ERGENEKON: AS THE POWER PENDULUM SWINGS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000368 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/SE E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2019 TAGS: EU OSCE PGOV TU SUBJECT: ERGENEKON: AS THE POWER PENDULUM SWINGS REF: ANKARA 144 Classified By: Pol Counselor Daniel O'Grady for reasons 1.4(b,d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Ergenekon investigation marks a swing of the power pendulum away from an entrenched, rigid urban elite to an Anatolian elite more representative of the Turkish populace. Prosecutors are accusing various military officials, bureaucrats, state employees, journalists and other members of Turkey's "deep state" of conspiring to generate the pretext for a coup against the democratically elected government. Although the public airing of such a far-reaching scandal has underscored the need for greater oversight of state institutions, the haphazard, wide-reaching, and possibly politicized methods by which the investigation is being carried out may also be symptomatic of a swing far past the balance point to the detriment of the government's opponents. END SUMMARY. THE STATE OUT OF CONTROL -------------- ¶2. (C) Investigations into a number of secret arms caches scattered around Turkey uncovered the Ergenekon network, a nebulous group named after a mythical Turkic eden nestled in the heart of the Altay Mountains. Its alleged members include military officials (both active duty and retired), bureaucrats, and members of organized criminal gangs who stand accused of conspiring to generate chaos throughout Turkey by committing a series of killings and attacks, thereby justifying a military coup. The prosecutors have tried to link the group to the killings of a number of Kurds, an Armenian journalist, a Jewish businessman, a nationalist academic, and even an Azeri military official. As evidence -- in the form of arms caches, "death wells", recorded conversations, confiscated notes, and spoken testimonies -- has accumulated, the prosecution has arrested an ever-widening circle of retired generals, union leaders, former high-level bureaucrats, journalists, and even the occasional transvestite actor. Among the arrested suspects are former head of the Higher Education Board, Kemal Guruz, and four retired generals. THE PENDULUM SWINGS -------------- ¶3. (C) The Ergenekon group is seen to be a subset of Turkey's "deep state," the collection of unelected government officials who on the one hand provide structure and continuity in Turkey's ever-shifting political environment, and who perceive themselves as the guardians of Turkey's secular unitary nature, but on the other have often intervened in the political process to direct, guide, or isolate democratically elected politicians. Whether or not the allegations are proved, it is becoming increasingly clear to the Turkish public that some members or former members of the deep state conducted their activities illegally and with little regard to human life. But as more people are arrested, often on seemingly tenuous grounds, a growing segment of the public has begun to fear that the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) is manipulating the investigation to demonize critics, in order to intimidate its political and ideological opponents. ¶4. (C) Embassy contacts in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP),and the military describe a situation in which the government is running an Ergenekon witch-hunt, targeting the innocent as well as the guilty. While all agree that those who abused their power should be prosecuted and punished for their crimes, they see an AKP having consolidated power to the point where it can wage a campaign of revenge against the secular establishment that had, as recently as 2007, abused the legal system to hinder, harass, and imprison AKP's supporters. ¶5. (C) Because the Ergenekon case is occurring simultaneously with a tax violation case against one of Turkey's largest media moguls, Aydin Dogan, non-AKP affiliated media feel a full-court press against them by the AKP government. Papers fear that publishing criticism of the government may lead to criminal investigation. The ANKARA 00000368 002 OF 002 Cumhuriyet daily, traditionally close to the CHP and independent of Turkey's media conglomerates, published an issue with a blank front page last week to highlight this conundrum: to bow to AKP pressure would be dishonest, but to print their version of the story would potentially land them in court. These fears and criticisms stem in part from a sense of helplessness. In the past, it was the deep state to whom these urban elites could turn for protection. With the deep state itself seemingly on trial, its members -- innocent and guilty alike -- feel a rootlessness they had never felt as a class before. They are finding that the demographic and political structure of Turkey has changed, marginalizing their sector of society. ¶6. (C) Given the weak performance of opposition parties, particularly the CHP, many view the military as the only counterweight to AKP's dominance. However, the ability of the military to protect secular interests has diminished, as displayed openly in its failure to block the election of AKP's Abdullah Gul to the presidency in April 2007. Following the failed "e-memo," the general consensus is that the days of military coups are over. The military leadership has remained mostly silent on the Ergenekon case, expressing support for the investigation, because it, too, wants to eliminate power structures outside formal military command. It has restricted itself to airing in private its concerns about the investigation, particularly concerning the detention and arrest of retired military officers, aware that overt pressure on the government and judiciary only serves to strengthen, not weaken AKP's popularity. THE FUTURE AFTER ERGENEKON -------------- ¶7. (C) The deep state held the pendulum of power high on its side for a long time. When a pendulum is allowed to fall, it will swing widely before settling into a stable balanced position. In the short-to-medium term, this should be expected in the wake of Ergenekon. As the newer Anatolian elites come to occupy an increasingly large segment of the elements of state, there will be internal disputes, cultural changes, painful learning processes, and possible abuse of power against outgoing deep state members. With six years of governance behind it, AKP has packed many of the lower ranks of the ministries with its followers -- who will then rise and, potentially, become a new deep state. ¶8. (C) The future of Turkey's democracy will determine how widely the pendulum will swing in the future. If Turkey continues along its gradual process of democratization, the rising AKP elites will no doubt be powerful, corrupt, and conspiratorial, but perhaps less so than their predecessors. In the long term, the pendulum should swing back, a process that can be facilitated and hastened should AKP begin in earnest to initiate reforms associated with Turkey's long-dormant EU accession bid, which many hope it will do following March 29 elections. This would provide parties of the center and left opportunities to govern and offer windows of opportunity for limiting the powers of the bureaucracy and increasing transparency. The perception that the Ergenekon case has been politicized raises concerns, however. If Turkish democracy stagnates, lack of respect for the rule of law could become institutionalized, continuing the opacity, partisanship, and rigidity of the Turkish state. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey Jeffrey