KEEPING CALM IN THE AEGEAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 000078 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/2019 TAGS: PREL MOPS NATO GR TU SUBJECT: KEEPING CALM IN THE AEGEAN REF: A. 08 ATHENS 966 ¶B. 08 ANKARA 2075 ¶C. 08 ATHENS DAO 161642Z DEC 08 IIR 6-837-0184-09 ¶D. ATHENS 18 ¶E. ATHENS 19 Classified By: Ambassador James F. Jeffrey, Reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The list of potential flashpoints between Turkey and Greece is long, and both sides have tried to drag the U.S. or NATO into these disputes, particularly on the status of demilitarization of islands in the eastern Aegean. To help ensure Greece -Turkey relations do not go off track, it is imperative that NATO stay out of Greece-Turkey bilateral disputes, and as in the past, apply vigorously the Luns Doctrine. This should include avoiding NATO participation in national exercises involving islands whose militarization status is in dispute. NATO's participation in Noble Archer by the overflight of Agios Efstratios, an island which Turkey argues is demilitarized, has increased Turkey-Greece tensions. A repeat of Noble Archer or a similar exercise scenario will exacerbate already elevated tension between Turkey and Greece, potentially to a dangerous level. We are cautioning Turkey against taking provocative steps in the Aegean that challenge the sovereignty of Greek islets in the Dodecanese. ¶2. (C) We disagree with two key Greek arguments in this regard: -- That Turkey could apply "demilitarization" to a never-ending list of Aegean islands (See Para 8 "1914"),and -- that a "dispute" that triggers NATO's Luns Doctrine requires ICJ involvement (particularly since a bilateral mechanism exists - see para 7). Turkish retaliation for Noble Archer by overflight of two populated Dodecanese islets implicitly questions Greek sovereignty, and we have raised this problem with the Turks (para 9 and septel). END SUMMARY State of Affairs in the Aegean Post "Noble Archer" -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Rapprochement between Turkey and Greece has been one of the policy successes of the last decade, and we have a keen interest in strengthening it. The list of potential Turkey-Greece flashpoints (and on-going disputes) is long -- including minorities in both countries, Balkan issues, and Cyprus -- the one area of direct potential conflict is the Aegean. Both sides have tried to drag us or NATO into their disputes over militarization of the islands. In the past few months we have seen an up-tick in tensions, including NATO inclusion of Agios Efstratios in a recent exercise, allegations of Turkish overflights in "retaliation," Russian exercises in the Aegean which apparently included FIR notification to Athens (a redline for Turkey),and recent Greek allegations of an increase in Turkish provocations in the Aegean (refs C and D). ¶4. (C) Our goal should be, first, to keep both sides from provoking the other. This may require specifically taking both sides to task when they do things that are politically foolish or legally or historically questionable. But, in addition, we need to ensure that neither we nor NATO (identified closely here with the U.S.) become involved in these bilateral disputes. Thus, our admonition that NATO and the U.S. need to apply vigorously the Luns Doctrine. ¶5. (C) We were not happy that NATO took its decision to participate in Noble Archer, although we did our best to dampen the initial Turkish response. The subsequent Greek media (Ref B) emphasis on the GoG's successful diplomacy and the lack of an immediate Turkish reaction, and the possible Turkish reaction to this reaction, however, illustrate how Aegean issues can spiral down even when both sides say they want to maintain calm. ¶6. (C) MFA Under Secretary Apakan made starkly clear to Ambassador on January 8 that Turkey views with real alarm NATO's moving forward with the Noble Archer exercise, violating a long tradition of neutrality in these disputes. A formal letter from the Turkish military representative to the NATO Military Committee Chairman in November should have indicated to NATO that this was a disputed issue. This would have a deleterious effect on the overall rapprochement between Greece and Turkey, he went on, and thus he just could not understand NATO's action. ¶7. (C) COMMENT: We do not believe the standard applied to the definition of a "dispute" between Turkey and Greece that triggers the Luns Doctrine should be as formal as submission to the ICJ. This has not been the standard in Greece-Turkey disputes for the last 20 years, and, as U/S Apakan made clear to Ambassador, the two countries have a bilateral mechanism to address such disputes formally recognized by the EU. When there is an openly stated dispute, NATO thus must apply the Luns Doctrine to avoid exacerbating tensions. The following paragraphs provide the legal and political underpinning of our conclusions. END COMMENT Aegean Islands Demilitarization Background -------------- ¶8. (SBU) A look at the basic issues between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean, especially demilitarized islands, may help in reviewing actions and options. The demilitarization provisions of various agreements are open to interpretation, but to the best of our knowledge, the following are the facts: 1914: Six Party Decision: The "Great Powers" at the time, following agreements between Greece and Turkey after the 1913 Balkan War, awarded the "islands occupied by Greece" without naming them to Greece, on the understanding that they would be demilitarized, specifically, "shall not be fortified or used for any naval or military purposes." These islands include six subsequently named in the Lausanne Treaty and the Straits Agreement (see below),two that went back to Turkey (Imbros and Tenedos),and three more, including Agios Efstratios, the subject of last month's tension, as well as Thassos and Psara. 1923: Endorsement of Six Party Decision in Lausanne: Article 12 of the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, regulating the peace between Turkey and the Allied parties, including Greece, endorsed specifically the Six Party Decision. There is nothing in this language, or in the subsequent actions since then to confirm a frequent Greek assertion that Article 12 only confirms Greek sovereignty over the islands, not the condition of demilitarization. 1923: Lausanne Demilitarization Provisions: Article 13 of the Treaty specifically demilitarized four of the larger "Decision" islands -- Mytilene, Chios, Samos, and Ikaria -- allowing only limited local military and police forces, and no fortification or naval base. 1923: Lausanne Straits Agreement: This agreement, appended to the Lausanne Treaty, demilitarized both the straits and a number of islands close to the mouth of the Bosporus, including the Turkish islands of Imbros and Tenedos, and the Greek islands of Limnos and Samothrace. This demilitarization was more radical than that in the Lausanne Treaty or the Decision, specifically prohibiting any military forces whatsoever, and establishing specific small arms limits on police and gendarmerie. 1936: The Montreux Straits Agreement of 1936 replaced the Lausanne Straits Agreement. In the Protocol, the Agreement declared that Turkey had the right to militarize the straits, to include Imbros and Tenedos. Nowhere does the Agreement address the Greek islands. Supporters of the Greek view point out that, as the Preface to the Agreement notes that as this agreement replaces the Lausanne Straits Agreement, the demilitarization of the two Greek islands in Lausanne was thereby lifted. Here, they cite a statement by the then-Turkish foreign minister in the Turkish parliament supporting the Greek right to militarize the islands. The Turks, while understandably embarrassed by that statement, point out that if the various states parties had meant to lift the demilitarization of the Greek islands, they would have said so, as they did with the demilitarization provisions of Lausanne in reference to the Turkish islands (i.e. in the Protocol). Turks further argue that general statements in a preface carry less weight, that the 1914 original disarmament decision in any case still remains in effect, and that the logic of international agreements from 1914 through 1947 is to demilitarize Greeks islands close to Turkey (see below). 1947: The Paris Treaty, between the Allied powers including Greece (but not Turkey) and Italy, granted sovereignty of the Dodecanese islands (seized from the Ottoman Empire by Italy in 1912) to Greece, but on condition that they be demilitarized. ¶9. (C) One problem which the Turks appear to be exploiting with overflights is the status of small inhabited islets in the Dodecanese. These islets, including Agathonisi and Farmakonisi, were named neither in the 1914 agreements nor in Lausanne, which turned the Dodecanese over to Italy from the Ottoman Empire, nor in the Treaty of Paris of 1947. Lausanne listed the major Dodecanese islands and then added "the dependent islets." The Paris Treaty continued things by referring to "adjacent islets." Given that the islands are inhabited, their status and Greek sovereignty over them seems quite clear, and implicit Turkish raising of their sovereignty a highly questionable response. The Political/Strategic Dimension -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Turks make three linked arguments on demilitarization. First, the geography of the Aegean is such that the string of Greek islands right off the coast of Turkey's largest ports, Istanbul and Izmir, and the entrance to the Bosporus, creates an unusual situation affecting Turkish security and world trade between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Second, in recognition of this fact, on each occasion (1914, 1923, 1936, 1947) that the international community addressed these islands by mention or omission (1936),it supported their demilitarization. Third, Turkey sees this issue through the focus of other Greek actions which, in Turkish eyes, have the cumulative effect of creating out of the Aegean a "Greek lake" and calling into question Turkey's rights of navigation, military operations, and exploitation of the seabed in "international waters and airspace" of the Aegean. ¶11. (SBU) These Greek actions include: -- demanding that military operations within the Athens FIR request permission, although the ICAO states specifically that the FIR is for civilian aircraft; -- the declaration of a 10-mile airspace around Greek territory including islands, when common international practice is to have national air and sea space contiguous (i.e., in the Aegean, six miles); -- the claim to the right to declare a 12-mile national waters; -- a vague claim that various agreements in the 1930,s and in the Paris Treaty divided the Aegean between Greece and Turkey; and (from the Turkish point of view) -- exaggerated claims of continental shelf arising from the Law of the Sea Treaty. ¶12. (SBU) Each of the Turkish assertions can be and has been challenged. The Turks (and Greeks) are on more solid ground on some than on others. But the key point is that these are true international disputes. Why Aegean Demilitarization Dispute Matters to Turkey -------------- -------------- ¶13. (C) Turks today do not fear a stranglehold on the Turkish coast, sea trade, and key cities by Greek bases, nor do they fear an invasion like the British landing at Canakkale from Limnos in 1915. Nevertheless, the disputes remain important from several standpoints: -- They represent an issue of "borders," albeit mainly sea, continental shelf, and airspace. Borders are of fundamental importance to the Turkish state's sense of self, from defending them in the 1920s against the Greeks, Italians, French, Russians, and English, to post-independence border issues, beginning with the Mosul Vilayet surrender decision, the 50-year dispute with Syria over Hatay province, and the (still latent) border "dispute" with Armenia. Turks fear that Greek assertions of rights not justified in international agreements could encourage others to advance their own claims. -- The Continental Shelf dispute, particularly active in the 1980s, represents to the extent oil or gas is ever discovered there, a pragmatic reason for Turkey,s asserting its rights in the Aegean. -- Finally, as we saw in U.S.-brokered discussions on the Aegean in the late 1990s, Turkey's yielding eventually on the island demilitarization question - on the assumption that this is the most sensitive for Greece and its sovereign interests - is about the only Aegean "quid" Turkey could easily deploy in return for the Greek "quo" of yielding on its various other claims noted above. If the international community starts taking the "Greek side" on these demilitarization issues (e.g. Noble Archer),the Turkish quid soon becomes worthless. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey Jeffrey