ERDOGAN'S ATHENS VISIT: STARTING OVER AGAIN...AGAIN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000840 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/16/2019 TAGS: PREL GR TU SUBJECT: ERDOGAN'S ATHENS VISIT: STARTING OVER AGAIN...AGAIN REF: A. 08 ANKARA 2177 ¶B. 08 ANKARA 180 Classified By: A/POLCOUNS Christopher Krafft for reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Although PM Erdogan and Greek PM Karamanlis have not officially met face-to-face since January 2008, the leaders will only have a brief opportunity to speak on the margins of the June 20-21 Acropolis Museum opening festivities. MFA and Greek Embassy officials report that the abbreviated bilateral session is expected to touch on traditional issues: improving relations, the Aegean, and religious minorities. FM Davutoglu and Greek FM Bakoyannis will likely continue dialogue on the margins of the June 27-28 Corfu OSCE ministerial and her expected Ankara visit later this year. Erdogan's trip represents a welcome return to his regional engagement agenda following his heated foreign policy rhetoric earlier this year aimed at rallying his domestic base in the run-up to the March elections. While no deliverables are on the table, Erdogan may use the platform to continue his recent oratory on ethnic harmony within Turkey and improving Turkey's mixed record toward minorities. Some commentators in Ankara speculate that this might include an announcement on the Halki seminary or Ecumenical patriarch. End Summary. ¶2. (C) PM Erdogan's primary purpose of visiting Athens, June 20-21, is to attend the Acropolis Museum opening ceremonies at the invitation of Greek PM Karamanlis extended in April, affirmed MFA and Greek Embassy officials. Despite being close friends and having spoken regularly on the telephone, added MFA Greece Department Head Ozlem Gulsun Ergun, the two leaders have not met officially since Karamanlis, January 2008 trip to Ankara. The GOT has yet to finalize its delegation list or talking points. Ergun speculated the discussion will be limited to key topics such as the bilateral relationship, the Aegean, and treatment of religious minorities due to the short time set aside for the bilateral session. The MFA has not prepared any agreements for signing; the meeting itself is the deliverable. Reflecting Ergun's sentiments, Greek Embassy Second Secretary Photis Bourloyannis-Tsangaridis characterized the upcoming visit as a "positive step." ¶3. (C) In the coming months, FM Davutoglu is expected to meet twice with Greek FM Bakoyannis. Having missed each other on the margins of the May Prague energy summit, Davutoglu and Bakoyannis plan to talk on the margins of the Corfu OSCE ministerial, June 27-28. Ergun cautioned, however, the meeting is also expected to be short given Bakoyannis, hosting responsibilities. Davutoglu has also extended an invitation to his Greek counterpart to visit Ankara for an official bilateral meeting; neither side has set a date. ¶4. (C) Comment: The upcoming series of visits represents a welcome return to Erdogan's regional engagement policy, especially during a time of increased Greek media-driven anxiety in Athens over events in the Aegean. This is potentially a marked change from Erdogan's domestically-aimed negative foreign policy rhetoric (especially on Gaza) seen during the run-up to the March nation-wide municipal and provincial assembly elections. No longer focused on cheap wins at the ballot box, Erdogan and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) can now return to more constructive dialogue. ¶5. (C) Comment continued: For the AKP, lingering areas of dispute such as the Halki seminary, Aegean, Ecumenical Patriarch, and Cyprus remain an impediment to many of its domestic reform plans and broader regional aspirations, and serve as a point of contention in Turkey's relations with the U.S. and EU. Furthermore, these issues reflect long-standing red lines of greatest importance to the ultra-secularist Kemalists and the Turkish military that run contrary to AKP's greater agenda. Some commentators in Ankara have speculated that Erdogan may make a positive announcement in Athens on one of these topics based upon recent public comments he has made about ethnic harmony within Turkey and improving Turkey's mixed record toward minorities. (We have not heard anything concrete to support that and it may prove only wishful thinking.) Whether the political opposition supports or seeks to obstruct a rumored initiative, Erdogan stands to benefit. He can either eliminate a constant sore point in Ankara's relationship with Washington and Brussels (and ANKARA 00000840 002 OF 002 Athens),or create a very tangible example of the opposition's inflexibility and obstructiveness. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey JEFFREY