the former president's supporters, and with those in the former opposition who haven't gotten their due from the new administration. The "new opposition" held rallies on March 21 and 23 in downtown Antananarivo, with plans to continue daily, and have called for larger anti-Rajoelina demonstrations on Sunday, March 29, to coincide with the annual commemoration of the beginning of the 1947 revolution against the French. These protesters will have little more cohesion than those of the past three months, with little common agenda other than ousting the new "president", but will likely attract some significant support against the new government. END SUMMARY. PAVING THE WAY FOR RATSIRAKA'S RETURN -------------- ¶2. (C) MFM, Rakotonirina's party, has generally walked a middle road between Ravalomanana's TIM and the "real" opposition parties of AREMA, MTS, LEADER-Fanilo, and others. Rakotonirina himself has had an on and off relationship with Ravalomanana, whom he helped win power in 2001 before falling out several years later; he remains a well-known politician and public figures, having been involved in national politics since 1968, including as a leader of the student group in the 1972 crisis. MFM has kept its distance from both the opposition and the former government during the last several months, but appears to have held open a line to Ravalomanana without publicly backing him. ¶3. (C) Rakotonirina requested the meeting in order to inform the Ambassador of his plans to mount an opposition to "President" Rajoelina, and condemn the transfer of power as a coup. He also came with a message from Ravalomanana, later repeated directly in a phone call to the Ambassador (reftel), that "Ravalomanana was required to sign the order (transferring power to a military directorate) under threat of death." (Note: post does not believe that this was actually the case, although it appears to underpin TIM's new strategy.) Rather than focusing his anger at Rajoelina, however, Rakotonirina and his two MFM colleagues mostly spoke about former president Didier Ratsiraka. In their version, Rajoelina has been paving the way for Ratsiraka and his allies to return from exile in France, and he was clearly concerned that Ratsiraka may move to retake power. As a former general and commander in chief of a now divided and confused army, he believes Ratsiraka will command extensive support among the country's armed forces, as well as that of the population in his historical base along the east coast of Madagascar. Like many here, Rakotonirina blames "France Inc." with masterminding Ravalomanana's demise and Rajoelina's ascent to power. His brochure inviting Malagasy to participate in the March 29 celebration does so in fairly inflammatory, anti-French terms. THE PLAN -------------- ¶4. (C) The platform of Rakotonirina's "new opposition" is simple: he agrees that the country's laws need revising, but disagrees with Rajoelina's recent suspension of parliament and broad reorganization of the "transition government", as outlined in Ordinance 2009-003 (septel). He envisions an enlarged Senate joining the National Assembly to form a 200-member "constituent assembly" tasked with rewriting the electoral code and political party law, and working to hold new elections in much shorter timeframe than Rajoelina's stated deadline of 24 months. He is already in talks with members of TIM, and will likely attract the support of several other minor parties and independents who have not fared well with the new government. On parting, Rakotonirina suggested to the ambassador that the UN send peacekeepers to Madagascar, which the ambassador dismissed out of hand. ANTANANARI 00000203 002 OF 002 ¶5. (C) COMMENT: Rakotonirina is not alone in his dismay at the recent turn of events, and he will have many allies of convenience to support his movement, particularly now that the TIM-dominated parliament has been suspended. MFM will likely emerge as a key organizing force in this "new opposition", although its relatively small support base will limit Rakotonirina's ability to set the agenda. He will continue to straddle the sizable divides among the new opposition forces, and will be a useful counterpart to the TIM opposition (who may solely be interested in regaining power) in a renewed push for some form of national dialogue and reconciliation. END COMMENT. MARQUARDT