WHY THE AKP'S UNITY MESSAGE MISSES THE MARK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001835 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/SE E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/27/2019 TAGS: PGOV TU SUBJECT: WHY THE AKP'S UNITY MESSAGE MISSES THE MARK REF: ANKARA 1791 Classified By: POL Counselor Daniel O'Grady, for reasons 1.4(b,d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: While the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has embarked on a project to seek a better social, economic and cultural environment for Kurds and other minorities, the initiative is being driven by the highest levels of the Party, who seem disinterested in feedback from the party's central committee, its regional directors or its grassroots. While it is clear the AKP sees no turning back, its forward movement is complicated by the lack of a consultative process both within the party and in Parliament. End summary. ¶2. (C) According to prominent members of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) as well as lower-level functionaries, the decision to group a number of reforms together and call them the "National Unity Project" was made at the highest level of the party, most notably by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Minister of the Interior Besir Atalay. The Project was created to show that the GOT was seeking ways to reach out to the Kurds to improve their social, economic and cultural situation, while examining how other minority groups could benefit from this outreach. Yet although the GOT met with opposition and civil society groups allegedly to shape its policy, the majority of AKP elected representatives received no warning that the policy was being developed, nor instructions on how to promote it. Battleground Constituencies -------------- ¶3. (C) This lack of guidance helps explain why the AKP is struggling in the polls in general, and why this project in particular has become the easy target of opposition parties seeking to undermine the AKP. Since MPs and mayors were not given advance warning that the Government was going to announce its outreach program for Kurds, they could not inform the highest levels of the Party about why -- especially in some battleground constituencies -- that might have negative ramifications, nor could they help to shape the message or its delivery. In a recent meeting with the Ambassador, the heads of four polling companies agreed that the AKP had bungled its messaging and delivery of the Project. For months the Government had been saying first a "Kurdish Opening" then a "Democratic Opening" then the "National Unity Project" was coming, without clearly saying what was in it, who it was for, or what it would achieve. In addition, they said the choice of the label "National Unity Project" was most unfortunate, because the group that initiated the military coup in 1960 was called the "National Unity Committee," and this would bring back unfortunate memories. ¶4. (C) The Government's rollout of the liberalization of the use of Kurdish was equally fumbled. Little regulation or legislation has been passed to protect the use of Kurdish, which in the past was prohibited in many cases. Rather, there seems to be an agreement with Minister of Justice Sadullah Ergin that cases about the use of Kurdish will not be prosecuted. The possible temporary nature of the change has unsettled Kurds to the point that they now publicly reject it as insincere, although they continue to enjoy using Kurdish. ¶5. (C) Both with the development and promotion of the Project, as well as with relaxing the regulations on the use of Kurdish, AKP MPs could have played a vital role in informing the party leadership about the risks of taking those steps, and could have recommended alternate solutions to ensure the success of the Project. However, the AKP's command structure does not permit policy formation to benefit from open discussion. According to Bulent Akarcali, a former MP (1983-2002) and Minister of Health (1987-1988),and a ANKARA 00001835 002 OF 002 close confidant of PM Erdogan, policy decisions in the GOT are made by Erdogan, with occasional input from his closest advisors. According to AKP Vice Chairmen Ekrem Erdem, in charge of Party Organization, and Reha Denemec, in charge of Research and Development, the policy message is then passed down through the AKP party groups at the provincial, sub-provincial, and local levels. Feedback from these groups is supposed to go back to headquarters for consideration. The AKP's "Political Academy" also bases some of its seminars on the policy prerogatives of the Party leadership, reaching a limited audience who generally pay a fee to attend its courses. But there is negligible direct dialogue on the issues between MPs and the voting public, upon which the AKP's future depends. No Details, No Guidance -------------- ¶6. (C) In the run-up to the November 10-13 debates on the National Unity Project in parliament, there was no national effort by elected AKP officials (MPs or mayors) to promote the project. With no speaking instructions -- indeed with no guidance whatsoever on what the Project even entailed -- they were compelled to keep a low profile and let PM Erdogan and Minister Atalay's statements to the press determine the reception of the project. Even if an elected official had wanted to address such a sensitive issue, a public misstep could have had repercussions from the PM, so it's not surprising that no one wanted to take the risk. In the aftermath of the debates, Erdogan summoned around 40 of his most trusted speakers to visit all 81 provinces in Turkey to explain the content of the Project and drum up support. But this effort was too little, too late: public opinion had already started a downward slide on the Project and the AKP. ¶7. (C) At the party's semiannual conclave on November 20-22 a few deputies began to express their frustrations with both the lack of planning and guidance they had received, and with the objectives of the Project altogether. Alaattin Buyukkaya, an MP from Istanbul, said that "while the point of the opening is clear, where it is going is not obvious." Ali Riza Alaboyun, an MP from Aksaray, complained that the public is "getting angry with us." Murat Basesgioglu, a former Interior Minister, Labor Minister, and five-term MP from Istanbul, declared openly that "pursuing a policy on national identity is a mistake." Perhaps if these concerns had been addressed, the AKP would not be facing its lowest popularity since 2002. According to Ozgur Guven, a senior staff member for AKP MP Mevlut Cavugoglu, the situation for MPs in battleground provinces is worsening: their spouses and children are being harassed by an electorate that increasingly sees the AKP as trying to ruin the unity of the Turkish Republic by giving special treatment to minorities. ¶8. (C) COMMENT: As the GOT continues to develop its National Unity Project, the effect on its poll numbers will hinge largely on its ability to sell the program to the public as something that is beneficial for Turkey's future. Many minority groups in Turkey are eager for acceptance, and challenge the concept that Turkishness means setting aside cultural heritage. The potential to tap broad support for addressing the Kurdish issue still exists, but the AKP's top-down structure for developing and delivering policy messages is not conducive to a productive dialogue. It bodes ill for the party's ability to listen to the public to hone its message into one of real unity. SILLIMAN "Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.s gov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey"