TURKISH COMPANY POSSIBLY SUPPLYING MACHINE TOOLS

S E C R E T ANKARA 000293 DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, ISN/MTR FOR MAYES E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2029 TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC TU SUBJECT: TURKISH COMPANY POSSIBLY SUPPLYING MACHINE TOOLS TO PAKISTAN BEING MONITORED REF: A. STATE 4344 AND PREVIOUS ¶B. STATE 3403 Classified By: Pol-Mil Counselor A.F. Godfrey, Reasons 1.4 (b,d) This is an action request. See Para 3. ¶1. (S) Responding to our initial demarche in January providing the GOT with information that Turkish firm Spinner Takim was attempting to ship proliferation sensitive materials to weapons-related entities in Pakistan (ref a), MFA Deputy DG for Nonproliferation and Disarmament Gun told us on February 24 that the GOT interagency Export Control Board has been alerted about this case and that, based on preliminary information, the company has not applied for an export license for the equipment. Gun further noted that the company is being closely watched and that "a red flag" will go up if the company does apply for a license. He promised to provide more information on the interagency's findings when the MFA has received information from all relevant agencies, but mentioned that the Ministry of National Defense agreed with the assessment that the equipment should not be allowed to be shipped to Pakistan. ¶2. (S) Noting that the equipment is not of Turkish origin and asserting that Turkey does not produce advanced machine tools subject to international controls, Gun took the opportunity to reiterate his request that problematic shipments be stopped at the country of origin. He said the company in this case as well as another "problematic company" (referring to Ak Makina, see ref b) both operate in a Free Trade Zone and that from a legal stand point, the MFA does not have much leeway to take action against these entities without substantial evidence of wrongdoing. He wondered whether the USG, in such cases, would be able to work with the country of origin to obtain information on the purported end-user reported by the original exporter. If there's evidence that Turkish entities are trying to alter end-user information in order to transship proliferation sensitive equipment to countries of concern, the GOT would have a stronger case to take additional action against these companies beyond simply turning down their export license applications. ¶3. (S) Action Request: Request Washington determine whether we can obtain end-user information regarding these sensitive shipments and share them with Turkish authorities. Providing such information could help the GOT take additional measures against problematic Turkish firms. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey Silliman