TURKEY: INPUT ON STRATEGY TO INTEGRATE IRAQ INTO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 000395 SIPDIS DEPT. FOR NEA/I AND EUR/SE E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2029 TAGS: PGOV PREL ENRG IZ TU SUBJECT: TURKEY: INPUT ON STRATEGY TO INTEGRATE IRAQ INTO REGION REF: A. STATE 21447 ¶B. BAGHDAD 630 ¶C. 08 ANKARA 2016 ¶D. 08 ANKARA 1964 Classified By: Ambassador James Jeffrey for reasons 1.4(b,d) ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: The future of Iraq, its unity, stability, and territorial integrity, remain an issue of central importance to Turkey. Despite a high degree of tension in recent years between Turkey and Iraq because of the presence of PKK terrorists in the KRG-administered region, the Turks have remained positively engaged in efforts to integrate post-Saddam Iraq into the region. The GOT looks to deepen its economic relationship with Iraqi Kurds, specifically in the energy sector where Turkey hopes to ensure its companies are involved in developing potentially oil and gas-rich fields in the KRG-administered region and is positioning itself to do so when national hydrocarbons legislation is passed. The Turks are supportive of multilateral efforts to continue to assist Iraqi integration -- as long as they are major players in the group(s) -- but are not wed to a specific forum. Turkey may be open to transitioning to an initiative with more of a regional focus instead of an Iraq-specific approach. END SUMMARY Turkish-Iraqi Relations: An Upwards Trajectory -------------- - ¶2. (S) Long concerned about the destabilizing effect US intervention in Iraq and the deposing of Saddam Hussein's government would have on Iraq and the region, Turkey has taken a cautious approach in rebuilding its ties both to the Iraqi central government in Baghdad and to Iraqi Kurdish authorities in the Kurdish region of northern Iraq. The presence of the terrorist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in northern Iraq and the PKK's continuation of attacks inside Turkey and against Turkish security forces in the border region in 2004 ensured that tension between Iraq and Turkey (and concomitantly between Turkey and the US) remained high. Nonetheless, realizing a strong central government in Baghdad would help counter ethnically driven centrifugal forces in Iraq, the GOT's Iraq policy has been predicated on bolstering PM Maliki and governing institutions in Baghdad. The alternative, an Iraq riven along ethnic and sectarian lines, led to unthinkable existential issues for Turkey, with its large Kurdish minority dominating the country's Southeast and thought by many to be vulnerable to nationalist Kurdish demands for a greater Kurdistan. ¶3. (S) Turkey-Iraq bilateral ties have progressed quickly after several years of mutual distrust. President Bush's commitment to PM Erdogan on November 5, 2007 to significantly increase the level of USG cooperation with Turkey to counter the PKK threat afforded the Turkish military the ability to eliminate or significantly degrade the PKK threat in northern Iraq and led to an increase in the GOT's willingness to risk reaching out to both Baghdad and, more importantly, Erbil, to begin repairing the Turkey-Iraq relationship. Since then, Turkey-Iraq ties have been on an upwards trajectory. ¶4. (S) PM Maliki and President Talabani have each visited Turkey twice in the past year and a half, PM Erdogan paid a historic visit to Baghdad last summer, and President Gul is preparing his own visit to Baghdad on March 23-24. The Turks are hoping the Gul visit, the first by a sitting Turkish head of state in 35 years, will provide an opportunity for Gul to meet not only with Talabani, Maliki, and other Arab political leaders, but also be the first meeting of a senior Turkish political leader with Massoud Barzani. These visits are illustrative of a bilateral relationship that has begun to blossom, as evidenced by the establishment of a formal senior level dialogue and cooperative mechanism on a host of bilateral issues, discussions on the text of a bilateral mil-mil MOU that will enable Turkey to train and otherwise assist the rebuilding of Iraq's military, and the formation of a trilateral (IZ-TU-US) mechanism to facilitate cooperation and communication in the effort to bring to an end the PKK presence in Iraq. ¶5. (S) Having demonized KRG President Massoud Barzani for his perceived support of PKK terrorists after 2003/2004, Turkey's relations with the KRG are nearing full circle, returning to the period during the early and mid 1990s when Turkish troops fought together with Kurdish Peshmerga against the PKK in northern Iraq and Barzani and Talabani were regularly received by senior Turkish officials in Ankara. GOT officials recognize what they describe as a special cultural affinity between Turks and Kurds and see Turkey as the most natural outlet to bring the Kurdish region's hydrocarbon ANKARA 00000395 002 OF 003 resources to world markets as well as the primary source for investment, consumer goods, and technology. In part to help satisfy its own growing energy requirements and in part to make viable plans to bring gas from both Middle East and Caspian Basin sources to European markets, Turkey has begun to sound out possibilities for Turkish companies to help develop oil and gas fields in the KRG-administered region as well as to link those fields to the existing Kirkuk-Yamurtuluk oil pipeline and a proposed northern route gas pipeline into Turkey. The Turks argue that they do not want to undermine efforts to achieve agreement on national hydrocarbons legislation in Iraq, but similarly do not want to be penalized for "doing the right thing" by discovering that contracts signed with the KRG end up being grandfathered under a final deal between Erbil and Baghdad, with Turkish companies sidelined as a result. Protecting Turkish Commercial and Energy Interests -------------- -------------- ¶6. (S) Turkey continues to export household and consumer products, food, services (especially transportation and construction),machinery and even refined fuel to Iraq, and remains one of the largest investors in northern Iraq. It sees Iraq,s hydrocarbon resources both as a solution to its growing energy needs and desire to diversify supply, and as another way to cement Turkish-Iraqi relations in ways favorable to Turkey,s interests. We expect Turkey will attempt to slow or halt any changes in multilateral policy towards Iraq or Iraqi integration with the region that would diminish Turkish commercial and energy interests. We see this in Turkey,s recent decision to open discussions with Iraqi Kurds on energy, noted above, in order to protect Turkish commercial interests. Turkey is particularly sensitive about proposals to send Iraqi gas to Syria and into the Arab Pipeline, which it sees as the major competitor to its proposed northern route pipeline. It fears Iraqi gas will end up supplying Egypt instead of Turkey, and/or that it will supply LNG facilities outside Turkey. Recently, the GOT has argued that it could supply Iraqi gas to Syria from a northern route pipeline and still connect Iraq to European markets. We could also use Turkey,s desire to protect its commercial edge to our advantage. For example, Turkish banks are in good financial condition and are logical candidates to supply banking services in Iraq. This, in turn, could get GOT-GOI cooperation going on banking, finance, and money laundering/terrorism finance issues. How the US Can Help Ensure Positive Turkish Engagement -------------- -------------- ¶7. (S) All the aforementioned steps are indicative of Turkey's commitment to support Iraq's continued development into a stable, unified, free market democracy. In helping to establish a kindred democracy in the region, Turkey would benefit, it hopes, by eliminating a strongly nationalist Kurdish entity on its southern border with which it could have serious difficulties. Turkey appears strongly committed to its current approach on Iraq, but, as was the case prior to November 2007, a massive, urban terrorist event attributed to the PKK would set back the relationship. While we believe it unlikely Turkey would quickly return to the point that it threatens to invade northern Iraq with a massive ground force aimed at dislodging PKK terrorists from their cave complexes, the GOT's success at keeping the PKK pinned down in isolated areas in Iraq continues to be predicated on close cooperation and intelligence-sharing between Turkey and the United States. ¶8. (S) Until such time as Turkey is able to develop its own indigenous collection and targeting capability, provision of US platforms to maintain visibility over PKK-populated areas of northern Iraq will be critical to helping maintain Turkey's ability to carefully counter PKK targets without endangering Iraqi civilians and, consequently, Turkish-Iraqi relations. The US should also continue to facilitate Turkish-Iraqi cooperation against the PKK with a view towards the day when the absence of a robust US presence in Iraq will necessitate much closer bilateral coordination and cooperation between Turkey and Iraq. ¶9. (S) The future status of Kirkuk, prospects that the city and its surrounding energy-rich areas could be subsumed into the Kurdish region, further strengthening prospects for a future independent Kurdish state, and protecting the rights of its Turkomen brethren there, remain important issues for the GOT. The Turks have overcome their initial skepticism and come around to supporting the efforts of UNAMI to help the Iraqis resolve their problems related to internal boundary disputes. They have demonstrated an ability to deliver useful, positive messages both to the Turkomen and to ANKARA 00000395 003 OF 003 Sunni Arab leaders. We should continue to consult closely with the GOT as we continue to assist the Iraqis in working through these issues. Continued Regional Integration of Iraq -------------- ¶10. (S) Turkey was, and remains, a strong advocate for multilateral mechanisms designed to support our common goals in Iraq. As an instrumental and galvanizing force behind the institution of the Neighbors Process, the Turks have long supported such mechanisms as a way to ensure Iraq reintegrates into the region and, at the same time, provides a way to help temper the influence and negative actions taken by Iran and others contrary to Turkish interests. The GOT is not wed to a continuation of the neighbors/expanded neighbors processes and the Compact in their current form. In fact, most GOT officials with whom we've discussed the issue admit there have been few concrete results from either. However, the GOT gives great weight to the symbolism of regional support for Iraq's recovery and reintegration. We believe the Turks will continue to be broadly supportive of such efforts, with acknowledgement of the need to begin to shift the focus from one that is Iraq-specific to one that is more regional in nature. ¶11. (S) In fact, Turkey has already proposed the foundation of just such an entity, an OSCE-like Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East (CSCME),though efforts have been quiet and halting. The Turks had planned to roll out the concept during President Gul's address to UNGA last September, but did not do so when it became clear the immediate reaction from key regional players was lukewarm at best. The GOT may see discussions on how to replace the neighbors process with something of a more regional nature as an opportunity to once again push forward with its still nascent thinking on CSCME. ¶12. (S) Conversely, the GOT is unlikely to support regional mechanisms focused on Iraq that do not include Turkey, such as the GCC 3. ¶13. (S) COMMENT: Continued bilateral and multilateral Turkish engagement with Iraq on trade, hydrocarbons, mil-mil cooperation, counterterrorism and other areas is the best way to ensure that Turkey's interest lies with our efforts in Iraq. Excluding the Turks from regional or global engagement is likely to lead to Turkish freelancing that may not be in our best interests. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey Jeffrey