TURKEY: ISN DELEGATION TWISTS ARMS, MAKES PROGRESS

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 001478

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2019
TAGS: KNNP MNUC PREL TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: ISN DELEGATION TWISTS ARMS, MAKES PROGRESS
TOWARD NEW ENRICHMENT GUIDELINES.

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Jeffrey for reason 1.4 (b, d)

Summary
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1. (C) During September 28 consultations with the Turkish
interagency in Ankara, ISN DAS Eliot Kang and ISN/NESS Office
Director Richard Stratford made a persuasive case for Turkey
to join the growing consensus for new guidelines at the
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to prohibit the transfer of
nuclear enrichment technology. Kang outlined in broad terms
how the work of the NSG supports the Administration's
non-proliferation policy and Stratford explained in detail
how far the USG has gone in negotiations to address the
individual concerns of NSG member states. Turkish leaders,
especially at the MFA and Prime Ministry, were open to the
USG arguments, and were quick to explain that Turkey's
hesitance to join consensus was based due to a lack of
development in its nuclear energy policy and a concern that
the new guidelines might deny Turkey some opportunity it
might need in the future. Turkish officials were grateful to
be engaged and said that this visit should prompt a
re-consideration of the inter-agency position at the NSG.
End Summary.

Engaging the Turkish Inter-Agency
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2. (C) A delegation led by ISN DAS Kang traveled to Turkey
on September 28 to press Turkey to re-consider its position
blocking consensus on new guidelines which would further
constrain the transfer of Enrichment and Reprocessing (ENR)
technology at the NSG. Kang and Stratford, together with
UNVIE Science Officer Lisa Hilliard, delivered a consistent,
powerful message in meetings with Turkish Atomic Energy
Commission Acting President Zafer Alper, Energy Ministry
Undersecretary Metin Kilci, Prime Ministry Foreign Policy
Adviser Hakan Fidan (also Turkey's IAEA governor) and,
finally, an inter-disciplinary team at the MFA led by Acting
Undersecretary Unal Cevikoz (who serves as PM Erdogan's
non-proliferation "Sherpa"). The Ambassador was an active
participant in the majority of the meetings.

Kang: New NSG Guidelines Central To President's Non-Pro Push
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3. (C) DAS Kang opened each meeting by explaining how
central non-proliferation issues are to President Obama's
policy. The President's first foreign policy speech and his
first foreign policy initiative were both focused on
non-proliferation. The proposed Nuclear Suppliers Group
guidelines to limit the transfer of enrichment and
reprocessing (ENR) technology are fundamental component of
U.S. non-proliferation policy. Kang explained in broad terms
how the guidelines would not establish new restrictions, but
would "capture the current norm" for sharing technology. He
described how these guidelines would make it more likely that
the firms which had developed commercial technology for
enrichment would build more facilities around the world. The
"black box" enrichment plant has become the standard, Kang
said, and the U.S. will utilize such commercial UNRENCO
plants with proprietary technology, yet will not have access
to this technology.

Stratford: Addressing Turkey's Concrete Concerns
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4. (C) ISN/NESS Director Stratford presented a formidable
case for how the U.S. was willing to adjust language in the
draft guidelines to meet the concerns of each NSG state,
provided these guidelines would not diminish the core goal of
preventing the transfer of enrichment technology, except
pursuant to the "black box," i.e. by keeping the enabling or
manufacturing technology from being disclosed. Stratford
outlined in detail each member state concern and how each was
being addressed. He warned that if negotiations proceeded as
expected, Turkey could soon be the only NSG state which had
not agreed to the new guidelines. Stratford took Turkey's
two specific concerns head-on. He said that the U.S. had
already struck language from the draft guidelines which
Turkey believed would establish "subjective criteria" on
issues related to stability in the region of a potential
recipient country.


5. (C) Stratford recognized that Turkey's second concern was
more complex and that no wordsmithing would resolve it.
Turkey sought an "exemption" for NPT states in good standing
so that they might seek enrichment technology from
technology-holder states. As such an exemption would
undercut the entire effort to restrain the unnecessary

transfer of centrifuge manufacturing technology, Stratford
said the U.S. would instead seek to address what we
understood was Turkey's reason to seek such an exemption:
Turkey was concerned that without the ability to enrich, its
energy security might be subject to political manipulation by
suppliers. Stratford stated that the U.S. was prepared to
provide firm assurances to ensure Turkey's access to nuclear
fuel. Stratford quoted from the U.S. - Turkey Agreement on
the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (our "123 Agreement"
which entered into force in June 2008),that the U.S. would
"endeavor to take such actions as may be necessary and
appropriate to ensure a reliable supply of nuclear fuel to
the republic of Turkey." He said that the Department of
Energy had authorized him to offer an additional step, making
this commitment even more specific: The U.S. had a stockpile
of HEU which it was converting into what amounted to a
national nuclear fuel bank. If Turkey's supply of fuel for
its commercial reactor was interrupted and could not be
supplied by commercial means, the U.S. would place Turkey
first in line to purchase, at market conditions, a reactor
core load while it sought alternate market supply.

TAEK: Turkey Wants To Own Every Part of the Fuel Cycle
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6. (C) Turkish Atomic Energy Agency (TAEK) Acting President
Zafer Alper offered the strongest resistance to the USG
proposal. He said that Turkey's energy needs were growing at
more than six percent a year and that by 2030, Turkey was
expected to need to produce more than 100,000 megawatts of
electricity. Turkish policy directs that by 2030, fully 20
percent of this energy should be produced in nuclear power
plants. Alper said that from both a strategic and an
economic standpoint, Turkey must ensure that each stage of
the fuel process was managed indigenously, with no dependence
on outside suppliers. Alper questioned whether the new
guidelines were necessary, since there had never been a case
where a technology-holder state had shared the enrichment
technology with another state. Kang pushed back, saying that
the new guidelines were intended to make it easier for
private consortia to transfer the capability to enrich to
other states without transferring the enabling technology.
The Ambassador was more blunt: he said that if Turkey's
economic plan relies on a country sharing enrichment
technology with it, then it does not have a viable plan. If
Turkey is seen as opposing new safeguards, the Ambassador
continued, then Western firms may well feel uncomfortable in
making bids which would commit them to a long-term
relationship with Turkey.


7. (C) Energy Ministry Undersecretary Mehmet Kilci was
clearly least involved in the NSG decision process, but
stressed Turkey's need to develop its nuclear power industry
and that this had been a political goal for years. This goal
had grown in importance as Turkey's energy dependence on
Russia had increased. He reiterated that Turkey was
committed to the NPT and was a leader in several
non-proliferation regimes. Kilci said that the U.S.
approaches had prompted the GOT to re-consider its position
at the NSG and that a decision should be ready by November.

PM Advisor Open to U.S. Proposals
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8. (C) Hakan Fidan, PM Erdogan's foreign policy advisor and
Turkey's Governor at the IAEA, a key player in the NSG
decision, was open in discussing how Turkey had come to its
current position in opposition to new ENR guidelines.
Turkey's nuclear industry is still in its infancy, and very
few at the policy level understood fully what was being asked
of Turkey at the NSG. Decisions therefore were being taken
at the working level, where officials tended to look at the
"worst case" scenario. Fidan appreciated the new U.S.
commitments to ensure supply of nuclear fuel and said that
they would "help Turkey move toward your position." Turkey
needed a new level of comfort and assurances, Fidan
concluded, and may approach the U.S. with further questions.

MFA "Almost Convinced," But Will Wait For Interagency View
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9. (C) MFA Deputy Undersecretary Unal Cevikoz expressed deep
appreciation for the U.S. delegation's visit and its
readiness to engage with the Turkish inter-agency. He
described in broad outlines Turkey's objections to the
proposed guidelines, and was frank about the fact that some
of them seemed based not merely in the text of the
guidelines. "Turkey does not want to be considered in the
same basket of countries as Iran," Cevikoz explained, and
said that Turkey did not want to be hindered in its relations

with Allies if it chose to pursue enrichment technology.
Cevikoz said that a significant difference between Turkey and
other NSG states was its relative ignorance in nuclear power
issues. This uncertainty made decisionmakers cautions. Kang
and Stratford presented a strong case, with Kang dismissing
out of hand any suggestion that Turkey would be considered at
any time with Iran. Stratford again laid out how the U.S.
would make sure that - should the market fail - the U.S. was
willing to make a written commitment to ensure that Turkey
had access to nuclear fuel. Cevikoz appreciated the U.S.
proposals and said that while he found them persuasive, he
would need to engage with the rest of Turkey's inter-agency
before any decisions were taken.


10. (U) DAS Kang and ISN Director Stratford cleared this
telegram.

JEFFREY

"Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.s
gov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey"