MADAGASCAR: CLASHES CONTINUE AS NEGOTIATIONS LOOM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANTANANARIVO 000149 SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/E - MBEYZEROV PARIS FOR RKANEDA LONDON FOR PLORD TREASURY FOR FBOYE E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MA UN SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR: CLASHES CONTINUE AS NEGOTIATIONS LOOM REF: A. ANTANANARIVO 139 ¶B. ANTANANARIVO 143 ¶C. ANTANANARIVO 144 ANTANANARI 00000149 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: AMBASSADOR NIELS MARQUARDT FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D. ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Last week's failed negotiations between president and TGV have been followed by almost-daily protests in Antananarivo and in several provincial capitals, despite the appearance of weakening public support and an increasingly firm response by GOM security forces. The conflict has settled into a routine that may be short on headlines but threatens to persist for the foreseeable future, taking more lives and causing more injuries to both people and property. TGV has publicly and privately sworn off further bilateral negotiations, but tells us he is eager for a "consensus solution" that could be achieved quickly, in his view, by convening a national cunsultative conference immediately; indeed, this process may start as early as Wednesday. President Ravalomanana, for his part, is increasingly clear about his intention to remain in power, but there are also signs that he is poised to crack down harshly to end public demonstrations, rather than make concessions. END SUMMARY. PROTESTS SPREAD -------------- ¶2. (C) Following the breakdown of talks on February 25, when Ravalomamana failed to show up for a fourth day of negotiations with TGV, the opposition staged a series of rallies in Antananarivo and several provincial capitals. Although they had hoped for a massive demonstration of support on Saturday (February 28) in Tana's Place de 13 Mai, predicting crowds of 100,000, these events have actually been much smaller than in past weeks. A Thursday, February 26, rally at the Mahamasina stadium complex in Anosy attracted several thousand, the rally on Saturday had between 5,000 and 10,000, and Monday's rally had less than 5,000. Each event resulted in several injuries from sporadic clashes between looters and security forces. Rajoelina has called for further rallies (every day until Ravalomanana steps down, according to his speech on Saturday),but he does not seem able to attract the kinds of crowds seen in mid-February. Whether it's due to increased security measures and stricter �A;enforcement of "red zones", or simply fatigue after five weeks of conflict, is not clear. TGV admitted to the ambassador today that there is a"false sense of calm," but said that popular dissatisfaction remains high and that the people will easily be mobilized once there is something concrete for them to do -- like march on the President's Palace at Iavoaloha. One problem is simply material: people do not have the means to come protest every day. However, he said that he wants to keep the conflict from heating up, and will continue to call only for non-violent protest, even if this keeps the crowds down. ¶3. (C) The provincial capitals continue to witness protests and sporadic violence. At least one protester was killed (other reports say four) and several injured in a rally in Fianarantsoa on February 27; despite the protesters reportedly having authorization for the rally, security forces used live rounds and tear gas to disperse the crowd. Two main opposition factions in Diego Suarez joined forces Monday to stage a large peaceful rally and launch a general strike (poorly observed, thus far). Opposition parties in Tamatave held a rally on Saturday, and plan more this week; reports indicate that local security forces are gearing up for a fight as they attempt to maintain control in one of Madagascar's most violence-prone opposition strongholds. Majunga and Tulear have both seen small but violent opposition rallies in the past several days; a key opposition leader in Tulear (Robert Razaka of PSDUM) has been arrested, but that is unlikely to defuse tensions on the west coast. Former president Albert Zafy was scheduled to arrive in Tulear on March 3, likely seeking to push for further demonstrations as he did in Tamatave during late February. General strikes have been called in several of these cities, although only Ambositra was reportedly observing it fully. ¶4. (C) TGV told the ambassador Tuesday that he is concerned that events in the provinces may spiral out of control. He admits he has little control or influence there, especially ANTANANARI 00000149 002.2 OF 003 as the government denies the opposition all access to state radio and TV with national coverage. He observed that Albert Zafy is calling for the formation of "regional governments" -- the taking of regional offices by the opposition, beyond the control of TGV's movement. He claims that in Sambava, the capital of the northeastern SAVA region, the regional chief -- "chef de region" -- has already been deposed and replaced by an opponent of the regime. He claims that Ravalomanana has little control beyond Tana and is able to visit regional capitals only by force. (Indeed, the opposition put rocks on the Tulear runway last Wednesday when Ravalomanana was rumored to be landing there.) ¶5. (C) Students in Antananarivo grabbed headlines on March 2 with a small but violent confrontation near the university; security forces intervened, killing one, wounding several others, and deploying tear gas before the mob finally dispersed. Similar incidents occurred there again today, with no fatalities. These incidents, in Tana and elsewhere, are the product of a broader trend: while the scattered opposition groups remain somewhat coordinated in message, they are acting independently without looking to TGV for their cues. Although he still commands the largest crowd, other leaders are ramping up their own efforts, and security forces are responding with tear gas, grenades, rubber bullets, and live rounds, and reports indicate that small-scale opportunistic looting is on the rise as others take advantage of the general disorder. With two separate demonstrations in Tana, the interruptions to school and commercial activities are growing (reftel C),even among those who would otherwise ignore calls for a strike. A TWO-TRACK SOLUTION FROM THE UN -------------- ¶6. (C) UN Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs Haile Menkerios returned to Tana last week to help restart the stalled negotiations; he will be augmented and eventually replaced after former Malian Foreign Minister Tiebile Drame arrives on March 4 as the UN's "senior mediator". (Another AU Envoy, Ramtane Lamamra, also has arrived, and met Ravalomanana today.) Menkerios has met again with TGV and Ravalomanana, and consulted with other leaders and local ambassadors as he laid the groundwork for continued dialogue. Although now opposed to the two leaders meeting again themselves (as we are),he envisions a two-track process to get the protests back off the street and into dialogue. The first track is continuing the closed-door negotiations between representatives of the two politicians, which resumed on February 28 and have continueed daily since then. These teams have good working relations, but TGV told the ambassador today that they have reached an impasse and should be discontinued as of Wednesday. He wants the two versions of a solution developed by each side to be referred now to a national consultative conference (NCC),or round table, of Malagasy stakeholders, for their decision/recommendation. ¶7. (C) This NCC would be the second track (or the only one if the bilaterals cease tomorrow, as TGV wishes) -- a far more inclusive process based on a broad, representative group drawn from political parties, religous groups, private sector, civil society, etc. TGV says he is pushing the FFKM Church Council to launch the NCC immediately. He also said today that while he cannot agree bilaterally to any scenario in which Ravalomanana remains in office, he would accept this outcome if it emerges as the consensus solution recommended by the NCC. (He is clearly thinking of a phased removal of Ravalomanana, first by his ceding power to a consensus prime minister, then through early elections.) The NCC would help TGV avoid a split in the opposition between the Merina political leaders (in Tana) and their mostly coastal allies; opposition figures such as Zafy will not cease their provocations until they are somehow brought into the process, which has not yet happened in bilateral negotiations. It is also seen as conferring enhanced legitimacy on whatever solution is recommended. The NCC may not be the fastest route to a solution, but Menkerios believes it stands the best chance for success. TGV, for his part, thinks it can be wrapped up within two days, as there is already a great deal of consensus among the wise men, he said. IN FOR THE LONG HAUL -------------- ANTANANARI 00000149 003.2 OF 003 ¶8. (C) COMMENT: Post supports UN efforts to promote the two-track (or NCC-only) solution outlined above, and we are doing what we can to keep additional initiatives from the AU and SADC subordinate to the UN. It will be no small feat to keep dialogue moving forward. With multiple rallies or other events taking place spontaneously around the country almost every day, the possibility for violent confrontation is also greatly increased, while increased crime and a tougher security enforcement posture make sour relationships even worse. Ravalomanana, for his part, is probably moving mentally away from any negotiated solution, as he may be interpreting the apparent lost steam of Tana's daily demonstrations as a sign that the public is ready to move ahead -- with him remaining fully in charge. We continue to believe that major concessions on the president's part -- such as a transition government with powers granted to a temporary prime minister, followed by early elections -- is the likely and best solution to this crisis -- but this will occur only once Ravalomanana realizes there is no other way out. The ambassador met for 40 minutes of Friday with the Prime Minister, who showed absolutely no awareness of this version of reality. Key ambassadors have scheduled another meeting with Ravalomanana for Thursday morning: if he is in listening mode, he will hear a clear and sobering message about the need to compromise. Meanwhile, there is reason to believe that he has a crackdown, not concessions, in mind. END COMMENT. MARQUARDT