SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF TURKISH FM DAVUTOGLU

S E C R E T ANKARA 000780

SIPDIS

FOR SECRETARY CLINTON FROM CHARGE D'AFFAIRES DOUG SILLIMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2029
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ENRG TU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF TURKISH FM DAVUTOGLU
TO WASHINGTON

Classified By: CDA Doug Silliman for reasons 1.4(b,d)


1. (S) Newly appointed Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu
welcomes the opportunity to meet with you early in his tenure
as Minister. Our continued willingness to engage the Turks
at the highest levels reinforces the message that this
administration considers Turkey a strategic partner. Turkish
officials say they will continue to push ahead on the
normalization effort with Armenia, though it hangs by a
thread because of Azerbaijan's effective use of domestic
political pressure inside Turkey, leading GOT officials to
insist publicly that opening the border with Armenia is
contingent on a deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan on
Nagorno-Karabakh. The economic downturn that is leading to
record levels of unemployment, and the ruling Justice and
Development Party's (AKP) weakened mandate in the aftermath
of a disappointing showing in local elections in late March,
led to a recent cabinet reshuffle that brought Davutoglu to
MFA and sent his predecessor, Ali Babacan, upstairs to
coordinate the GOT's economic portfolios. The Turks remain
deeply concerned about the potential damage to the bilateral
relationship should a congressional resolution on Armenian
"Genocide" pass.

KEY POINTS TO RAISE
--------------


2. (S) During your meeting with FM Davutoglu, I suggest you
make the following key points:

- BILATERAL RELATIONS: Our bilateral relationship is
critically important for both our countries and we must
continue to consult closely and often on the many issues on
which we share interests.

- TURKEY-ARMENIA; ARMENIA-AZERBAIJAN: The Turks and Armenians
will continue to need a strong push to close a deal to
normalize relations, open the border, and start a joint
examination of 1915, though it is now complicated by
Azerbaijan's successful effort tying progress on this
initiative to a parallel effort on Nagorno-Karabakh. USG
remains committed to helping all three parties move these
dual processes forward, but we believe the normalization of
Turkey's relations with Armenia should occur regardless of
what occurs on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue (para 5);

- CYPRUS: Comprehensive settlement of Cyprus in 2009 is
absolutely critical for the future of a reunified island,
Turkey's own long-term hopes for EU membership, and NATO-EU
cooperation. The US will remain fully engaged in helping
both sides reach a deal and hopes Turkey will be able to
demonstrate continued support for the process and flexibility
in dealing with difficult questions when real negotiations
begin later this year (para 6);

- IRAQ/PKK: Intelligence sharing against the PKK has led to a
real improvement in our overall relations, as well as
between Ankara and Baghdad and Ankara and Erbil. Turkey
needs to continue to work with Iraq and Iraqi Kurdish
officials directly, which the US will continue to facilitate
through the trilateral process. The GOT seems to be looking
at ways to undercut the PKK by addressing core political and
cultural demands of Turkey's Kurdish population (para 7);

- IRAN: Despite its interest in Iran as a source of energy,
Turkey should press Tehran harder to comply with the IAEA and
UNSC resolutions (para 9);

- AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN: Turkey and the US must intensify our
already close cooperation and consultation on Afghanistan and
Pakistan. Turkey could play a crucial role in ensuring the
success of NATO's mission in Afghanistan and spark the
political and social development needed to counter the
dangerous spread of the Taliban's radicalism and its efforts
to undermine Pakistan's democracy (paras 10-11);

- TURKEY'S UN SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDENCY: We look forward to
supporting Turkey's June 2009 UNSC presidency and working
cooperatively to achieve its goals (para 12); and

- ENERGY SECURITY: Urge Turkey to take steps immediately to
open the East-West energy corridor. Allowing Iraq as an
entry point for Nabucco is one important step. Another step
is to sign the Nabucco IGA in late June (para 13).

WATCH OUT FOR
--------------


3. (S) Davutoglu will very likely raise:

- ARMENIA GENOCIDE RESOLUTION: An Armenian Genocide
Resolution in the House of Representatives is horrifying to
them and will set back or scuttle entirely the simultaneous
efforts Turkey is pursuing to normalize relations with
Armenia, achieve a deal on Nagorno-Karabakh, and finally
conclude a comprehensive settlement to the Cyprus issue (para
5);

- CYPRUS: During your visit to Ankara, you noted the naming
of a special envoy for Cyprus would be a good idea.
Davutoglu and the Turks will want to hear about USG plans to
engage more deeply in the Cyprus issue in hopes that we can
bring greater pressure to bear on the Greek Cypriots to
finalize a deal by the end of the year (para 6);

- US RECOMMITMENT TO MIDDLE EAST PEACE: As the GOT's chief
architect of its Middle East policy, Davutoglu will want to
hear your thoughts on getting the new Israeli administration
to commit to the peace process, including a resumption of its
indirect talks with Damascus facilitated by the Turks. He
will likely also press on continued US outreach to Syria and
the need to bring HAMAS -"a political reality"- into the
peace process (para 8).

BACKGROUND
--------------


4. (S) Your visit to Turkey and that of President Obama
earlier this Spring paved the way for a fundamentally new
relationship with the Turks, who remain committed to working
closely with the United States on a host of foreign policy
issues critical to both countries. Our expressed commitment
to continue the sharing of actionable intelligence on the PKK
continues to bolster both the bilateral relationship and GOT
efforts to address long-standing complaints of Turkey's
ethnic Kurdish minority in an effort to undermine and
ultimately bring to an end the terrorist PKK. Turkey was
slow to feel the effects of the global economic slowdown, but
continues to be hit hard on exports and jobs. The economic
downturn and the ruling AKP's disappointing performance in
local elections in late March have brought added pressure to
PM Erdogan and led to the recent cabinet reshuffle that took
Davutoglu from the Prime Minister's office to the Foreign
Ministry. Erdogan's recent remarks have been both positive
(admitting mistakes of the past that led to significant
minority populations leaving Turkey) and problematic (tying
the Armenia normalization effort to progress on
Nagorno-Kababakh),but all seem predicated on his perceived
need to shore up political support for the AKP, ranging from
nationalists on its center right flank to liberal reformers
on the left.

TURKEY/ARMENIA/NAGORNO-KARABAKH
--------------


5. (S) Turkey and Armenia initialed a roadmap for the
normalization of relations on April 22; President Obama
referred to the breakthrough in his April 24 Armenian
Remembrance Day statement. Since then, however, Turkey has
appeared to backtrack, at least publicly, with both PM
Erdogan and, most recently, FM Davutoglu, during his May 25
visit to Baku, linking the opening of the border with Armenia
to the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh (N-K) crisis.
While the normalization process with Armenia has sparked
renewed and intensified efforts to resolve the N-K conflict,
preconditioning the normalization of relations with Armenia
with resolution of N-K could dissuade Yerevan from moving
forward with Azerbaijan and calls into question Turkey's
commitment to the agreement it initialed in April. You
should urge FM Davutoglu to press ahead immediately and
without pre-conditions on the normalization of relations with
Armenia, underscoring the United States, sustained and
high-level engagement on resolving the N-K conflict and
Turkey's assurances to us that it would honor its commitments
regarding Armenia. Normalizing relations and opening the
border with Armenia would be a game-changer, lending
confidence to the Armenian side and catalyzing the resolution
of this and perhaps other regional frozen conflicts, and
would allow Turkey to play a more dynamic role in promoting
the stability and development of the whole South Caucasus
region.

CYPRUS/EU
--------------


6. (C) Turkey has taken a largely hands-off approach to the
latest round of Cyprus settlement negotiations, giving "TRNC"
leader Talat free rein to negotiate a deal. GOT officials
are concerned that the Greek Cypriots have little motivation
to achieve a deal and will try to delay as pressure on a

November 2009 EU deadline builds for Turkey to open its ports
to Greek Cypriot vessels. Failure to do so will put Turkey's
EU membership aspirations at risk, but the GOT is very
unlikely to take this step absent a comprehensive settlement.
Real progress on Cyprus would help save Turkey's EU
membership prospects (which we have long publicly supported),
facilitate expanded NATO-EU cooperation, and provide an
incentive to resolve other frozen disputes (Aegean, Armenia).
Ankara will push us again to consider naming a special envoy
given your support for the concept voiced during your March 7
meetings here.

IRAQ/KRG
--------------


7. (C) The Turks are becoming frustrated with the very slow
progress and lack of concrete results produced by the
US-TU-IZ trilateral process on the PKK. Nonetheless, they
remain committed to participating and recognize the need to
establish good working relations with their Iraqi (and Iraqi
Kurdish) counterparts to prepare for the day when US troops
are no longer in Iraq. Turkish officials remain concerned
about Iranian influence in Iraq and are committed to
expanding ties with Iraq, including building on a nascent
dialogue with Iraqi Kurdish leaders. Massoud Barzani slowed
that process when he turned down an invitation to meet with
President Gul during the latter's visit to Baghdad earlier
this Spring. There are indications - including positive
statements by President Gul and PM Erdogan - that the GOT is
considering how to undercut support in Turkey for the PKK by
addressing the political and social demands of Turkish Kurds.


MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
--------------


8. (C) The GOT is eager to resume indirect Israel-Syria
talks, however Ankara has some work to do yet to regain
Israeli confidence after PM Erdogan's blistering verbal
attacks during the Gaza crisis. At a joint press conference
in Syria in early May, Presidents Gul and Asad called for the
indirect talks to resume and the GOI to name a negotiator.
Davutoglu has been this government's Middle East policy
architect and principal interlocutor with regional leaders as
well as with Hamas and may press for the USG to talk with
HAMAS directly as well as to continue our renewed dialogue
with the Syrians. PM Erdogan told a visiting CODEL last week
that HAMAS is not a terrorist organization but a "political
reality" that must be factored into the peace process.

PRESSING IRAN
--------------


9. (C) The Turks are deeply concerned about Iran's nuclear
weapons ambitions, but have done little publicly to press
the Iranians to accept the P5-plus-1 deal. They have been
more helpful in private. Turkey seems determined to increase
energy cooperation with Iran. Talks for a gas deal continue.
On May 28, Turkey signed a protocol with Iran, Iraq, and
Syria to connect their electricity grids, paving the way for
export and import of electricity among the four nations.

AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN
--------------


10. (C) Turkey has been resolute on Afghanistan and Pakistan.
It pledged $100 million to Afghanistan at each of the last
two Afghanistan donors, conferences in London and Paris and
$100 million to Pakistan at the April 2009 Pakistan Donors,
Conference in Tokyo. The Turks believe that the
international community's efforts should be focused on
reconstruction and development, and have focused their
contributions in Afghanistan on heath and education,
particularly for girls. Turkey has twice commanded ISAF and
will resume command of RC Kabul in November 2009, boosting
its troop commitment to 1900 from about 820. The Turks
operate a civilian-led PRT in Wardak province and are giving
consideration to a second PRT, most likely in northern
Afghanistan. They have close historical and cultural ties to
both Afghanistan and Pakistan, including very deep and
well-established ties to Pakistan's General Staff and
Intelligence Services, that have allowed them to promote
dialogue and cooperation between the Presidents and senior
security officials of the two countries through the
trilateral "Ankara Process." The Turks have hosted three
such summits since April 2007 and believe their effort
complements the more action oriented U.S.-led trilateral
process. In Afghanistan, Turkey believes it is playing a
constructive role by urging the ethnic Turkish populations in
the North to support Afghanistan's unity and stability, but

has at the same time urged constitutional reform in
Afghanistan to ensure that all ethnic groups are treated
equitably.


11. (C) Turkey has been a key supporter of Pakistan's
democratic government, using its connections with both the
government and opposition parties to press all sides to unify
and support the democratic process. The Turks have expressed
interest in and some support for Afghan/Pakistani-led
initiatives to engage "moderate Taliban" or moderate
representatives of other opposing military forces. Turkey
believes that its message to all sides of the political
equation in both Afghanistan and Pakistan is enhanced by its
status as an independent, developed, majority-Muslim country
whose own democracy has endured and even thrived despite
episodes of military intervention. Turkey hosted a meeting
of the Special Representatives to Pakistan and Afghanistan,
including Ambassador Holbrooke, in Istanbul on May 18, and
has announced it will host the next Ministerial meeting of
the Friends of a Democratic Pakistan. According to MFA
contacts, Davutoglu intends to travel to Islamabad as soon as
possible, most likely in June.

UN SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDENCY
--------------


12. (C) Turkey assumed the presidency of the UN Security
Council on June 1, the first time since assuming its
non-permanent seat on January 1. It remains unclear what the
Turks hope to accomplish during their presidency, though they
seem amenable to our suggestion that they focus on
counterterrorism efforts.

ENERGY SECURITY
--------------


13. (C) Over the past two decades, Turkey and the U.S. have
shared a strategic vision to bring new oil and gas resources
to market through new routes. Opening an East-West corridor
for gas would strengthen the ties of Central Asia and the
Caucasus with the West and decrease the dependence of eastern
and central European countries on one gas source. Over the
past two years, we have also seen Turkey articulate another
vision that is sometimes at odds with our shared one;
Turkey's gas needs come first. With the appointment of a new
Energy Minister in the cabinet reshuffle, Taner Yildiz,
Turkey has experienced a breakthrough in negotiations with
Azerbaijan and Russia for additional gas supply. By
contrast, negotiations with Nabucco partners appear to have
taken a turn for the worse, with Turkey making a play to
hoard Iraqi gas that may be available for export to Europe.
We should remind the Turks that win-win solutions are
possible. A policy that positions Turkey at the heart of an
East-West energy corridor will inevitably pull more resources
to Turkey as well as Europe. With the transit of increased
gas resources, Turkey can strengthen its own relationships
with Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Iraq and the EU.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

SILLIMAN