TURKEY: SADRIST MOVEMENT MEETS IN TURKEY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000645 SIPDIS DEPT. FOR EUR/SE AND NEA/I E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2029 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR IZ TU SUBJECT: TURKEY: SADRIST MOVEMENT MEETS IN TURKEY Classified By: POL Counselor Daniel O'Grady for reasons 1.4(b,d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Moqtada al-Sadr gathered together approximately 80 Shiite politicians and other members of the Sadrist movement May 2-3 in Istanbul to discuss their political future and need to focus on improving their performance in the next national election in Iraq. Sadr met with President Gul and Prime Minister Erdogan in one-on-one meetings in Ankara May 1, during which the Turks reportedly emphasized to Sadr the need to put down arms, forswear the use of violence, and engage more vigorously in Iraq's political process. Sadr is looking for Turkish help to strengthen the party, both through political party training and, it seems, financial assistance. He requested permission to open a party office in Istanbul. They may also be looking to establish a television channel, perhaps based in Istanbul, should the Turks support such a move, which seems unlikely. END SUMMARY ¶2. (C) MFA Department Head for Iraq Aydin Acikel told us May 4 Moqtada al-Sadr met with about 70-80 members of his movement May 2-3 in Istanbul to plot out a path toward strengthening its future as a political party and improving its performance in Iraq's next national election. About 30 of those in attendance are based in Europe, with the remainder coming from Iraq or Iran. While in Turkey, MFA pushed for President Gul and PM Erdogan to receive Sadr in Ankara, which both did in one-plus-one meetings on May 1. MFA Special Envoy Murat Ozcelik sat in on the meetings, according to Acikel. Ozcelik is now traveling in Germany so Acikel could not yet provide a read-out of the Gul and Erdogan meetings with Sadr. However, prior to the meetings, Ozcelik told us he had pushed for engagement with Sadr to help nudge him away from Iranian influence. ¶3. (C) Ozcelik told us last week that Gul and Erdogan would deliver strong messages pressing Sadr for his party to integrate more fully into Iraq's political process by giving up its arms and the use of violence and returning to an Iraq base from which it would be better able to represent the interests of the Iraqi people. Ozcelik said that he had also spoken to Sadr group members last year, and they said they want to be on good terms with the US. ¶4. (C) Acikel told us Ozcelik met separately May 3 with Sadr spokesperson Salah al-Obeidi and several other Iraq-based officials to deliver the same message, underscoring the need for Sadrists to become a purely political organization, giving up its arms and forswearing the use of violence. Ozcelik told them, "If you truly want the U.S. forces to leave, you must stop the violence." In reaction to Sadr's request to open an office in Istanbul, Ozcelik told al-Obeidi that while the GOT hopes all Iraqi political parties will eventually come to believe that the Iraqi embassy can represent the interests of all Iraqis in Turkey and elsewhere around the world, there is a recognition that many parties do not yet perceive this to be the case. He said Turkey would, at the moment, permit a party representative to be based in Istanbul, just as the KDP, PUK, and others have representative offices in Turkey. Acikel said he has the sense the Sadrists see the Istanbul office as a way station for its Europe-based followers, a good base from which to launch a more concerted public relations effort, and as a liaison office for its relations with Turkey. ¶5. (C) Al-Obeidi emphasized the importance of a strong performance for the party in the next general election, recognizing the diminished influence it wields as a result of the weak support it received in local elections. Al-Obeidi and his colleagues indicated that they wish to learn more about dealing with the media and other public relations aspects of the political process and requested political party training, which the GOT has funded for other Iraqi political parties. According to Acikel, GOT officials responded favorably to the request. He noted al-Obeidi also lamented the party's lack of control over a ministry in ANKARA 00000645 002 OF 002 Iraq's central government, claiming that other parties in Iraq had effectively used such control to gain financial advantage over their rivals. Acikel said the implication was obvious that the Sadrists are looking for financial assistance and made it clear they would welcome help from wherever they could get it. ¶6. (C) In addition to party training and financial assistance, Acikel said the Sadrists are also looking to establish a television station and hope to do so in Istanbul. On this they also sought training and other assistance from the GOT. Acikel said Ozcelik told al-Obeidi the GOT would take this into consideration, though he commented to us the Turks are unlikely to look favorably upon such a request. Acikel expressed his view that GOT officials would not welcome being too closely associated with such an entity and the degree to which some in Iraq might see it as a Turkish effort to interfere in Iraqi politics. The Iraqis also requested Turkish assistance in helping to train Sadr's bodyguards and Ozcelik indicated the GOT would likely be able to assist with this. Acikel is expecting the party will submit a list of 25-30 names in the near future to undergo training in Turkey. ¶7. (C) On Kirkuk, Acikel said the Sadrists hold a view similar to that of the GOT; i.e., the issue of the future status of Kirkuk should be resolved taking into account the views and interests of all involved communities. He said they also expressed their belief that federalism in Iraq must be limited, preserving greater central government authority and, in fact, want to introduce constitutional limits on the powers of the regions as a way to limit/contain federalism. Ozcelik urged the Sadrists to play a more constructive and active role in easing tensions between Sunnis and Shia. He noted that the Shia are now in control after decades of Sunni dominance, but this power shift should not lead to exclusive Shia dominance over Iraq. Failing to take into account the needs and wishes of the Kurds, the Sunnis, and other groups would only lead to the break-up of Iraq -- a sentiment shared by the Sadrists, according to Acikel. ¶8. (C) Acikel spoke with Sadr directly for a half-hour on May 3 at the airport, prior to his departure. He said Sadr was quite pleased with the visit and seemed in very good spirits. Sadr indicated how impressed he was with Turkish hospitality and was grateful for the Turks' provision of security during his visit. Acikel noted Sadr's participation in the conference in Istanbul had been in question up until the last moment and his impression was that Sadr was extremely concerned about his personal safety, convinced, Acikel believed, that the United States would seek to assassinate him. The GOT had reassured Sadr that they did not share this view and that they would provide a security detail during his visit. In an interesting aside, Acikel noted most of the conference participants stayed at the Istanbul Ramada hotel, but Sadr and a core group of Tehran-based officials, along with at least two of Sadr's wives, had stayed in the Conrad Hotel and remained detached from the rest of the group for most of the time. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey Jeffrey