"DEMOCRATIC OPENING" DEBATE UNDERSCORES RIFTS IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001653 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/SE E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2019 TAGS: PGOV PINR TU SUBJECT: "DEMOCRATIC OPENING" DEBATE UNDERSCORES RIFTS IN PARLIAMENT REF: A. ANKARA 1604 ¶B. ANKARA 1514 Classified By: POL Counselor Daniel O'Grady, for reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The Turkish public was captivated by the unprecedented November 13 Parliamentary debate over the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government's "Democratic Opening" initiative. This is the initiative loosely defined as a set of government policies designed to broaden the scope of Turkish democracy with an understood goal of reconciling Turkey's disaffected Kurds with the state, thereby neutralizing domestic supporters of the terrorist Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK). Though stronger on details than previous announcements, the initiative as presented by MoI Atalay remains a collection of concrete short-term and vague long-term aspirations with no firm structure or timeline. The main opposition parties predictably lambasted the government for its handling of the issue, and predicted apocalypse for Turkey if it were to be enacted as the government envisions. The Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) offered its support in as moderate a voice as it could conjure. In contrast to the acrimonious debates on November 10 (held to discuss the agenda for discussing the Initiative),this round of debates was notable for the air of solemnity and respect that befits a mature democracy -- at least until the Prime Minister took the podium. End summary. At Last, Something Resembling a Plan -------------- ¶2. (U) Interior Minister Besir Atalay presented the government's Democratic Opening initiative to Parliament on November 13, opening official debate on an issue that has been percolating in the news since the summer. He presented the initiative as a method of both raising the standards of democracy in Turkey and eliminating terrorism. He outlined a number of steps that the AKP has made over its seven-year tenure, from the lifting of martial law over Turkey's southeastern provinces and the elimination of state security courts to ratifying UN conventions on equal rights (such as for the disabled and for migrants) and the increasing of punishments for those convicted of committing torture. Describing the initiative as a "dynamic process with an open end," he described some of the short-, medium-, and long-term steps the AKP hopes to accomplish. He highlighted the two �00A;most recent short-term goals: an amendment to an anti-terrorism law to ensure that children under 18 are tried in juvenile courts and are not given harsh sentences under anti-terrorism legislation, and an amended regulation under Turkey's broadcast laws that would allow 24-hour broadcasts on television and radio in languages other than Turkish. He also promised similar changes to come, such as allowing politicians to conduct election campaigns in languages other than Turkish. ¶3. (U) In the medium-term, Atalay proposed two new administrative bodies. The legislation for founding the first -- an independent Anti-Discrimination Committee -- is already underway. The second would remove the Human Rights Directorate from the Prime Ministry to create an independent human rights watchdog, a development the government has been promising for a while. These two organizations would consist of representatives from universities, bar associations, human rights organizations, and civil society organizations. Atalay envisions liaison offices in every district of Turkey holding roundtables and consultations with citizens to identify and help resolve cases of discrimination. Atalay said the government would also ratify the additional protocol to the UN Convention Against Torture, which would allow inspection of police detention areas by international observers. He also claimed that the government would improve implementation of legislation against hate-crimes and discrimination, stopping short of calling for hate crime legislation. Finally, he announced that the government would create an independent body to handle complaints against law enforcement officials. ¶4. (U) In the long-term, Atalay repeated the government's position in favor of creating a fully democratic civilian constitution. He noted the sensitivities of the opposition, ANKARA 00001653 002 OF 003 and argued that in so doing, the basic characteristics of the country would not be touched in revamping the constitution. Those in Favor... -------------- ¶5. (SBU) The opposition's reaction to the initiative proposals was predictable. The DTP and, to a lesser extent, the small parties in Parliament, pledged support to the initiative. The Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and Republican People's Party (CHP) -- who together could probably block any attempt to amend the constitution, but not laws or regulations -- were stridently against it, though for different reasons. DTP Chairman Ahmet Turk described the initiative as a project of peace that would solidify, rather than divide, the Turkish nation. He argued that previous Turkish governments ignored the fact of ethnicity in trying to solve Turkey's social, economic, and security problems, which invariably led to failure. Citing historical examples of state-sanctioned prejudice against Kurds, he claimed that only a program that works to eliminate such sentiments could succeed. ...And Those Opposed -------------- ¶6. (SBU) The MHP and CHP argued against the initiative: the MHP opposing it on ideology, and the CHP on details of implementation. MHP Chairman Devlet Bahceli described the government's project as a "Disintegration Initiative." He claimed that the government program would create new ethnic minorities with collective rights, which would feed separatist sentiments. He stressed that the Turks united under the Turkish flag, language, and state system precisely because they wanted to live one among another. Instead of focusing on ethnic identity, Bahceli argued that the government should solve Turkey's social problems by capturing and trying PKK members and lifting the burden of poverty across the country through development programs. Summing up his speech, Bahceli argued that the initiative was actually a plan concocted by "global actors" to lay hands on the water and oil resources of the Greater Middle East (deliberately referring to our Greater Middle East Project) using the Kurds as a proxy. ¶7. (SBU) CHP's Deniz Baykal took a more balanced approach before rejecting the initiative. He pointed out that the CHP had issued a report twenty years ago characterizing Turkey's Kurdish problem as arising from an insufficiency of democracy. He enumerated a list of policies that CHP had called for and noted their similarity to the AKP's initiative. He argued, however, that the Government was implementing its policies in cahoots with the PKK. He pointed to the return of PKK members from Iraq as an example. He stressed that not only did they return in an atmosphere of triumph, but they had not laid down their arms as a condition of returning. He argued that the government was clearly negotiating with the PKK and, in effect, surrendering to it, by giving it an apparent triumph without compensation. Baykal questioned why jailed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan's roadmap -- much anticipated during the summer -- has never been revealed to the public, insinuating that the public would see too many similarities between it and the initiative for comfort. He also argued that the government was creating a state that was not ethnically blind, claiming that though private broadcasts should be allowed in languages other than Turkish, the Turkish state had no business opening its own as it did in January with TRT-6 in Kurdish. Back to Business As Usual -------------- ¶8. (C) The final speaker was Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Reiterating many of Atalay's arguments, he criticized the opposition for being out of touch with the people. He accused them of having little empathy for families whose villages had been evacuated, whose pastureland had been appropriated by the state, and whose family members had died in fighting. He argued that the initiative was not primarily an anti-terrorism project, or even a project concerning ethnic differences, but one that promoted ANKARA 00001653 003 OF 003 individualism and democracy. The decorum and respect that had previously governed in the chamber began to break down as the PM spoke. As Erdogan increasingly addressed the opposition directly, hecklers increasingly challenged his assertions. Upon Erdogan's suggestion that there were certain people who opposed the initiative because they are benefiting politically from the unfair status quo, a group of CHP members left the chamber in protest. (Note: Surprisingly, MHP -- against whom the criticism was probably leveled -- stayed until the end of the PM's speech.) Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) The initiative -- as presented to Parliament -- reflects both the good and the bad of what we have been hearing from our contacts since the summer. The plan appears to be pragmatic, allowing for the government to put forward new reform proposals as opportunities and the political atmosphere allow. The short-term goals respond to some of what the press, parties, and polls suggest the Kurds want. The points Atalay presented as medium-term goals are actually already underway. However, although these reforms may appear positive in theory, Turkey's history is littered with the creations of ineffective -- or even obstructive -- oversight bodies. The key to success for the initiative will be whether there is cooperative implementation with civil society and independent lawyers to prevent abuse. The AKP's long-term goal of changing the constitution would be difficult to meet in the current political atmosphere, but if the short- and medium-term goals are implemented effectively, there could be less resistance to constitutional change in the future. ¶10. (C) Comment (cont.): That proper Parliamentary decorum was upheld until nearly the end of the debates is reassuring. Had the jeering, name-calling, and fighting that dominated the debate on November 10th continued on the 13th, it would have presaged the equivalent of a permanent filibuster as the parties competed to keep rational debate to a minimum. While Baykal's speech was negative, it was reassuring that the CHP could entertain good ideas presented well, and lent an air of potential cooperation. However, the petulant exit from the chamber by CHP members at a perceived provocation by the PM suggests that CHP can decide to be disruptive of parliamentary order when it sees fit. The AKP should not expect any help from CHP (less so from MHP) on the initiative, which will make its job of presenting it as a unifying project and gaining legitimacy for its medium- and long-term goals that much more difficult. JEFFREY "Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.s gov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey"