SCENESETTER FOR USAEUR'S VISIT TO ANKARA, MARCH

S E C R E T ANKARA 000394 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2019 TAGS: PREL MARR MASS IZ AF AM CY RS TU SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR USAEUR'S VISIT TO ANKARA, MARCH 23-24, 2009 REF: A. 08 ANKARA 1392 ¶B. 08 ANKARA 1596 Classified By: Ambassador James Jeffrey, reasons 1.4 (b and d) ¶1. (S) Thanks to highly successful intelligence sharing against PKK terrorists in northern Iraq over the last 15 months, bilateral military relations are at a high point. Your visit precedes a visit by President Obama in early April, follows the first ever bilateral Army-to-Army staff talks (in January),and will help reinforce Army-to-Army ties, which have traditionally been the weakest link in the bilateral military relationship. Turkish officials, both civilian and military, are deeply concerned, however, about potential damage to the bilateral relationship should either Congress or the President refer to an Armenian "genocide" in the next few months. The Turkish Army is seeking to modernize itself, but remains a mostly untransformed, conscript-based army. Your primary interlocutor, General Isik (UH-shuk) Kosaner (KO-sha-ner),is widely expected to be named the next chief of the Turkish General Staff in August ¶2010. You will also meet with Turkish CHOD Ilker (il-KER) Basbug (BAHSH-boo). KEY POINTS TO RAISE -------------- ¶2. (S) During your meetings, we suggest you make the following key points: - BILATERAL MILITARY RELATIONS: Our bilateral military relationship is based on shared interests and shared values. We welcome opportunities for deeper engagement with the Turkish Army, both among senior leaders and at the unit level. Appreciate Turkey hosting Army-to-Army staff talks and HQDA looks forward to hosting representatives from the Turkish Land Forces Command in 2010. Please let us know if the US can be in any way helpful in Turkish Army's modernization program (para. 6); - AFGHANISTAN STRATEGY: Welcome Turkey's contributions to ISAF since its inception. President Obama announced plans to provide an additional 17,000 troops to ISAF. We are seeking Allies' views on how to improve the situation in Afghanistan and are looking to all Allies to contribute more toward NATO's most important operation. We would welcome additional contributions from Turkey (para. 10); - IRAQ: Welcome Deputy CHOD Hasan Igsiz's March 4 visit to Iraq and encourage the Turkish military to continue to work with Iraq and Iraqi Kurdish officials directly (para. 11); - IRAN: Turkey and the US share an interest in preventing a nuclear-capable Iran. Would appreciate steady Turkish support for the international community's diplomatic efforts to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. Ask about recent engagement with the Iranian military (para. 12); - RUSSIA/CAUCASUS: Turkey's growing economic ties with Russia and dependence on Russian energy makes it cautious on Russia. While respecting Turkey's need for good relations with Russia, the US continues to have interests in the region and we would like to develop closer cooperation in the Caucasus and the Black Sea (para 13); and - CYPRUS: Comprehensive settlement of Cyprus in 2009 is possible, and absolutely critical for the future of a reunified island, Turkey's own long-term hopes for EU membership, and NATO-EU cooperation (para 14). WATCH OUT FOR -------------- ¶3. (C) The Turks will very likely raise: - ARMENIA GENOCIDE RESOLUTION: Passage of an Armenian Genocide Resolution in Congress or a presidential statement that includes the word "genocide" to characterize the mass killings in 1915 would do grave harm to the bilateral relationship, particularly in military relations. A deal with Armenia to normalize relations and open the border, the Turks believe, should help forestall such a resolution (para 9); - ISSUES FROM PREVIOUS MEETINGS: During Army-to-Army staff talks, the Turks raised a number of issues that they will likely also raise with you, including long-standing requests from Turkey for equipment and training (para 7). BACKGROUND -------------- ¶4. (C) Turkey is a key Ally that has provided vital support to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan through the Incirlik Cargo Hub and has contributed to all NATO operations. The November 2007 presidential decision to share actionable intelligence on the PKK marked a major positive turning point for US-Turkey relations. PM Erdogan is focused on March 2009 local elections, making him reluctant to tackle some sensitive issues (including Cyprus and EU reforms),and prone to play up others (civilian casualties in Gaza). Turkey was slow to feel the effects of the global economic slowdown, but recently has been hit hard on exports and jobs. ¶5. (C) Turkey is by far the strongest democracy in the region, but some events -- efforts in 2007 by the military to pressure the Erdogan government, Erdogan's own attacks on the media and exploitation of investigations of possible coup plotting and illegal armed groups associated with the military ("Ergenekon") -- have many here worried about Turkey's commitment to an open society. Finally, while Turkey is not slipping away from the West, it is often a very difficult ally. The trend toward more open manifestation of Islam's influence in society, Erdogan and his party's Islamic roots, dependence on the "non-West" for vital energy, contracts, exports, and tourism, and disappointment with the West (EU reluctance to offer full membership, failure of the 2004 referendum in Cyprus, US actions in Iraq in (2003-2005) all contribute to this. Army Staff Talks and Recent Engagement -------------- ¶6. (C) Your visit comes shortly after the inaugural Army-to-Army Staff Talks between the Turkish Land Forces Command (TLFC) and Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA). The 14-15 January 2009 conference, headed by HQDA G-3/5/7 MG Fastabend, and TLFC G-5 MG Turfan, focused on increasing engagement at the institutional level. Agreed to actions for follow-up included logistics, aviation, C-IED, and doctrinal development. TLFC is looking to increase the level of operational and unit engagement to include small unit exchanges at the company and platoon level. The draw-down of US forces during the post Cold War era combined with operational requirements has led to very limited unit exchanges, with none taking place in the last few years. The next scheduled combined army exercise is a battalion CPX in ¶2010. The TLFC will likely look forward to any opportunity for more small unit exchanges or exercises and to subject matter expert (SME) and information exchanges. TLFC continually requests SME exchanges and lessons learned dealing with counter-terrorist operations, especially from Afghanistan as that closely approximates the terrain in South-Eastern Turkey. ¶7. (C) GEN Kosaner raised the following issues in bilateral meeting during the Oct 2008 Conference of European Armies and by the TLFC G5 during Army Staff Talks. We expect them to be raised again during your visit: - AH-1 W helicopters: Senior military leadership, including VCJCS Cartwright, has been engaged on this. While the Turks have been informed about the current lack of availability of these assets, they remain eager to obtain these airframes to strengthen their capabilities in the Southeast. VCJCS has pledged to make a small number available, but not until 2011 at the earliest. - Direct intelligence downlink to 2nd Army: In addition to what is being provided through the Combined Intelligence Fusion Cell, the Turks have asked for a downlink of the intelligence directly to the 2nd Army headquarters, which has primary responsibility over operations in southeast Turkey. - C-IED: TLFC is very interested in receiving more information/training on US. experiences with C-IED. There are many disclosure/releasability issues which prevent us from giving them feedback. We have recommended TGS use its NATO channels to obtain more info. - Heavy Lift Helicopters: A Turkish team is traveling to the US 19-20 March to discuss progress in this FMS/DCS case. Turkey has requested 10 CH-47F Chinooks for use by TLFC and Special Forces. The sale is problematic due to source code releasability issues. - Large Area Maintenance Shelters: Estimated delivery is July 2009. - Night Vision Goggles for helicopter pilots: The TLFC has not provided an LOA for this equipment. - GPS, INS, precision guided artillery munitions, Excalibur: TLFC has received an initial briefing, but has not requested further information. ¶8. (SBU) TLFC Commander,s schedule did not support either of two CSA offered dates for a counterpart visit in 2009, and HQDA is looking for 2010 dates. Other recent senior level Army-to-Army engagement include: - TRADOC CDR GEN Wallace visited in September 2008. TLFC is working reciprocal Turkish TRADOC Commander visit to the US in the summer of 2009. - USAREUR CDR GEN McKernan in Nov 2006. - CSA GEN Schoomaker in Oct 2006. - USAREUR CDR GEN Bell in Mar 2005 TURKEY/ARMENIA -------------- ¶9. (S) Turkey and Armenia may be very close to a deal to re-establish relations and open the border, but Turkey feels compelled to be cautious prior to the March 29 local elections. Your Turkish interlocutors will likely warn that US acknowledging the mass killings of Armenians in 1915 as genocide would spoil this potential Turkey-Armenia rapprochement and gravely hurt our bilateral relations, including probably Turkey's support for our Iraq and Afghanistan sustainment operations. If raised, you should encourage the military to support rapprochement with Armenia. AFGHANISTAN -------------- ¶10. (C) Turkey has supported the ISAF mission from the very beginning. It led ISAF twice, and former Foreign Minister Cetin was ISAF's Senior Civilian Representative from 2004 to ¶2006. Currently, Turkey contributes some 700 troops, a civilian-led PRT in Wardak, a training team (OMLT) in Kabul, and 200 million dollars in humanitarian assistance. Turkey is slated to resume command of RC-Capital in November 2009, and there are indications that Turkey may contribute an additional OMLT and offer to sponsor the Afghan Defense University or Staff College in Kabul. Turkey has provided limited contributions to NATO's ANA Trust Fund (1.5 million euros) and 5 million dollars to support elections, but remains unwilling to place their troops in combat situations. Senior officials, however, have expressed an interest to do more on training and redevelopment. We should encourage this. With the growing sense that the Afghan police force may need more gendermerie-like capabilities, Turkey's Jandarma may be in position to help in this aspect of police training. IRAQ/KRG -------------- ¶11. (C) Turkish officials remain concerned about Iranian influence in Iraq and are committed to expanding ties with Iraq, including building on a nascent dialogue with Iraqi Kurdish leaders. Deputy CHOD Hasan Igsiz visited Baghdad on March 4 and met with the Iraqi Defense Minister and the Chief of Staff. TGS is reportedly negotiating a military cooperation MOU with Iraq which would include a role for Turkey to help with reconstruction efforts at the Ministry of Defense and the Iraqi Armed Forces. President Gul hopes to visit Baghdad o/a March 23, while FM Babacan is considering travel to Erbil, Mosul, and Basra, where he will open a new consulate. Turkish, Iraqi (including KRG),and US officials at the working level have held a series of trilateral meetings since late November, primarily to establish a conduit between Turkey and Iraq/KRG for eventual sharing of intelligence and coordinating counter-PKK operations in northern Iraq. This increasing momentum of direct Turkey-Iraq direct engagement is positive and should be encouraged. PRESSING IRAN -------------- ¶12. (C) The Turks are deeply concerned about Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions, but do not believe there is (nor will they support) a military solution to this challenge. The Turkish General Staff assesses that Iran is very close to obtaining sufficient nuclear material for a nuclear weapon and is deeply concerned about the even greater regional influence of a nuclear Iran. At the same time, Turkey relies on Iran as an important energy supplier and is engaging in tactical cooperation with the Iranian military against the PKK/PJAK, their common enemy. The two countries held reciprocal J2 exchange visits within the past year, the most recent being the Iranian J2's visit to Turkey in early March. The Turks assure us that they do not share any of the intelligence provided by the US. to Iran. You should encourage your interlocutors to support the diplomatic process to prevent Iran from attaining a nuclear capability, including by urging Iran publicly to address the international community's concerns. RUSSIA/CAUCASUS -------------- ¶13. (C) Russia's invasion of Georgia changed the regional dynamic and threatened core Turkish interests. However, Turkey's burgeoning economic relations with and growing energy dependence on Russia has meant that Turkey is cautious with Russia. For its part, the Turkish military, particularly the Navy, has been developing deeper ties with Russia, even in the aftermath of the Georgia crisis. Although cautious, Turkey agreed to all our official requests for support during the August 2008 crisis, while privately blaming Saakashvili. The Turks have been less than enthusiastic about our strategy to isolate Abkhazia and South Ossetia, fearing that it will encourage their closer integration into Russia. We should respect Turkey's right to develop good relations with Russia, but note that the US also has interests in the region and desires close cooperation with Turkey, including in the Black Sea and the Caucasus. CYPRUS -------------- ¶14. (C) Turkey has taken a hands-off approach to the latest round of Cyprus settlement negotiations, giving "TRNC" leader Talat free rein to negotiate a deal. GOT officials believe the Greek Cypriots are delaying to exploit pressure on a November 2009 EU deadline for Turkey to open its ports to Greek Cypriot vessels. Failure to do so will put Turkey's EU membership aspirations at risk, but the GOT is very unlikely to take this step absent a comprehensive settlement. Real progress on Cyprus would be a game-changer here, helping save Turkey's EU membership prospects (which we have long publicly supported),restarting NATO-EU cooperation, and providing an incentive to resolve other frozen disputes (Aegean, Armenia). The Turkish military had supported the 2004 Annan plan, but is reportedly reticent to go beyond what the Annan plan called for in terms of the reduction of Turkish troops remaining on the island, and unwilling to sign off on scrapping Turkey's "guarantor status" as provided for in the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee between Greece, the UK, Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus. You should encourage your interlocutors to view resolution of the Cyprus question as a strategic opportunity for Turkey. GENERAL BASBUG -------------- ¶15. (C) Chief of General Staff GEN Ilker Basbug (see ref a for bio),who has a tendency to be reserved, is one of few senior Turkish figures willing to defend the bilateral relationship publicly, most notably during his speech a the change of command ceremony in August 2008 (ref b), immediately after he assumed his current position. Unlike his predecessor, Basbug has avoided a confrontational approach with the government and has reportedly found a modus vivendi with the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP),especially on working together to forge a non-military solution to the PKK threat. He may press you on Turkey's request for Predator and Reaper UAVs and flag his concerns about the risks of Congress or the Administration calling the events of 1915 "genocide." He is an English speaker. GENERAL KOSANER -------------- ¶16. (C) General Isik Kosaner, your primary interlocutor, became Turkish Land Forces Commander in August 2008. Unlike TGS Chief General Basbug, Kosaner reportedly is not an advocate for strong military ties with the United States. Kosaner had previously served as the Jandarma Commander (2006-2008),TGS Deputy CHOD (2005-2006),Commander of the Aegean Army (2004-2005),and Commander of Security Forces in Northern Cyprus (2002-2004). He has served in a number of assignments in the Special Forces Command, including as the first Chief of Special Warfare Branch of TGS. He served as a staff officer in AFSOUTH's intel department, but does not have other direct NATO experience. He is an English speaker, but does not have a strong comfort level and prefers to have an interpreter present. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey Jeffrey