TURKISH-ISRAELI RELATIONS CONTINUE TO SOUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001481 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/SE E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR TU IS SUBJECT: TURKISH-ISRAELI RELATIONS CONTINUE TO SOUR REF: TEL AVIV 2245 Classified By: Ambassador James Jeffrey, for reasons 1.4(b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Turkish-Israeli bilateral relations remain strained. GOT interlocutors attribute the tension to Israel's December Gaza operation and argue that the bilateral relationship will recover only when Israel allows improvements to the humanitarian situation in Gaza. The GOT's last-minute decision to exclude Israeli participation from the Anatolian Eagle joint military exercise further frayed ties, despite heroic efforts by the MFA, TGS, Israel, Italy, NATO, and us to make the best of a bad situation. Another sore point is that FM Davutoglu has yet to visit Israel since his appointment in May, although he has visited many of the other countries in the region in that same time period. Plans for an October trip by the FM to Israel are still up in the air due to GOI concerns over his desire to also visit Gaza. ¶2. (C) The Israeli Embassy here attributes the deterioration of the relationship exclusively to Prime Minister Erdogan. Meanwhile, military ties may also be weakening because of the decrease in senior-level visits. With each side expecting the other to make the first move, there is little prospect for near-term improvements in Turkey-Israeli relations. End Summary. GOT Still Angry Over Gaza -------------- ¶3. (C) PM Erdogan felt betrayed by then Israeli PM Olmert, when they met in Turkey just days before the start of Israel's Gaza operation last December, according to Ibrahim Kalin, foreign policy advisor to the Turkish PM. Kalin contended to us that Olmert had lied to Erdogan about Israeli intentions in Gaza. Kalin said it is now the GOI's responsibility to reach out to Ankara. He said there is no ideological barrier between the two countries, but that Erdogan cannot overlook Olmert's affront. Kalin pointedly told us Israel must address the humanitarian situation in Gaza and allow reconstruction to begin. ¶4. (C) PM Erdogan has publicly complained about Israel at international and domestic fora recently. Erdogan, while in New York last month for UNGA, discussed Israel and Gaza on multiple occasions. He complained to reporters that no one talks about the issue of Israel's possession of nuclear weapons or its use of phosphorous weapons in Gaza, but focuses on Iran's possible development of nuclear weapons. He also told them that there should be "accountability" for anyone guilty of war crimes in Gaza. A portion of his speech at UNGA focused on the Palestinian-Israel conflict with special emphasis on the Gaza conflict. During his address to his own Justice and Development Party's (AKP) congress, he again discussed Israel's nuclear weapons and the poor conditions in Gaza that, he claimed, were caused by Israel. (Comment: Erdogan and the AKP's rhetoric are likely an effort to tap into strong popular Turkish sympathies for the Palestinians. Erdogan's hardline on Israel has also yielded him points among Middle Eastern states, including Syria and Iran. End Comment) Politics behind Anatolian Eagle Decision -------------- ¶5. (C) The decision to exclude Israel from the Anatolian Eagle joint military exercise came from senior-level Turkish government officials only a week before the exercise was scheduled to commence. The Turkish DCHOD told our Ambassador that it was a political-level decision. Turkish MFA Israeli Desk Officer Rauf Denktas said the GOT was concerned the parliamentary opposition would condemn the government for allowing the same Israeli air force that had bombed Gaza to participate in the exercise. FM Davutoglu, in an interview with CNN on Sunday, appeared to link openly the exclusion of Israeli participation in the exercise to the lack of progress in improving the situation in Gaza. However, the Turkish Foreign Ministry said in statement on Monday that "is it wrong to derive political meaning or conclusion from ANKARA 00001481 002 OF 003 postponing of the international part of the exercise." It also urged Israeli officials to use "common sense" in their statements and attitudes with regard to the exercise following Israeli officials' claims in the press that Turkey postponed the exercise after opposing Israeli participation. Meanwhile, Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon was cited by Turkish media as stating that Turkey should pay no attention to reports in the Israeli media and "the continuation of historic strategic relations between Turkey and Israel is very important." ¶6. (SBU) In yet another development, pro-government papers Wednesday began carrying an account that the GOT had nothing to do with the decision, but rather it came from the Turkish Air Force as retaliation for Israeli failure to provide Heron UAVs Turkey has paid for. (Comment: While the Heron case is a complicated mess, we give this tale little credence. End Comment.) Senior Leadership Interaction Necessary -------------- ¶7. (C) Turkish-Israeli bilateral relations remain cool at the senior level of both governments, and visits by high-level Turkish officials are needed to return warmth to the relationship, according to Israeli Embassy Spokesman Amit Zarouk. He told us that the GOI has been encouraging a visit by a high-level Turkish official for months and the two countries have been negotiating a visit by Turkish FM Davutoglu. According to Zarouk and Denktas, Israeli President Peres has invited Davutoglu to present a speech at Peres's Presidential Conference in late October. ¶8. (C) According to the Turkish MFA Israel desk officer and an Israeli Embassy official, Davutoglu's wish to also visit the Palestinian Territories -- including Gaza -- has been a key sticking point. Zarouk told us that, at first, the GOI said it would tolerate Ramallah, but not Gaza. However, Israel recently said that it would also accept the FM visiting Gaza, under the condition he not cross from Israel. He said the GOI fears that HAMAS would exploit Davutoglu's presence in Gaza for political and public relations purposes. Ibrahim Kalin would not confirm that the visit would take place, but told us that if the FM visits Israel, he will also go to the West Bank and Gaza. He said that no matter what, Israel will be involved in Davutoglu's ability to visit Gaza since the Israelis control the Rafah crossing in Egypt. Denktas provided no concrete answer on the FM's attendance at the conference in Israel. ¶9. (C) According to Zarouk, a Davutoglu visit could create the goodwill necessary to move the relationship back on track. (Note: According to normal protocol the Israeli FM is due to visit Ankara, but it appears both sides are willing to skip that visit. End Note.) Once Davutoglu goes to Tel Aviv, it could clear the road for President Gul to reschedule his own postponed trip. According to the Israeli Embassy, the Israelis view these visits as necessary steps for Turkey to take if it wants to regain Israel's confidence. Additionally, Zarouk said that regular communication between the two Prime Ministers, currently nonexistent, would also go a long way in restoring the bilateral relationship. ¶10. (C) The Turkish and Israeli MFAs have maintained regular contact and continue to hold consultations, according to our Israeli and Turkish contacts. The Israeli Embassy's spokesperson told us that Israel has had difficulties getting meetings outside the MFA. Israel has been unable to arrange meetings with members of the Turkish Parliament or other officers in ministries besides the MFA. Israeli Embassy officials attribute their decline in contact with Turkish government officials to the chilling effect PM Erdogan's hostility towards Israel has had on subordinates. Military Ties Damaged -------------- ¶11. (C) The Turkish-Israeli military bilateral relationship has been a cornerstone of the strategic partnership, but cracks may be appearing in these relations. The GOT's ANKARA 00001481 003 OF 003 withdrawal of Israel's invitation to the Anatolian Eagle exercise curtails regular interaction between the two air forces. Turkey's Deputy Chief of Staff GEN Aslan Guner told the Ambassador on October 8 that he regretted deeply the political decision to exclude Israel and that he understood the U.S. decision to withdraw as well. He appreciated the way that the U.S. sought to limit damage to the Turkey-Israel relationship by stage managing a "postponement." The Turkish military values its relationship with Israel, as was demonstrated in August 2009 during the joint Turkey-US-Israel naval exercise "Reliant Mermaid." Zarouk told us that the GOI continues to wait for the Turkish CHOD to arrange his long-awaited visit to Israel and the postponed January 2009 Strategic Dialogue meeting has yet to be rescheduled. Denktas said that the Turkish military had no official visits to Israel scheduled for the rest of the year, but indicated that the two militaries are continuing their connections, including two exercises planned for the last quarter of 2009. Comment -------------- ¶12. (C) A Davutoglu trip could jump start high-level leadership interaction between the two nations. However, his recent comments during a press conference in Syria calling for the human tragedy in Gaza to end as soon as possible and for Israel to pay attention to culturally and religiously sensitive sites may weaken Davutoglu's ability to improve relations between the two countries. The restart of MEPP negotiations may provide the next opportunity for Turkish senior leadership to engage Israel if the Turkish FM does not attend the Israeli President's conference in late October. A Turkish journalist told us that if the MEPP resumes, Davutoglu would go to Israel because he would want to be involved in the process. Turkey's ties to Israel support its claim to regional leadership and its assertion that it is able to talk to all parties in its neighborhood. We will continue to remind our Turkish interlocutors (although the MFA does not need reminding) that Ankara is endangering its aspiration to become the region's mediator by allowing its ties to Israel to attenuate. But, ultimately, the question remains not so much whether Erdogan and Davutoglu want a relationship with Israel, but rather, whether they are willing to pay any price in compromise or concessions to maintain one. JEFFREY "Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.s gov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey"