TURKEY: NEW EU NEGOTIATOR DISCUSSES TURKEY'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000341 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2019 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL EUN TU SUBJECT: TURKEY: NEW EU NEGOTIATOR DISCUSSES TURKEY'S ACCESSION FUTURE REF: ANKARA 298 Classified By: Ambassador James Jeffrey for reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The GOT cannot push for bold EU-mandated reforms until after the March 29 local elections, according to Turkey's new EU negotiator Egemen Bagis. Even after the elections, Bagis noted that he would not have the necessary clout internally to successfully advocate for the unpopular changes unless he can demonstrate to the Turkish public that he can deliver in Brussels. Bagis reported he is working to boost his credibility by pushing the EU to open for negotiation three or four chapters by July, instead of the usual two per EU presidency. Bagis cited pressure from Cyprus on the Czechs not to open the energy or education chapters and solicited U.S. help to push those forward. He noted that although Cyprus reunification talks are progressing, it is doubtful the two sides can reach progress by the end of 2009. Nevertheless, he has received assurances from EU officials that the progress report due later this year will not be unduly biased against Turkey. The Ambassador reiterated USG support for Turkey's EU bid, but warned that the recent tax case brought against the Dogan media group conveys the wrong image of Turkey in Europe. End Summary. ¶2. (C) State Minister for EU Affairs and Lead EU Negotiator Egemen Bagis updated the Ambassador February 25 on Turkey's accession bid. Bagis said that it is a delicate period, with Turkey facing local elections in March, European parliamentary elections in April, German elections this fall, and a formal review of frozen chapters later in the year. The Ambassador noted that many in France are predicting Sarkozy will lift his objection to EU expansion this spring and underscored that Turkey should not be an obstacle to France's NATO membership. It is not in Turkey's interest to react quid pro quo, he warned. ¶3. (C) Bagis cautioned that the GOT cannot take any decisive or controversial moves, including supporting France's NATO reintegration, until after the March elections. Turkey will not have another election for three years, which will allow the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) to tackle the hard reforms necessary to fulfill EU criteria. Nevertheless, Bagis said he would not have the necessary credibility to push for domestic change until he has been able to demonstrate his ability to influence Brussels. The Turkish public measures EU progress by the number of chapters opened, not closed. Bagis underscored that to be taken seriously within Turkey, he would need to convince the Czech Presidency to show leadership and break the trend of opening two chapters per term and increase the number to three or four. He reported that the GOT is working to meet the requirements to open the taxation and social policy and employment chapters. However, the Czechs are hesitating on energy and education due to "threats from Cyprus." ¶4. (C) Bagis noted negotiations between Cyprus and the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" (TRNC) are progressing. While it is doubtful that the two sides will reach a comprehensive settlement by the end of 2009, there will not be a full breakdown either. Regardless, he has received assurances from Brussels that the EU review of frozen chapters related to Turkey complying with its commitments under the Ankara Protocol later this year would not be biased against the GOT if a Cyprus settlement is not reached. He posited that Nicosia has no incentive to pursue reconciliation. The Greek half of the island has far better infrastructure, economy, and standard of living, all of which could be hurt by reunification. Furthermore, the EU has offered Cyprus neither a carrot nor a stick. Bagis asserted that Cypriot President Christofias needs a reason to compromise, such as the EU naming an arbitrary date at which it would consider letting an independent "TRNC" join. Bagis added that Ankara has received guarantees from the major "TRNC" parties that no matter who wins the April parliamentary elections, Talat will continue his role as chief negotiator. ¶5. (C) The Ambassador reiterated USG support for Turkey's EU bid, adding that Europe needs Turkey. Bagis warned that voicing such support too publicly might offend many Europeans. He encouraged the U.S. to limit its public statements and to make a stronger push in private, ANKARA 00000341 002 OF 002 specifically for opening the energy and employment chapters. He also stressed how important it is that President Obama not use the word "genocide" in his April 24 statement commemorating Armenian Remembrance Day, for the sake of maintaining the bilateral relationship. ¶6. (C) The Ambassador warned that the recent tax case brought against the Dogan group, Turkey's largest media company, has not helped Turkey's image in Europe. It gives the impression Prime Minister Erdogan has initiated a personal vendetta against Dogan, even tasking the Finance Ministry to investigate its finances. The GOT must leave the media alone; even a hint that AKP leadership seeks to rein in its domestic critics provided opponents of Turkey's accession with more ammunition. Bagis indicated that this was a tax matter and that essentially no one was above the (tax) law. 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