TURKEY: HALKI SEMINARY -- A PRIMER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 001700 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/SE E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2019 TAGS: PHUM PGOV TU SUBJECT: TURKEY: HALKI SEMINARY -- A PRIMER REF: A. 08 ISTANBUL 381 ¶B. 08 ISTANBUL 535 Classified By: Ambassador James Jeffrey, for reasons 1.4(b,d) This is a joint Embassy Ankara - Consulate General Istanbul cable. Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) This cable is a primer on the history and issues surrounding the Halki Seminary in Turkey. In the end, the reopening of Halki is a question of political will. With the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) in a tight spot with its attempts to promote its Democratic Opening initiative, to create an atmosphere for Armenian rapprochement, and to buoy the struggling economy, it is unlikely that overtures to reopen Halki will be brought up before the next elections (which must take place by July 2011) -- absent much pushing from us and the "right" deal. However, what would be of great help in the interim is an open dialogue between the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the GOT to address the technical issues addressed here in preparation for "the day." We should encourage both sides to begin this dialogue at various levels to lay the groundwork for a long-lasting solution. 1923: The Treaty of Lausanne -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Recognition of minority rights in Turkey is an explosive issue and the fear of division of the unitary state derived from such recognition lies deep in the Turkish psyche. For many citizens of Turkey, the Treaty of Lausanne represents everything anyone needs to know on the issue. The 1923 Lausanne Treaty attempted to establish equality under the law for all citizens of Turkey. Articles 39-44 of Lausanne strongly emphasize the individual rights of non-Muslim minority populations and tie these rights to the rights of every citizen of Turkey. Therefore, under Lausanne, the obvious differences of minorities (religion, language, etc.) are protected to the same extent as for any other citizen of Turkey. Article 45 then confers those same rights to the Muslim minorities in Greece, by stating that, "The rights conferred by the provisions of the present Section of the non-Muslim minorities of Turkey will be similarly conferred by Greece on the Muslim minority in her territory." ¶3. (SBU) Arguably, the writers of Lausanne could have spared the confusion by simply repeating all the provisions of Articles 39-44 for Greece instead of using the time-saving method of reciprocity in Article 45. Unfortunately, Article 45 establishes an (easily misconstrued) implied linkage between the rights of the two minorities. Technically, it just goes in one direction -- Greece must provide what Turkey provides. There is no apparent requirement or authorization formally for Turkey to link or tailor its treatment of its Greek minority to whatever Greece does. Furthermore, article 45 does not formally legitimize the Turkish argument that it cannot do something with its Greek minority unless Greece does the same thing with its Turkish minority. Most Turkish officials interpret Article 45 to mean that anything Turkey does for its Greek Orthodox minority must be reciprocated quid pro quo by Greece for its Muslim minority. In fact, many Turkish officials have gone even further, stating that Turkey would not recognize the rights of its Greek Orthodox citizens until Greece does the same for its Muslim minority. Although this is not an accurate interpretation of Lausanne, it is one that is held strongly by many Turks. 1961 Constitution: Article 130 on Nationalized Universities -------------- -------------- ¶4. (SBU) The 1961 Constitution included an article mandating that all institutions of higher education must be "public corporations" and administered "to serve the country and humanity." According to this article, "universities and units attached to them are under the control and supervision of the state and their security is ensured by the state." It wasn't until the 1970s that educational institutions ANKARA 00001700 002 OF 004 established prior to the 1961 Constitution were challenged, likely because of the problems in Cyprus and general xenophobia. Prior to 1964, seventy percent of Halki students were foreign nationals, and foreigners were allowed to attend religious institutions in Turkey. ¶5. (SBU) Prior to its closure, Halki was under the control of the Ministry of Education (the seminary operated at that time with a Turkish Muslim assistant director),but was run by the Patriarchate. The Patriarchate controlled, at the least, curriculum and admissions. A Constitutional Court decision in 1971 mandated all non-public institutions of higher education be nationalized or closed. Although the Ministry of Education at the time only permitted the seminary's diplomas to note that they conferred a degree of two-year vocational training to the recipient rather than a university degree, Halki was deemed to fall under the Court's decision. The Patriarchate decided to close the seminary rather than nationalize because it could not accept full state control of the institution. 1982: Private Universities Okay, but Not Religious Ones -------------- -------------- ¶6. (SBU) The same article from the 1961 Constitution that formed the basis for the Court's decision appears as Article 130 in the 1982 Constitution under which Turkey still operates. Article 130 states that, "Universities and units attached to them are under the control and supervision of the State and their security is controlled by the State." The 1982 Constitution allowed for the existence of both "public universities" and essentially private universities operated by foundations. Turkey, however, does not allow new foundations to be formed for religious purposes, so the Patriarchate could not take advantage of this provision. Even if it could have, Halki would then have fallen under significant aegis of the Ministry of Education, something unacceptable to the Patriarchate. It is unclear how much control YOK and the MoE would want to have over the curriculum and admission to Halki under such a situation, and anything different than pre-1971 would likely be unacceptable to the Patriachate. ¶7. (SBU) Additionally, Article 24 of the 1982 Constitution addressing freedom of religion and conscience says "education and instruction in religion and ethics shall be conducted under state supervision and control." The article represents a version of Ataturk's 1924 law on the "Unification of Education" meant to disband madrasas and to close religious education institutions not controlled by the government. Article 24 strengthens Article 130. On its face, this article does not strictly prohibit the reopening of the seminary but is a new element in the Constitution not present when Halki last operated prior to 1971. Also, as with Article 130, the level of state control mandated by the Constitution is not clear. Today: International Law Enters the Picture -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Finally, Section D, Article 90 of the Constitution, ratified in 2004, states that, "In the case of a conflict between international agreements in the area of fundamental rights and freedoms duly put into effect and the domestic laws due to differences in provisions on the same matter, the provisions of international agreements shall prevail." With this provision, Turkey accepted the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) on all matters falling under the European Charter of Human Rights, signed and ratified by Turkey in 1954. In 1987, Turkey accepted the right of the individual to apply to the ECHR. This may provide an "individual rights" trump over the 86 year-old Lausanne Treaty's vague provisions, especially as Turkey (and Greece) have recognized the ECHR's jurisdiction over the rights of minorities in Turkey (i.e. the Buyukada Orphanage case decided in favor of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate in 2008, REF A). The ECHR has already begun to deliver decisions like this in favor of the rights of the Patriarchate to own property -- it is likely only a matter of time before a decision could be given on the opening of Halki. (Note: The Patriarchate cannot currently own property as it is not a legal entity. The Patriarch can own property, ANKARA 00001700 003 OF 004 as can various foundations. End Note.) Denying a Fundamentalist Foothold and Restricting Regulations -------------- -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Members of both the AKP and the opposition, as well as members of state institutions, have conveyed a concern that with the reopening of a private -- albeit state-sanctioned -- school of religion, Islamic fundamentalists would argue that they should be free to do the same. The current situation, it is argued, protects the state from religious extremism by allowing it to control the instruction of religion. The fear of a growing number of fundamentalist schools was not as much of a concern in the first 50 years of the Republic as it is now, hence the change in approach. (Note: Some in the country, especially secularists, also fear the growing popularity of private foundation secondary schools funded by Fetullah Gulen-inspired organizations (REF B). End Note.) ¶10. (SBU) The Turkish Board of Higher Education (YOK) and Ministry of Education require institutions to be co-ed and devoid of religious attire or adornments. Representatives of the Patriarchate note that these requirements would not be compatible with a single-sex religious seminary where the liturgy is practiced. It is possible that the Patriarchate could create a parallel school for the training of Greek Orthodox women who wanted to pursue divinity or theology studies. (Note: We are not sure of the Patriarchate's view on such a possibility. End note.) Imam Hatip schools in Turkey, although religiously Islam-based, are also required to provide classes to both men and women, and do so in segregated facilities without problems. ¶11. (SBU) Still the focus of much effort, there have been moves afoot since 1999 to find a way to "place" the seminary under Istanbul University's Theology Department as the "Orthodox Faculty." This has run afoul of numerous concerns, from the intrusive YOK to the unwillingness of the Patriarch to cede important management powers to comply with university and YOK regulations, to those institutions' refusal to yield on these powers. Reciprocity: A Hard Nut to Crack -------------- ¶12. (C) As stated above, some officials in the GOT argue that Article 45 of Lausanne obligates both Greece and Turkey to provide reciprocal rights to their respective religious minorities. If Turkey were to reopen Halki, then, in the eyes of these officials, Greece must build a mosque for its Muslim minorities in Athens and provide the right to elect imams to the Muslim minority in Western Thrace. PM Erdogan and other senior government officials within the AKP have indicated that they do not necessarily see these points as reliant upon one another, possibly a step toward a solution in Turkey. (Comment: In our view, the individual rights of the citizens of one country should not be dependent upon the actions of another country. Furthermore, the issues and dispute between groups in Turkey and Greece are very different. In Turkey, the larger issues involve property rights and the Halki question. In Greece the issues focus on the complex question of the imam's dual role as both a religious leader comparable to the religious leaders of the Christian communities here, and their role as administrative judges carrying out Sharia law and thus agents of the State. End Comment.) Comment: Open and Honest Dialogue Needed -------------- ¶13. (C) We should press both the GOT and the Patriarchate to begin real and open conversations on a way forward on Halki and on other issues facing the Greek Orthodox minority in Turkey. This will require opening a dialogue with the Greek Diaspora groups in the U.S. who want to see a solution to this issue as well. PM Erdogan seems ready to engage on these issues, and the Patriarch has indicated willingness as well. However, neither side has actively pursued an action plan. JEFFREY ANKARA 00001700 004 OF 004 "Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.s gov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey"