TURKEY: CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE/KEY RESOURCES

S E C R E T ANKARA 000406 SIPDIS S/CT - SHARRI R. CLARK E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2029 TAGS: PTER PGOV ASEC EFIN ENRG KCIP TU SUBJECT: TURKEY: CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE/KEY RESOURCES REF: A. 08 ANKARA 332 ¶B. STATE 15113 Classified By: POL Counselor Daniel O'Grady. Reasons: 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (S) Ref B cites three items as critical infrastructure/key resource (CI/KR) elements in Turkey: -- Metal fabrication machines: small number of Turkish companies (Durma, Baykal, Ermaksan) -- Bosphorous Strait -- Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline ¶2. (C) Post recommends the first item, "Metal fabrication machines," be deleted. We are unaware of any metal fabrication machine plant whose incapacitation would significantly impact U.S. national security. ¶3. (S) Post recommends modification of the second item, "Bosphorous Strait," to read: "The Turkish Straits, comprised of the Strait of Canakkale (Dardanelles),the Sea of Marmara and the Istanbul Strait (Bosphorous Strait)." Justification for modifying: The Turkish Straits are among the most hazardous, crowded, difficult to navigate and potentially dangerous natural waterways in the world. Ships carrying 143 million metric tons of petroleum products, including 96 million metric tons of crude oil, transit the straits every year. The closure or disruption of any of these critical infrastructures would impede the flow of significant amounts of crude oil to world markets. ¶4. (S) Post recommends the third item "Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline" be modified to read "Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and Ceyhan port terminal." Justification for modifying: Ceyhan port terminal is an integral part of this critical infrastructure. Post believes the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and Ceyhan port terminal may be an active target of terrorist groups. In August, 2008, a designated terrorist group, the Kurdish Workers' Party (KGK/PKK),claimed responsibility for an attack on the eastern section of the pipeline that temporarily disrupted its flow. The government, however, asserted the incident was the result of a technical failure. ¶5. (S) Post also recommends the addition of the following item: Port of Mersin -- Habur Border Gate transportation corridor. Justification for addition: The majority of material destined for coalition forces in Iraq arrives in Turkey at the port of Mersin and transits overland to Harbor Border Gate. Habur Border Gate is the primary Turkey-Iraq border crossing point. Approximately 135 Operation Iraqi Freedom sustainment supply trucks per day and 40 percent of the sustainment fuel for coalition forces cross into Iraq through Habur Border Gate. Incapacity or destruction of either the Port of Mersin or Habur Border Gate would impact U.S. national security interests by degrading our military and humanitarian efforts in Iraq. ¶6. (S) The Government of Turkey does not have a specialized agency responsible for CI/KR security. That task falls to the Turkish military, law enforcement agencies and enterprises' own security guards. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey Jeffrey