INFLUENCING TURKEY'S APPROACH TO ADDRESSING

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 000456

SIPDIS

CDR USEUCOM FOR GEN CRADDOCK FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2019
TAGS: PREL MARR PARM TU
SUBJECT: INFLUENCING TURKEY'S APPROACH TO ADDRESSING
THREATS IN THE BLACK SEA REGION

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Jeffrey for reason 1.4 (b, d)

Summary and Comment
--------------


1. (C) Turkey's approach to the Black Sea and its perception
of potential threats in the wider Black Sea region differ
sharply from our own and from that of other littoral states.
Turkey has consistently resisted almost every attempt to
broaden membership of Black Sea-related organizations beyond
the six states which actually have coastline. With the
longest -- by far -- Black Sea coastline and an obligation to
manage the Straits defined by international law, Turkey
believes that it should have the leading role in setting any
collective Black Sea security policy. Turkey believes its
leadership in the Black Sea provides a security benefit to
the wider region, and particularly to NATO. While Turkey's
view of the Black Sea as a members-only club has frustrated
states and organizations which seek a larger role, its
leadership has supported U.S. and NATO goals for the region
for decades.


2. (C) Since Russia's actions in Georgia in August 2008,
however, other littoral states perceive a growing threat to
regional security; Turkey is concerned, but not to the extent
that others are. Turkey's approach to Russia has been
consistent: It seeks to remain engaged in discussion with
Russia at every available forum. In contrast, the approach
of other littoral states has tended more toward seeking
support from each other and from outside actors, including
the U.S. The immediate problems we thus have include efforts
by NATO and particularly EUCOM to become more involved in the
Black Sea, Turkey's push for ever more institutionalization
of Turkish-led Black Sea states-only organizations and our
various friends among the Black Sea states (particularly
Georgia and Romania) resisting Turkish leadership as too soft
on Russia and hard on U.S. presence. As it is unlikely that
Turkey will relax its definition of the Black Sea region, we
should instead focus on informing Turkey of how other
littoral states perceive regional threats and on persuading
Turkey to use its leadership role in the region to respond to
these threats. End Summary and Comment.

Turkey In The Lead
--------------


3. (C) The Turks are enthusiastic supporters of institutions
supporting dialogue for improved regional security, but they
support only one Black Sea organization -- the Organization
for Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) -- which has
membership beyond the six littoral states. In addition to
BSEC, the inventory of relevant organizations includes:

- Operation Black Sea Harmony,
- BlackSeaFor,
- the Black Sea Defense Ministerial, and
- the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform.


4. (C) Each is a good examples of how Turkey is ready to
engage regional partners in dialogue and in some activities
aimed at improving regional stability. The common thread in
all of these organizations is Turkish leadership. Turkey
takes its leadership role in the Black Sea seriously and
resents perceived attempts, particularly by non-littoral
states, to impinge on that role. Turkey's view is that it
supports NATO's goals in the Black Sea region by working to
maintain security and stability and also by sharing
information (gained through Operation Black Sea Harmony) with
NATO on potential illicit shipments transiting the Black Sea.


Montreux
--------------


5. (C) With both physical and legal (through the 1936
Montreux Convention) control of the only maritime access to
the Black Sea and a coastline far longer than that of any
other littoral state, no one disputes Turkey's leadership in
the region. Montreux specifically places the security of the
Straits and the maintainance of the military provisions in
the hands of Turkey. Diplomatic notification must be made to
the Turkish government of transit of any warship through the
Straits. Twice each year, all Black Sea states must report
to Turkey the gross aggregate tonnage of their military
fleets in the Black Sea. If at any time Turkey should feel
itself threatened by war, per the Montreux Convention, the
passage of warships through the Straits is "left entirely to
the discretion of the Turkish Government." Achieving

Montreux as a replacement to the 1923 Lausanne agreement was
a major victory for Turkish diplomacy and the convention
represents one of the oldest still-active miltilateral arms
control regimes. While the U.S. is impacted by Montreux's
limitations on our own freedom of maneuver in the Black Sea,
historically the Soviet Union and Russia have been most
affected, leading to various Soviet challenges to the regime,
notably in 1946.

Recent Developments
--------------


6. (C) But while other littoral states recognize Turkey's
right to leadership, they do not necessarily believe that
Turkey should decide how to evaluate threats on their behalf
or to define how the Black Sea region should respond to these
threats. When concern in August 2008 over Russian military
action in Georgia was at its height, Turkey was helpful,
providing assistance, increased intelligence, blanket access
to airspace, opening borders (even with Armenia) and finding
ways to help the USG increase its naval presence in the Black
Sea (though always within the limits set by Montreux). But
it also launched the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation
Platform during the peak of international indignation. To
some observers, this step smacked of appeasement; to others,
including littoral states, it seemed as though Turkey was
unwilling to impose political consequences on Russia for its
actions.


7. (C) Now that the crisis with Georgia has passed, Turkey
is ready, more quickly than other littoral states, to return
to engagement with Russia, and proposed a Black Sea Defense
Ministerial meeting for April 2009. While this meeting was
eventually postponed indefinitely, Georgia and other littoral
states turned to the USG with questions about Turkey's
apparent lack of understanding of the threat they believed
Russia still posed in the region.


8. (C) Turkey's readiness to engage with Russia stems from
two basic factors: First, the Turks believe that it is better
to be engaged in dialogue with Russia, even if the substance
of that dialogue is not productive. Second, they do not
perceive Russia as a significant threat to their security, as
other littoral states clearly do. Turkey's bilateral
relationship with Russia is strong and, while it recognizes
the dangers of its energy dependence on Russia, Turkey seeks
both to broaden and deepen its bilateral ties.

Toward Achieving A Greater U.S. Role
--------------


9. (C) Turkey might view a more activist U.S. military role
in the Black Sea as a threat to its own political interests
in the region. Turkey does see the U.S. as a strong partner
and will continue to engage with us, but sometimes its
cooperation seems grudging, and the reasons behind their
apparent hesitance are not always fully understood. EUCOM's
announcement that it planned to host a Black Sea Chiefs of
Defense (CHOD) Ministerial went over like a lead balloon in
Ankara. After some arm-twisting by the Ambassador and
assurances that the U.S. does not wish to supplant Turkey as
NATO's leader in the Black Sea, Turkey agreed to send a
representative, but will not send the CHOD. In a later
meeting, a senior diplomat suggested to us that Turkey would
welcome a greater EUCOM role, but this should be approached
gradually, first through direct engagement with Turkey alone,
then widening the circle to include Romania and Bulgaria and
then, after exercises and confidence-building measures,
inviting all remaining littoral states, including Russia
(provided its behavior remains reasonable). Should the CHOD
conference as currently planned by EUCOM take place, even if
there was no substance to discussions, he believed it would
send a clear signal of a new antagonistic relationship with
Russia on one side and the U.S. and other Black Sea states on
the other.


10. (C) Changing Turkey's recognition of the potential
threats to other littoral states is a challenge best
approached without calling into question Turkey's leadership
role in the Black Sea. By engaging Turkey through NATO, not
always bilaterally, with ideas to address capability and
intelligence gaps in the Black Sea, to improve the capability
of newer and prospective NATO members, to track potential
illicit shipments in the Black Sea and, finally, to show
Alliance solidarity in order to deter any future Russian
adventurism, would have the best chance of success.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at

http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

Jeffrey