Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ANKARA777
2009-06-02 12:37:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

TURKEY: UPDATED INFORMATION ON HOST GOVERNMENT

Tags:  PTER ASEC KVPR PREL PGOV CVIS KHLS TU 
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VZCZCXYZ0016
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAK #0777/01 1531237
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 021237Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9798
INFO RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHDC PRIORITY
UNCLAS ANKARA 000777 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

S/CT FOR HILLARY BETJER JOHNSON, PAUL SCHULTZ

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER ASEC KVPR PREL PGOV CVIS KHLS TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: UPDATED INFORMATION ON HOST GOVERNMENT
PRACTICES: INFORMATION COLLECTION, SCREENING AND SHARING

REF: A. STATE 32287

B. 07 ANKARA 2848

UNCLAS ANKARA 000777 SENSITIVE SIPDIS S/CT FOR HILLARY BETJER JOHNSON, PAUL SCHULTZ E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PTER ASEC KVPR PREL PGOV CVIS KHLS TU SUBJECT: TURKEY: UPDATED INFORMATION ON HOST GOVERNMENT PRACTICES: INFORMATION COLLECTION, SCREENING AND SHARING REF: A. STATE 32287 ¶B. 07 ANKARA 2848 ¶1. This message is sensitive but unclassified. Please handle accordingly. Post's responses are keyed to Ref A questions. As instructed, only updates are provided. Unless otherwise stated, information provided Ref B remains valid. New information is provided in CAPITAL LETTERS. ¶A. (SBU) Immigration Data Bases and Traveler Information Collection: -- What computerized immigration databases are used to track entries and exits? See REF B. A COMPUTERIZED IMMIGRATION DATABASE IS COLLECTED AND MAINTAINED BY THE TURKISH NATIONAL POLICE (TNP) FOREIGNERS' POLICE. -- Is the computerized immigration database available at all ports of entry (POEs)? YES. If immigration databases are available at some POEs, but not all, how does the host government decide which POEs will receive the tool? -- What problems, if any, limit the effectiveness of the systems? For example, limited training, power brownouts, budgetary restraints, corruption, etc.? THE DATA ENTRY SYSTEM APPEARS TO BE EFFECTIVE AND RELIABLE. -- How often are national immigration databases updated? DAILY. NOTE: THE TNP USED TO HOLD EXIT-ENTRY RECORDS ONLY FOR THE PREVIOUS TEN YEARS. RECORDS ARE NOW KEPT INDEFINITELY, ALTHOUGH POST BELIEVES TNP BEGAN KEEPING RECORDS ONLY IN THE EARLY 1990S. ALSO, BOTH TURKISH CITIZENS AND FOREIGN TRAVELERS MAY NOW OPT NOT/NOT TO HAVE THEIR PASSPORTS STAMPED WITH ENTRY AND EXIT STAMPS. NONETHELESS, AN ELECTRONIC RECORD IS KEPT OF THE EXIT OR ENTRY. -- What are the country's policies (legislation, mandates, etc.) on collecting information from travelers arriving in the country? IT IS MANDATORY FOR THE TNP TO COLLECT EXIT AND ENTRY INFORMATION ON ALL TRAVELERS. (THE SOLE EXCEPTION IS THE POPE.) -- Are there different policies for entry and exit at air, sea, and land POEs and for domestic flights? NO. -- What agency oversees the collection of traveler information? THE TURKISH NATIONAL POLICE, WHICH IS UNDER THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR. -- What are the policies of the collecting agency to share that information with foreign governments? TURKEY CURRENTLY DOES NOT HAVE BILATERAL AGREEMENTS WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS, BUT DOES HAVE ARRANGEMENTS WITH INTERPOL AND EUROPOL. -- Does the host go
vernment collect Passenger Name Record (PNR) data on incoming commercial flights or vessels? NO. Is this data used for intelligence or law enforcement purposes to screen travelers in a systematic way? Does host government have any existing treaties to share PNR data? -- If applicable, have advance passenger information systems (APIS),interactive advanced passenger information systems (IAPIS),or electronic travel authority systems been effective at detecting other national security threats, such as wanted criminals? N/A ¶B. (SBU) Watchlisting: SEE REF B. Is there a name-based watchlist system used to screen travelers at POEs? -- What domestic sources of information populate the name-based watchlist, i.e. names of deported persons, terrorist lookouts, criminal wants/warrants? If host government maintains a watchlist, how many records does the watchlist contain, and how many are terrorist-related? -- Which ministry or office maintains the watchlist? -- What international watchlists do the host government use for screening individuals, e.g. Interpol or TSA No Fly lists, UN, etc.? -- What bilateral/multilateral watchlist agreements exist between host government and its neighbors? ¶C. (SBU) Biometrics: SEE REF B. -- Are biometric systems in place at ports of entry (air, land, sea)? If no, does host government have plans to install such a system? If biometric systems are available at some POEs, but not all, how does the host government decide what POEs will receive the tool? -- What biometric technologies, if any, does the host government use, i.e. fingerprint identification, facial recognition, iris recognition, hand geometry, retinal identification, DNA-based identification, keystroke dynamics, gait analysis? Are the systems ICAO compliant? IN JANUARY 2009, TURKEY BEGAN TO COLLECT BIOMETRIC DATA (FINGERPRINTS ONLY) ON TURKISH CITIZENS APPLYING FOR A NEW TURKISH PASSPORT. SEE PASSPORT SECTION, BELOW. -- Are biometric systems integrated for all active POEs? What are the systems and models used? Are all passengers screened for the biometric or does the host government target a specific population for collection (i.e., host country nationals)? Do the biometric collection systems look for a one-to-one comparison (ensure the biometric presented matches the one stored on the e-Passport) or one to many comparisons (checking the biometric presented against a database of known biometrics)? -- If biometric systems are in place, does the host government know of any countermeasures that have been used or attempted to defeat biometric checkpoints? -- What are the host government's policies on collecting the fingerprints of travelers coming into the country? -- Which agency is responsible for the host government's fingerprint system? -- Are the fingerprint programs in place NIST, INT-I, EFTS, UK1 or RTID compliant? -- Are the fingerprints collected as flats or rolled? Which agency collects the fingerprints? ¶D. (SBU) Border Control and Screening: SEE REF B. -- Does the host government employ software to screen travelers of security interest? -- Are all travelers tracked electronically, or only non-host- country nationals? What is the frequency of travelers being "waived through" because they hold up what appears to be an appropriate document, but whose information is not actually recorded electronically? What is the estimated percentage of non-recorded crossings, entries and exits? -- Do host government border control officials have the authority to use other criminal data when making decisions on who can enter the country? If so, please describe this authority (legislation, mandates, etc). -- What are the host government's policies on questioning, detaining and denying entry to individuals presenting themselves at a point of entry into the country? Which agency would question, detain, or deny entry? -- How well does information sharing function within the host government, i.e., if there is a determination that someone with a valid host-government visa is later identified with terrorism, how is this communicated and resolved internally? ¶E. (SBU) Passports: SEE REF B. -- Does the host government issue a machine-readable passport containing biometric information? If so, what biometric information is included on the document, i.e. fingerprint, iris, facial recognition, etc.? If not, does host government plan to issue a biometric document in the future? When? THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED PLANS IN 2007 TO ISSUE A MACHINE READABLE PASSPORT. BY MAY 2009, THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT HAD BEGUN COLLECTING FINGERPRINTS BUT NO OTHER BIOMETRIC DATA. THE NEW MACHINE-READABLE PASSPORTS MAY BE ISSUED AS EARLY AS LATE 2009, BUT 2010 IS A MORE REALISTIC TIMEFRAME. THERE ARE ALSO REPORTS THAT TURKEY WILL USE FACIAL RECOGNITION AS WELL. -- If the host government issues a machine-readable passport containing biometric information, does the host government share the public key required to read the biometric information with any other governments? If so, which governments? Does the host government issue replacement passports for full or limited validity (i.e. the time remaining on the original passports, fixed validity for a replacement, etc.)? -- Does the host government have special regulations/procedures for dealing with "habitual" losers of passports or bearers who have reported their passports stolen multiple times? -- Are replacement passports of the same or different appearance and page length as regular passports (do they have something along the lines of our emergency partial duration passports)? -- Do emergency replacement passports contain the same or fewer biometric fields as regular-issue passports? -- Where applicable, has Post noticed any increase in the number of replacement or "clean" (i.e. no evidence of prior travel) passports used to apply for U.S. visas? -- Are replacement passports assigned a characteristic number series or otherwise identified? ¶F. (SBU) Fraud Detection: SEE REF B. -- How robust is fraud detection and how actively are instances of fraud involving documents followed up? -- How are potentially fraudulently issued documents taken out of circulation, or made harder to use? ¶G. (SBU) Privacy and Data Security: SEE REF B. -- What are the country's policies on records related to the questioning, detention or removal of individuals encountered at points of entry into the country? How are those records stored, and for how long? -- What are the country's restrictions on the collection or use of sensitive data? -- What are the requirements to provide notice to the public on the implementation of new databases of records? -- Are there any laws relating to security features for government computer systems that hold personally identifying information? -- What are the rules on an individual's ability to access data that homeland security agencies hold about them? -- Are there different rules for raw data (name, date of birth, etc.) versus case files (for example, records about enforcement actions)? -- Does a non-citizen/resident have the right to sue the government to obtain these types of data? ¶H. (SBU) Identifying Appropriate Partners: SEE REF B. Department would appreciate post's in-house assessment of whether host government would be an appropriate partner in data sharing. Considerations include whether host government watchlists may include political dissidents (as opposed or in addition to terrorists),and whether host governments would share or use U.S. watchlist data inappropriately, etc. OVER THE PAST 18 MONTHS, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS PRESENTED THE GOVERNMENT OF TURKEY WITH OPPORTUNITIES TO PARTICIPATE IN SEVERAL DATA-SHARING INITIATIVES. THESE INCLUDE AN FBI INITIATIVE TO SHARE BIOMETRICS; HSPD-6; API/PNR AND TIP/PISCES. DESPITE REPEATED PRESENTATIONS IN ANKARA AND WASHINGTON, ANKARA REMAINS UNDECIDED. WE BELIEVE HIGHER LEVEL POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT ON BOTH SIDES WOULD HELP FACILITATE THE PROCESS. -- Are there political realities which would preclude a country from entering into a formal data-sharing agreement with the U.S.? -- Is the host country's legal system sufficiently developed to adequately provide safeguards for the protection and nondisclosure of information? -- How much information sharing does the host country do internally? Is there a single consolidated database, for example? If not, do different ministries share information amongst themselves? -- How does the country define terrorism? Are there legal statutes that do so? Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey SILLIMAN

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