TURKEY ON FRENCH NATO REINTEGRATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 000194 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, EUR/RPM E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO TU SUBJECT: TURKEY ON FRENCH NATO REINTEGRATION Classified By: Ambassador James F. Jeffrey, Reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Upcoming local elections and an uneasy bilateral relationship with France make French reintegration into NATO's military structure a sensitive political issue for Turkey. A recent article in one of Turkey's leading newspapers highlighted the difficult decision facing PM Erdogan on meeting Alliance expectations for Turkey to support France's reintegration without preconditions. There are high expectations here that Turkey should receive some "quid" from France on Turkey's EU membership bid for Turkey's support on French reintegration. MFA contacts argue that France should make its intentions official at the NAC so that there is an opportunity for Allies to examine the implications of this move and make an informed decision. Without this, it will be difficult for the MFA to persuade its political masters that the best course for Turkey is to support the French request. Beyond process, we believe it is important to seek French understanding of Turkey's political sensitivities prior to the summit in order to decrease the risks of a potential train-wreck on French reintegration that could overshadow the summit and do lasting damage to NATO, US bilateral relations with Turkey, and Turkey's prospects for EU membership. Direct French engagement with Turkey or a private signal of its intention to drop its opposition to opening some of the frozen chapters in Turkey's EU accession negotiations could help ensure Turkey's support for French reintegration. End Summary. French Reintegration Hits the Front Page -------------- ¶2. (C) A February 7 front page article in "Milliyet," a leading Turkish daily, highlighted a "Le Monde" piece from February 4 which had reported that the French government has asked for US support to prevent Turkey from linking its support for France's reintegration into NATO's military structure with "greater flexibility" on the part of France for Turkey's EU membership bid. The article said that PM Erdogan will face a difficult decision since most NATO allies support France's full return to NATO while the Turkish government will "have serious troubles at home if it declines to use its veto power against the arbitrary decision of France to deadlock Turkey's EU negotiations in eight chapters." The article also called attention to Turkey's ;unconditional support for Greek reintegration back into NATO military structures in 1980, noting that the military-led government was heavily criticized for this move. The article concludes that Turkey is unlikely to block France's reintegration as such a step would risk Turkey's isolation in NATO and lead to a further rift in its relations with France. The article paints an optimistic outcome, but will likely trigger a more public debate on this issue in the run up to local elections at the end of March. ¶3. (C) The question of French reintegration into NATO is made more complicated by the uneasy bilateral relationship between Turkey and France. France is commonly identified as the chief culprit in preventing progress in Turkey's EU bid. Mil-to-mil ties have still not been fully restored since the French National Assembly passed a resolution criminalizing the denial of the Armenian genocide in 2006. MFA Cautiously Supportive, Seeks More Transparency -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) The MFA has underscored its understanding of the importance of French reintegration into NATO's military structure and has expressed its support in principle. However, officials, including U/S Apakan, have voiced concerns about the lack of transparency in the process and Turkey's expectation that France formalize its intentions to rejoin the Integrated Military Structure (IMS) at the NAC. They point to decisions taken by the NAC in 1966 -- at the time of France's withdrawal from the IMS -- that any future reintegration by France should be taken up by the NAC. Beyond technicalities, they also argue that a process is needed so that Allies can better understand the implication of France's return and make an informed decision. They warn that a "unilateral approach" by France without more consultations with interested Allies would be "counterproductive." ¶5. (C) MFA working level officials are also concerned that, without a better understanding of the implications, it will be difficult for the MFA to convince its political masters that Turkey's unconditional support for French reintegration is the right move. MFA officials are wary that initial discussions with France on this issue have ceased. They also reference the recent public criticism PM Erdogan made against diplomats in the aftermath of his walk-out at Davos. Using a derogatory term for diplomats, Erdogan said effectively that, unlike diplomats, he knows how to stand up for Turkey. Such an attitude should make it clear that convincing the MFA will be insufficient in ensuring that PM Erdogan and FM Babacan support French reintegration. French Embassy View -------------- ¶6. (C) The French embassy in Ankara has been adamant that France's reintegration into NATO should be judged on its own merits, and that there should be no linkage to Turkey's EU accession or France-Turkey bilateral relations. Deputy Political Counselor Francois-Xavier Reymond told us France's approach on Turkey's EU accession is "a completely separate process based on clear principles and are therefore non-negotiable." When asked, he acknowledged that initial discussions with Turkey at NATO have trailed off and there are no plans for senior level meetings at Munich or in other venues in the near future. ¶7. (C) French Ambassador Benard Emie, when asked about the article this morning, told the Ambassador that France publicly is taking a "no comment" position on "press speculation." Behind the scenes, however, he assured us that while France sees its reintegration into NATO military structures as a unilateral French decision, it fully recognizes that France must and will consult with its Allies, including Turkey. In contrast to the Turkish position, however, the French do not believe that reintegration requires a NAC decision and is thus subject to a Turkish potential veto. Comment: Possibility for a Win-Win? -------------- ¶8. (C) Current dynamics in Turkey's domestic political environment and France-Turkey bilateral relations do not bode well for the GOT to come out in support of unconditional French reintegration absent additional high-level formal engagement with the Turks by someone. While the GOT recognizes the political significance and risk for the Government of France on its reintegration into NATO's IMS, it is important for the GOF to also recognize the political challenges facing the GOT on this question. In our view, an optimal outcome is for France to provide some private assurances of its intention to drop its opposition to at least some of the now-frozen chapters in Turkey's EU accession process, without having to make any pledges on delivering the rest of the EU. Such a conversation will go a long way in ensuring that the GOT takes the right decision on French reintegration and potentially create some positive momentum for Turkey's EU accession. At a minimum, France must engage Turkey more directly on its IMS reintegration to avoid Turkish action in NATO that are roughly parallel to French actions in the EU. If France is not willing to do so, we will have to urgently review our own options. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey Jeffrey