A/S GORDON'S NOVEMBER 12 MEETING WITH U/S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 001644 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2019 TAGS: PREL PARM MNUC MASS IR TU SUBJECT: A/S GORDON'S NOVEMBER 12 MEETING WITH U/S SINIRLIOGLU REF: ANKARA 1626 Classified By: AMB James F. Jeffrey, for reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary: MFA Undersecretary Sinirlioglu opened his November 12 meeting with EUR A/S Gordon by attempting to recast Erdogan's recent public efforts to deflect international community criticism of Iran's nuclear program as an idiosyncratic reaffirmation of NPT principles. Gordon cautioned that perceptions generated by those statements could impede Administration efforts to support Turkish requests in other areas. Sinirlioglu said Armenian withdrawal from the five occupied Azeri regions (rayon) could ease Turkish parliamentary ratification of the protocols. He offered to guarantee to Armenia that Turkey would prevent Azerbaijan from exploiting a withdrawal. Sinirliogu confirmed the GoT's willingness to proceed quickly with a historical commission inquiry into the events of 1915. He renewed the GoT request for the appointment of a USG Cyprus special representative. He reaffirmed Turkey's continued commitment to the Annan Plan's scheduled reduction of guarantors' troops on the island and implied flexibility on Turkey's security guarantee to Turkish Cypriots. He said Turkey would not implement the Ankara Additional Protocol until the EU implemented the Direct Trade Regulation with northern Cyprus. Deputy Undersecretary Cevikoz reiterated Turkey would not accept separate negotiation of the CFE Flank Regime. Gordon requested Sinirlioglu urge the Bosniaks to accept the Bildt-Steinberg package. Sinirlioglu identified France as the major obstacle to Turkey's EU aspiration. He cautioned that an excessive international focus on corruption in Afghanistan could undermine Karzai. He said Turkey is engaging Iraqi Kurds more fully than ever. End Summary. Iran -------------- ¶2. (C) MFA Undersecretary Feridun Sinirlioglu opened his November 12 meeting with EUR A/S Gordon by attempting to recast PM Erdogan's recent public efforts to deflect international community criticism of Iran's nuclear program as an idiosyncratic reaffirmation of NPT principles. Sinirlioglu regretted any "confusion" engendered by Erdogan's statements, emphasizing: "We don't want a nuclear Iran; we're doing everything we can to prevent that." At the same time, Sinirlioglu said, the GoT does not support a military solution to the Iranian problem. "We support P5-plus-1." In his own style, Sinirlioglu elaborated, the prime minister is reinforcing key NPT principles. He is credibly advocating a nuclear-free world and a nuclear-free Middle East to the Muslim street, thereby undercutting popular sympathy for Iran. Gordon confirmed Erdogan's statements had aroused concern in Washington. He emphasized world leaders' responsibility to communicate clearly to Tehran that its current course would lead inevitably to negative consequences for Iran. Armenia Protocols -------------- ¶3. (C) Sinirlioglu said simultaneous progress in the Minsk Group process is key to securing Turkish parliamentary ratification of the Armenia protocols. He regretted Armenia's insistence on "a package deal," that would resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh and Lachin Corridor issues simultaneously. He argued, if Yerevan began acting now on its agreement in principle to withdraw from the five rayon, Azerbaijan could be persuaded to initiate its own normalization process with Armenia: "This would help us pass the protocols." He said he objected to the Minsk Group Co-Chairs' pessimism: "They are creating obstacles that had not been there previously." Gordon agreed that the co-chairs were not optimistic, but that is because the Azeri and ANKARA 00001644 002 OF 004 Armenian leadership seem unready. He said Armenia would be reluctant to withdraw early from the five rayon for fear of losing leverage. That said, we should start thinking bigger. Sinirlioglu responded: "We have ideas and we will share them with you." If Sargsian fears withdrawal from the five rayon would make Armenia vulnerable militarily, he said, we could guarantee that we would not let Azerbaijan take any advantage. ¶4. (C) Gordon asked Sinirlioglu for ideas on securing Azeri tolerance for the protocols: If Turkey reached a natural gas transit agreement with Azerbaijan, would the Azeris tolerate movement on the protocols? Sinirlioglu predicted a gas transit agreement would be signed within a few weeks: "We are converging on price." Nevertheless, he added, the Turkish parliament's antipathy to the protocols comes from within, not from Azerbaijan. ¶5. (C) Gordon noted failure to ratify the protocols could increase the likelihood of a Congressional genocide resolution. Sinirlioglu repeated his opening assertion: The Turkish parliament must see Minsk Group process progress before it will ratify. He described Turkey and Armenia's signing of the protocols as history-making. "It wasn't easy for us or for Sargsian." Your people need to understand how difficult this is for us, he said. ¶6. (C) Gordon inquired about the composition of the historical fact-finding commission. Turkish Deputy Undersecretary Unal Cevikoz said the commission would consist of historians and academics. He said the GoT had given the Swiss a draft terms of reference. Sinirlioglu said: "We can make it happen soon." Cevikoz inquired about the desirability of a Minsk Group meeting on the margins of the Athens OSCE Summit. Gordon counter-proposed a co-chairs ministerial. Sinirlioglu suggested this could include bilaterals. Cyprus -------------- ¶7. (C) Sinirlioglu renewed the GoT's request for the USG's appointment of a Cyprus special representative. A prominent US role, he argued, would attract the attention of the international community and make the Cyprus talks more transparent. He regretted Chrystofias' perceived inclination to depart from the parameters of the long-established UN process by attempting to recast the inter-communal dispute as the internal problem of an EU member. "He is trying to make us forget 2004." He also strongly rejected Greek Cypriot assertions that Talat is guided by or takes orders from Ankara. Nevertheless, Sinirlioglu claimed, on power-sharing, the most difficult issue, "we are almost there." Likewise, "on property disputes, we are almost there." Gordon replied the USG did not rule out appointing a special representative, but noted the Greek tendency to see that more prominent US role as favoring the Turkish side. ¶8. (C) On the issue of security guarantees, Gordon said, Ankara can be either part of the problem or part of the solution. Ankara's insistence on a troop presence and guarantees is seen by Greek Cypriots as obstructive. Sinirlioglu replied: "The Annan Plan dealt with this." Annan provided for a decrease in troop levels in tranches over the course of 19 years down to, with Turkey's EU membership, 650 Turks and 950 Greeks. Gordon asked if the GoT would accept a reduction of its right to intervene from the whole island to just the Turkish Cypriot area. Sinirlioglu argued no one on the Turkish Cypriot side would accept a deal without guarantees. "Guarantees are meant for the whole island." He immediately qualified that statement by saying guarantees would depend on the parameters of a deal. "We have in mind the Annan formula" and guarantees would be "within that framework." We are prepared to discuss ANKARA 00001644 003 OF 004 guarantees, first, in a trilateral (UK-Turkey-Greece) format and, then, in a quadrilateral format, as we proposed in the letter to Papandreou. "I do not rule out creativity." ¶9. (C) Gordon said we also need creativity on the Ankara Additional Protocol. Sinirlioglu replied: "You should expect nothing unilateral from us. It is not politically feasible." He added December is a date for an EU assessment, not a deadline. Once the EU implements the Direct Trade Regulation with northern Cyprus, he said, we will implement the additional protocol. Sinirlioglu registered continued GoT interest in the 2006 Finnish EU Presidency proposal of a one-for-one opening of Turkish and Greek Cypriot ports. CFE Treaty -------------- ¶10. (C) Noting Turkey's stake in the CFE Treaty, Gordon recalled Russia had suspended its participation and stopped transferring data two years ago. Russian wants to revisit the Flank Regime, he said. How critical is this to Turkey? Cevikoz confirmed the GoT "attaches utmost importance to the Flank; however, "CFE and the Flank are integral. We cannot accept separate negotiation of a Flank Regime." "Russia is dragging its feet," he said, "That's why we can't move on the adapted CFE Treaty." Gordon argued that failure to adapt the treaty could leave Europe without conventional arms control. Cevikoz insisted Turkey did not want to be isolated in discussions with Russia on the Flank; the whole Alliance would have to be engaged. Gordon suggested the Allies should assemble on the issue and be prepared to think creatively. Bosnia -------------- ¶11. (C) Sinirlioglu portrayed Turkey as a contributing constructively to reconciliation in Bosnia. He said Turkey is trying to bring the Serbs "to a more acceptable position." He reported a Serbian request for Turkish assistance in finding a way to help the Bosnian Serbs and Bosniaks live together again. The Bosniaks, he maintained, "are comforted by our presence." He added, the Serbs want four mediators: the US, EU, Russia and Turkey. "We don't understand why the Europeans don't want us." We want you involved, Gordon replied. He requested Turkey tell Haris Siladjdzic that in an ideal world the USG would like to do away with entity voting; unfortunately, for the moment, that is not politically possible in Bosnia. Our goal now is enough constitutional change to establish a functional state that can stand by itself at the starting lines for NATO and EU membership. He urged Turkey to underscore to the Bosniaks that we cannot get more change than this now. If Bosnia progresses towards the EU, he added, more constitutional change will come. Sinirlioglu said Turkey will work together with the USG. He underscored the importance of keeping Turkey at the table: "The EU can't deliver the Bosniaks." ¶12. (C) Referring to the expected December MAP offer to Montenegro, Sinirlioglu argued that failure to make a simultaneous offer to Bosnia would be a mistake: "We want them in the same package." He added a MAP offer to Bosnia would help the stabilization process. Gordon replied Montenegro is ready for MAP and Bosnia isn't, a view the US shares with several Allies. He said Bosnia's agreement to the Bildt-Steinberg package would make it a better MAP candidate. Turkey's EU Candidacy -------------- ¶13. (C) Sinirlioglu admitted to frustration over the progress of Turkey's EU candidacy; however, he said, the government and the majority of the people are dedicated to the goal. ANKARA 00001644 004 OF 004 Turkey's EU membership, he continued, would resonate throughout the Muslim world and contribute to stabilization efforts in the Balkans, Caucasus and South Asia. We can work with the Germans, he said. "The problem is France." Gordon assured Sinirliolgu: "We advocate for you at every opportunity." Afghanistan -------------- ¶14. (C) Emphasizing the GoT's commitment to working closely with the United States on Afghan stabilization and development, Sinirlioglu said he expected an SRAP-led USG team for meetings here December 1 and 2. He cautioned against focusing excessively on Afghan government corruption to Karzai's detriment. He described Gordon Brown's recent public statement on Afghan corruption as particularly unhelpful. Gordon said the USG planned to brief the President's decision on changes to our military commitment to Afghanistan to Allies at NATO. Iraq -------------- ¶15. (C) Sinirlioglu described the October 30 visit by FM Davutoglu and Minister of Trade and Industry Caglayan to Erbil as historic. "We are engaging the Iraqi Kurds in a much deeper way." We want to work with Barzani, he said, to bring the PKK down from the mountains, disband and disarm them and reintegrate the majority of their members back into Turkish society. To do this, we need a credible deterrent against terrorism, he added. "We need your support on our requests for attack helicopters and UAVs." Gordon expressed appreciation for what Turkey is doing overall in Iraq. He emphasized the administration wants to be as supportive as possible of Turkey's arms transfer requests. This would be easier except for the recent perception that Turkey was diverging from the international community's position on Iran's nuclear ambitions. Sinirlioglu acknowledged "a perception problem," but reiterated his contention that Prime Minister Erdogan's recent public statements had advanced the international community's shared goals on Iran. Look East, but Use Discretion -------------- ¶16. (C) Referring to recent newspaper columns speculating about Turkey's reorientation to the east, Sinirlioglu asserted Turkey's European geography and political identity. He said the GoT's new neighborhood policy is eastward looking, but it will allow Turkey to become a model of European standards for the region. Gordon reminded Sinirlioglu the EU conditions its outreach on democratization and good behavior. ¶17. (U) A/S Gordon has cleared this cable. JEFFREY "Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.s gov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey"