Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ANKARA337
2009-03-05 08:46:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:
TURKEY STILL PLANS TO MOVE AHEAD WITH BLACK SEA
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C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 000337
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/3/2019
TAGS: PREL PARM MARR NATO TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY STILL PLANS TO MOVE AHEAD WITH BLACK SEA
DEFENSE MINISTERIAL, BUT MAY POSTPONE
REF: STATE 19708 (NOTAL)
Classified By: Pol Mil Counselor Anthony Godfrey for reason 1.4 (b,d)
Summary
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 000337
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/3/2019
TAGS: PREL PARM MARR NATO TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY STILL PLANS TO MOVE AHEAD WITH BLACK SEA
DEFENSE MINISTERIAL, BUT MAY POSTPONE
REF: STATE 19708 (NOTAL)
Classified By: Pol Mil Counselor Anthony Godfrey for reason 1.4 (b,d)
Summary
--------------
1. (C) Turkey acknowledges reftel concerns regarding the
upcoming Black Sea Defense Ministerial (BSDM),but still
believes that establishing a political venue for littoral
states would enhance security in the Black Sea. A crowded
political calendar may put off this meeting for several
months: according to the Ministry of National Defense,
Turkey's upcoming local elections and the intense schedule of
other international meetings may require the BSDM to be
postponed until after June 2009. End Summary.
2. (C) We raised reftel talking points with Rear Admiral
Hakan Eraydin, Undersecretary of the Ministry of National
Defense, and with Deniz Cakar, Head of the MFA's Department
of NATO and Euro-Atlantic Infrastructure. Eraydin took our
points on board, but did not engage on substance. He did,
however, say that it was looking likely that the BSDM would
be postponed. Minister Gonul, a long-serving member of PM
Erdogan's Justice and Development (AK) Party, had been
spending more time than expected out on the campaign trail
and might not be able to devote an appropriate amount of time
to preparing for the BSDM. Eraydin also cited the crowded
schedule of international meetings, and admitted that when
compared with upcoming NATO meetings, the BSDM could be seen
as a distraction.
3. (C) The MFA's Deniz Cakar was not ready to give up on the
Ministerial. She claimed to have been working on arranging
the meeting since it was first proposed in December 2007
(long before Russia's actions in Georgia, she pointed out).
She said that the BSDM should not be seen as a new
initiative, but as a political umbrella over existing
technical cooperation such as BLACKSEAFOR and Operation Black
Sea Harmony. There should be a place, Cakar continued, where
the Defense Ministers of littoral states can come together.
She acknowledged that all littoral states were members of
SEDM, but believed that was not a forum for discussing Black
Sea issues.
4. (C) We argued that to hold a Ministerial meeting on Black
Sea issues and not to raise the most important security
events and threats of the past year made no sense. Russia's
aggressiveness in the Black Sea should be a serious concern
for littoral states; should Russia attend a meeting like the
BSDM, it could signal that littoral states had chosen not to
impose a political cost for Russia's actions in Georgia in
August 2008. Cakar ceded the point, but still thought that
there was value in having the ministers meet; while the
agenda for this first meeting was already set, perhaps these
controversial issues could be raised at a subsequent meeting.
Comment
--------------
5. (C) It has been Turkey's consistent view since August
2008 that any venue (including the Caucasus Stability and
Cooperation Platform and NATO - Russia Council Prepcons)
which engages the Russians has value, even if no substance is
discussed and even if the discussion might lend legitimacy to
Russian positions. It will be difficult, especially so close
to the date of the Ministerial, to persuade Turkey that the
BSDM is not useful. We will continue to track this issue and
will report if a decision to postpone has been taken.
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey
Jeffrey
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/3/2019
TAGS: PREL PARM MARR NATO TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY STILL PLANS TO MOVE AHEAD WITH BLACK SEA
DEFENSE MINISTERIAL, BUT MAY POSTPONE
REF: STATE 19708 (NOTAL)
Classified By: Pol Mil Counselor Anthony Godfrey for reason 1.4 (b,d)
Summary
--------------
1. (C) Turkey acknowledges reftel concerns regarding the
upcoming Black Sea Defense Ministerial (BSDM),but still
believes that establishing a political venue for littoral
states would enhance security in the Black Sea. A crowded
political calendar may put off this meeting for several
months: according to the Ministry of National Defense,
Turkey's upcoming local elections and the intense schedule of
other international meetings may require the BSDM to be
postponed until after June 2009. End Summary.
2. (C) We raised reftel talking points with Rear Admiral
Hakan Eraydin, Undersecretary of the Ministry of National
Defense, and with Deniz Cakar, Head of the MFA's Department
of NATO and Euro-Atlantic Infrastructure. Eraydin took our
points on board, but did not engage on substance. He did,
however, say that it was looking likely that the BSDM would
be postponed. Minister Gonul, a long-serving member of PM
Erdogan's Justice and Development (AK) Party, had been
spending more time than expected out on the campaign trail
and might not be able to devote an appropriate amount of time
to preparing for the BSDM. Eraydin also cited the crowded
schedule of international meetings, and admitted that when
compared with upcoming NATO meetings, the BSDM could be seen
as a distraction.
3. (C) The MFA's Deniz Cakar was not ready to give up on the
Ministerial. She claimed to have been working on arranging
the meeting since it was first proposed in December 2007
(long before Russia's actions in Georgia, she pointed out).
She said that the BSDM should not be seen as a new
initiative, but as a political umbrella over existing
technical cooperation such as BLACKSEAFOR and Operation Black
Sea Harmony. There should be a place, Cakar continued, where
the Defense Ministers of littoral states can come together.
She acknowledged that all littoral states were members of
SEDM, but believed that was not a forum for discussing Black
Sea issues.
4. (C) We argued that to hold a Ministerial meeting on Black
Sea issues and not to raise the most important security
events and threats of the past year made no sense. Russia's
aggressiveness in the Black Sea should be a serious concern
for littoral states; should Russia attend a meeting like the
BSDM, it could signal that littoral states had chosen not to
impose a political cost for Russia's actions in Georgia in
August 2008. Cakar ceded the point, but still thought that
there was value in having the ministers meet; while the
agenda for this first meeting was already set, perhaps these
controversial issues could be raised at a subsequent meeting.
Comment
--------------
5. (C) It has been Turkey's consistent view since August
2008 that any venue (including the Caucasus Stability and
Cooperation Platform and NATO - Russia Council Prepcons)
which engages the Russians has value, even if no substance is
discussed and even if the discussion might lend legitimacy to
Russian positions. It will be difficult, especially so close
to the date of the Ministerial, to persuade Turkey that the
BSDM is not useful. We will continue to track this issue and
will report if a decision to postpone has been taken.
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey
Jeffrey