REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY FOR IRAQ: A TURKISH

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000735 SIPDIS DEPT. FOR NEA/RA, NEA/I, AND EUR/SE E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2029 TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ TU SUBJECT: REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY FOR IRAQ: A TURKISH PERSPECTIVE REF: A. STATE 48144 ¶B. ANKARA 712 ¶C. ANKARA 701 ¶D. ANKARA 687 ¶E. ANKARA 395 Classified By: DCM Doug Silliman for reasons 1.4(b,d) ¶1. (C) In response to ref A para 12 request for an assessment of GOT views regarding creation of new regional networks on a host of issues beyond the existing Iraq-centric mechanisms, post notes specific GOT views conveyed in ref E, especially paras 10-12. As noted therein (as well as in refs B, C, and D) the future of Iraq, its unity, stability, and territorial integrity remain issues of central importance to Turkey and Turkey will want to remain engaged. At the same time, GOT officials understand and empathize with GOI officials' reluctance to continue participating in multilateral fora in which Iraq is seen as the principal subject and problem. Given the ruling Justice and Development Party's (AKP) overriding foreign policy priority of "no problems on Turkey's borders," Turkey will be supportive of any regional multilateral efforts that can help provide security and stability -- as long as Turkey is included. ¶2. (C) We already see Turkey seeking to engage in bilateral and multilateral discussions with its neighbors on a host of issues. The July 2008 establishment of a bilateral High Level Strategic Cooperation Council between Turkey and Iraq underscored the GOT's commitment to regular consultations with the GOI on issues ranging from political and military/security concerns to cultural and educational exchanges, continued focus on water-sharing, and deeper development of trade and other economic ties, including in the energy sector, at the most senior levels. The Turks have developed regular bilateral dialogue with the Syrians and Iranians as well, and GOT officials have sought both to deepen and increase the frequency of their interaction with Gulf states. Discussions on water take place fairly regularly with the Syrians and Iraqis, though fundamental differences on Turkey's ability to release more water downstream from the Tigris and Euphrates water basin have made this forum contentious (see ref D). Turkey continues eagerly to seek the export of Iraqi gas north into Turkish pipelines and onward to markets in Europe so as to make its Nabucco pipeline project viable. The USG shares this interest, particularly if it can help to ensure energy security for Europe without having to use Iranian gas. Turkey is not integrated into existing regional mechanisms, like the GCC plus 3 and the Arab League. Any effort to bring about a new multilateral institution in the region that includes Turkey would likely find support in Ankara. ¶3. (S) Some of Turkey's most fruitful multilateral engagement with Iraq has been on security issues. The U.S. - Turkey - Iraq trilateral security dialogue to facilitate intelligence sharing to counter PKK terrorism has grown to become a real venue for cooperation. Skeptics predicted that this forum would generate little substance, but it has begun to produce real results. The group plans on May 24 to open an office in Erbil, staffed by U.S., Turkish and Iraqi intelligence officers with a goal of sharing real-time counter-terrorism information to prevent the PKK from using northern Iraq as a safe haven from which to attack targets in Turkey. ¶4. (C) The GOT was a strong proponent and founding member of the Iraq Neighbors and Expanded Neighbors Processes as a way to help stabilize Iraq and ease a race amongst its neighbors for influence in the fractured state. The Turks will likely oppose any elimination of this forum unless they are sure they have other avenues to influence regional developments. The Turks were, and remain, extremely concerned about the prospect of Iraq turning into a Shiite-led vassal of Iran. The GOT's efforts to ensure the Neighbors Process working groups moved beyond talk shop status were often stymied, either by disagreement among participants or the inability of the GOI to formulate and pursue a coherent policy. This was especially the case in the energy working group, which the Turks chaired and hosted. Energy discussions are now beginning slowly to move forward on a bilateral basis between Turkey and Iraq, but the GOT remains concerned about the lack of comprehensive national hydrocarbons and revenue sharing laws and, at the same time, active energy exploration and development by foreign companies in the KRG that threaten to lock Turkish companies out of the Iraq oil and gas market if they wait for a hydrocarbons law. ¶5. (C) Turkey sees existing multilateral arrangements in the region as inadequate in achieving regional solutions to regional problems in large measure because, as noted in para ANKARA 00000735 002 OF 002 2, the Turks are not members. There are areas in which we believe the Turks would support the formation of ad hoc multilateral task forces. Turkey would be a logical leader for a trade and investment group -- it is the only market economy bordering Iraq, has large and growing trade and investment with Iraq (and Syria) and just signed an economic cooperation agreement that aims toward an eventual free trade agreement (see ref C). Given Turkish construction expertise and capacity, the Turks would also be logical leaders of an infrastructure development group. ¶6. (C) GOT views on the involvement of other stakeholders would very much depend on the subject matter of the organization or ad hoc grouping. Turkey generally welcomes involvement by the US, the EU, and selected others as a way to contribute to the stability of the region. On trade and investment, the Turks would want all possible multilateral development banks involved. We believe the Turks would welcome as large a role for the US as possible, though our lack of EXIM/OPIC cover on Iraq could make our participation problematic. On issues more sensitive to Turkey, like water, outside involvement would likely be less welcome as it would likely, from a Turkish perspective, lead only to more pressure on the Turks to provide more water to Iraq and Syria downstream. ¶7. (C) On specific functional issues that might be ripe for early discussion, the Turks would likely see discussions on energy, in which Turkey could emphasize its central role as a hub linking energy supplies in the Caspian basin and the Middle East with European and other world markets, as an excellent example of regional cooperation. Turkey wants to see the existing Kirkuk-Yumurtalik oil pipeline return to full capacity use, and to build a gas pipeline to supply both the Turkish domestic and EU markets -- and potentially Syria as well -- with Iraqi gas. There also is interest in the Turkish private sector in constructing power plants on the Turkish side of the border to supply electricity back into Iraq. ¶8. (C) While Turkish officials constantly remind us of their concern regarding Iranian intentions, their proposed solution is not to exclude Iran but to embrace it, encouraging greater regional cooperation so as to negate the Iranians' proclivity to export their brand of Islam and gain dominance within the region. With its long-standing relationship with Israel, it would also welcome Israeli participation in regional institutions were other neighbors equally as willing to include Tel Aviv. Turkey's one redline would be inclusion of the Republic of Cyprus, which Ankara does not recognize. ¶9. (C) Turkey's propensity to support regional multilateral diplomacy is demonstrated in its effort to establish a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform (CSCP) in the aftermath of Russia's invasion of Georgia in August 2008 as well as its long-standing, though largely moribund, effort to devise a European OSCE-style cooperative security mechanism for the Middle East -- a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East (CSCME). Recent visits by President Obama, Secretary Clinton, SRAP Holbrooke, and Special Envoy Mitchell, our UN Security Council consultations earlier this month, and our policy planning talks planned for late June are all key components of a strategy that entails regular dialogue and consultation with the Turks on a long list of issues critical to both our countries. Adding discussion of these regional integration issues will help ensure Turkish and US views remain in sync. We already are working on a new trade and investment strategy with Turkey, which we expect will include joint efforts in third country markets, including Iraq. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey JEFFREY