MADAGASCAR: ELECTIONS WITHIN SIX MONTHS?

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANTANANARIVO 000201 E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MA UN SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR: ELECTIONS WITHIN SIX MONTHS? REF: ANTANANARIVO 195 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: AMBASSADOR NIELS MARQUARDT FOR REASONS 1.4 D AND E. ¶1. (C) Summary: The St. Paddy's Day coup here ended the initial phase of Madagascar's political crisis, but the crisis itself is far from over; months of instability, often mascarading as normalcy, probably lie ahead for the long-suffering people of this extremely poor nation. In the wake of the coup, Madagascar now has a young, untested, and naive leader who enjoys unreliable support from those who pushed him forward, and almost no support or even familiarity beyond the capital; his ability to retain the reins of power is uncertain, especially as his odds of success are low. The military is now fractured horizontally and especially vertically, with virtually all flag officers removed from power under extreme intimidation from armed enlisted men, often literally at the point of a gun; colonels remain in tenuous charge of those benaeth them. The media is being intimidated by the same armed men not to report accurately on current reality. The Malagasy opposition, never even nominally united, can be expected to splinter further in line with their various regional, ethnic, religious, economic interests -- and the highly personalized interests of their leaders. The economy is in free fall, unemployment is high and rising, and the consequences of the global condemnation of Madagascar will only worsen these trends. And, as if this were not already enough, former President Ravalomanana and his supporters appear to be regrouping for an attempted reconquest of the power he dramatically lost one week ago -- already broadcasting via short wave, organizing rallies where TGV did the same just days ago, and claiming that he did not actually resign. 2, (C) However, the broad outlines of a resolution to the crisis were already on the table before the coup: national dialogue, followed by a referendum on constitutional amendment, electoral reform, a new political parties law, new statutes to cover the opposition and their access to media (and perhaps a few other changes),culminating in elections. This outline remains sound, and much of it was embraced in positive terms by TGV in his "installment" address on Saturday. To be sure, the new regime's insistence on a 24-month timetable to accomplish this agenda is unnecessarily long -- six months ought to suffice, if there is true political will -- and one can hope that they might accelerate their pace as they start to understand the further negative consequences of not doing so. The UN role going forward remains uncertain -- the UN has not yet been invited back, and the misperception of some sort of UN/international complicity in Ravalomanana's own unconstitutional transfer of power to a military directorate may not bode well for their return. On the other hand, both SADC and the AU are still engaged and might usefully pick up where the UN left off if it comes to that. This still leaves the question: is there any will on the part of the new leadership to move quickly to elections that might not leave them in charge? ¶3. (C) Ravalomanana's final days were obviously a roller coaster ride with extreme highs and lows. Poorly advised and increasily isolated, he was consistently weeks behind in perceiving accurately the state of affairs, and the extent of his power, beyond his remote palace walls. Periodic weak showings by TGV supporters at the public square were translated to him as lost steam. Even after the military mutinied on March 8 and its chain of command broke down completely, Ravalomanana appeared to continue to harbor illusions about surviving in power. By March 13 he was asking me about refuge in my residence and asylum in the U.S., only to change his mind hours later. The ill-advised public defection of Jacques Sylla on March 14 deprived Madagascar of the one unique figure who might have held together a constitutional solution: Ravalomanana's fury at Sylla's disloyalty -- combined with his stubborn refusal to give TGV power or make life easy for him after he got it -- is likely a major reason for his opting for a patently unconstitutional ordinance creating a military directorate. (An unanswered question here is what Sylla was thinking when he committed political suicide in this manner.) ¶4. (C) With his directorate, Ravalomanana lit a stink bomb before slipping out the palace door; when we asked why this approach, his reply -- "it's not my problem anymore" -- sounded a lot like "apres moi, le deluge." His after-the-fact assertion that the military directly coerced him into this course of option (Antan 195) does not hold up to even simple scrutiny: there were no signs of military having entered the palace on March 17 when I and others last saw him there, and the palace gates at that point were blocked by crowds of his supporters. Additionally, if it was a coerced act, why would the coercers have permitted him to sign a document that they angrily repudiated immediately afterwards when diplomats informed them of his act? While of course military pressure indirectly contributed to his departure, it is far more likely that Ravalomanana signed his ordinance intentionally to leave an unconstitutional, ungovernable situation in his wake. Now he can watch TGV flail, and eventually fail. His calls to me and others on March 20 claiming "I did not resign" may set the stage for him next to claim that he remains the legitimate President of Madagascar, perhaps even showing up at the next SADC Summit. Already, he and his partisans have begun rallies on the public square here and have started short-wave political broadcasts to Madagascar. ¶5. (C) For his part, TGV saw the chance to seize power, and no further need to negotiate a solution, share power, be patient, inclusive, or peaceful. The dramatic meeting at the Episcopat on the afternoon of March 17, when UN mediator read aloud Ravalomanana's ordinance, could have been the occasion for a negotiated solution of some sort. Instead, TGV angrily ordered the generals hauled off and detained while the opportunistic former Prime Minister Norbert Lala Ratsirihonona drafted a second unconstitutional ordinance for their signatures, transferring power to TGV. The hapless generals and admiral would gladly have signed anything passing the hot potato of power away from themselves; force clearly was not necessary, but it massively evident as all this occurred. Even Ravalomanana's pastor, president of the FJKM Church, was hauled away from the Episcopat by force, beaten, forced to drink his own urine, and released the following day. ¶6. (C) TGV's first acts as President of the High Authority of the Transition (HAT) suspended the parliament, confirmed his previously-named government in power (rather than creating any pretense of opening or inclusion),and announced a long, 24-month timetable before elections (septel). His Saturday "installation" speech struck a more conciliatory tone, especially vis-a-vis the invited but absent diplomatic corps, but TGV has demonstrated all along an inability to follow his words with consistent actions. He, like many Malagasy, seems to think that the world will conform to Madagascar's peculiarities and lack of attachment to principles, rather than Madagascar conforming to universal principles or the rules of the AU, SADC, or the UN which Madagascar has voluntarily accepted. ¶7. (C) The way out for Madagascar is nonetheless clear: move quickly to elections. The weeks of FFKM- and UN-faciliated mediation that preceded the coup left some consensus on the table about the possibility of doing this on an accelerated timetable of perhaps six months. There was already apparent agreement that national daigloue, a referendum amending the constitution, a change in the electoral code, a new political parties law, one new statute for the opposition and another assuring equitable access to media were necessary pre-conditions to elections, but all that was still seen as possible within a packed six-month period -- if the political will were present. The suspension of parliament raises new questions about how all that could be accomplished, and therefore was a distinctly negative move. The UN may or may not be invited back -- the March 17 events gave some the false impression that the UN and/or international community had some role in lighting Ravalomanana's stink bomb. Nonetheless, the AU and SADC are both still present and engaged here and could carry forth the process with or without support from the UN. ¶8. (C) Tana, meanwhile, shows many outward signs of returning to normalcy. Traffic is worse than ever, some looted stores are re-opening, the curfew was lifted on Saturday, and there have been no major insecurity events in the city since the transfer of power. However, this outward calm is offset by many disconcerting indications that it is but a facade. Heavily-armed soldiers are omnipresent. The military command structure is broken. Flag officers, sometimes literally at gunpoint, have been sent packing and do not know what will come nextm while those that remain in nominal charge have no power. There are already reports of looting by uniformed military, kidnappings, extortion, and other forms of opportunistic exploitation of their arms. Journalists say they are being threatened not to run stories unfavorable to the regime. Intimidation is being widely practiced to keep people quiet, under control, and/or on-message. Especially former officials in the Ravalomanana government continue to report threats against them. A truck full of soldiers drove by the pro-Ravalomanana rally on Monday and fired warning shots. Local officials affiliated with the TIM party are being replaced, forcibly as needed. The release of "political prisoners" announced last weekend included some notorious criminals, now under house arrest but perhaps soon to be liberated entirely. This climate of violence and intimidation is a major concern to the entire international community going forward. ¶9. (C) Finally, the French. Following Sarkozy's words on Friday calling the coup a coup, the French here seem determined to minimize the consequences of what has happened. While agreeing with us on the need to move quickly to elections, their brand-new ambassador Jean-Marc Chataigner appealed yesterday to the SADC Troika delegation not to move toward sanctions, calling them "part of the problem not the solution." (The SADC ministers, for their parts, stressed that sanctions are a last resort, not something they hope to employ.) Chataigner is making clear here that the French have no intention to suspend any aid or other program here; he implied privately that they will seek to delay and/or mitigate any EU actions in this regard. A French embassy security meeting today characterized things as "settling down" and "returning to normal". In this regard, the French are outliers, as most of the resident diplomatic community sees this crisis, as we do, as far from over. MARQUARDT