TURKEY: ISN DELEGATION TWISTS ARMS, MAKES PROGRESS

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 001478 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2019 TAGS: KNNP MNUC PREL TU SUBJECT: TURKEY: ISN DELEGATION TWISTS ARMS, MAKES PROGRESS TOWARD NEW ENRICHMENT GUIDELINES. Classified By: Ambassador James F. Jeffrey for reason 1.4 (b, d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) During September 28 consultations with the Turkish interagency in Ankara, ISN DAS Eliot Kang and ISN/NESS Office Director Richard Stratford made a persuasive case for Turkey to join the growing consensus for new guidelines at the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to prohibit the transfer of nuclear enrichment technology. Kang outlined in broad terms how the work of the NSG supports the Administration's non-proliferation policy and Stratford explained in detail how far the USG has gone in negotiations to address the individual concerns of NSG member states. Turkish leaders, especially at the MFA and Prime Ministry, were open to the USG arguments, and were quick to explain that Turkey's hesitance to join consensus was based due to a lack of development in its nuclear energy policy and a concern that the new guidelines might deny Turkey some opportunity it might need in the future. Turkish officials were grateful to be engaged and said that this visit should prompt a re-consideration of the inter-agency position at the NSG. End Summary. Engaging the Turkish Inter-Agency -------------- ¶2. (C) A delegation led by ISN DAS Kang traveled to Turkey on September 28 to press Turkey to re-consider its position blocking consensus on new guidelines which would further constrain the transfer of Enrichment and Reprocessing (ENR) technology at the NSG. Kang and Stratford, together with UNVIE Science Officer Lisa Hilliard, delivered a consistent, powerful message in meetings with Turkish Atomic Energy Commission Acting President Zafer Alper, Energy Ministry Undersecretary Metin Kilci, Prime Ministry Foreign Policy Adviser Hakan Fidan (also Turkey's IAEA governor) and, finally, an inter-disciplinary team at the MFA led by Acting Undersecretary Unal Cevikoz (who serves as PM Erdogan's non-proliferation "Sherpa"). The Ambassador was an active participant in the majority of the meetings. Kang: New NSG Guidelines Central To President's Non-Pro Push -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) DAS Kang opened each meeting by explaining how central non-proliferation issues are to President Obama's policy. The President's first foreign policy speech and his first foreign policy initiative were both focused on 
non-proliferation. The proposed Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines to limit the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technology are fundamental component of U.S. non-proliferation policy. Kang explained in broad terms how the guidelines would not establish new restrictions, but would "capture the current norm" for sharing technology. He described how these guidelines would make it more likely that the firms which had developed commercial technology for enrichment would build more facilities around the world. The "black box" enrichment plant has become the standard, Kang said, and the U.S. will utilize such commercial UNRENCO plants with proprietary technology, yet will not have access to this technology. Stratford: Addressing Turkey's Concrete Concerns -------------- --- ¶4. (C) ISN/NESS Director Stratford presented a formidable case for how the U.S. was willing to adjust language in the draft guidelines to meet the concerns of each NSG state, provided these guidelines would not diminish the core goal of preventing the transfer of enrichment technology, except pursuant to the "black box," i.e. by keeping the enabling or manufacturing technology from being disclosed. Stratford outlined in detail each member state concern and how each was being addressed. He warned that if negotiations proceeded as expected, Turkey could soon be the only NSG state which had not agreed to the new guidelines. Stratford took Turkey's two specific concerns head-on. He said that the U.S. had already struck language from the draft guidelines which Turkey believed would establish "subjective criteria" on issues related to stability in the region of a potential recipient country. ¶5. (C) Stratford recognized that Turkey's second concern was more complex and that no wordsmithing would resolve it. Turkey sought an "exemption" for NPT states in good standing so that they might seek enrichment technology from technology-holder states. As such an exemption would undercut the entire effort to restrain the unnecessary transfer of centrifuge manufacturing technology, Stratford said the U.S. would instead seek to address what we understood was Turkey's reason to seek such an exemption: Turkey was concerned that without the ability to enrich, its energy security might be subject to political manipulation by suppliers. Stratford stated that the U.S. was prepared to provide firm assurances to ensure Turkey's access to nuclear fuel. Stratford quoted from the U.S. - Turkey Agreement on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (our "123 Agreement" which entered into force in June 2008),that the U.S. would "endeavor to take such actions as may be necessary and appropriate to ensure a reliable supply of nuclear fuel to the republic of Turkey." He said that the Department of Energy had authorized him to offer an additional step, making this commitment even more specific: The U.S. had a stockpile of HEU which it was converting into what amounted to a national nuclear fuel bank. If Turkey's supply of fuel for its commercial reactor was interrupted and could not be supplied by commercial means, the U.S. would place Turkey first in line to purchase, at market conditions, a reactor core load while it sought alternate market supply. TAEK: Turkey Wants To Own Every Part of the Fuel Cycle -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Turkish Atomic Energy Agency (TAEK) Acting President Zafer Alper offered the strongest resistance to the USG proposal. He said that Turkey's energy needs were growing at more than six percent a year and that by 2030, Turkey was expected to need to produce more than 100,000 megawatts of electricity. Turkish policy directs that by 2030, fully 20 percent of this energy should be produced in nuclear power plants. Alper said that from both a strategic and an economic standpoint, Turkey must ensure that each stage of the fuel process was managed indigenously, with no dependence on outside suppliers. Alper questioned whether the new guidelines were necessary, since there had never been a case where a technology-holder state had shared the enrichment technology with another state. Kang pushed back, saying that the new guidelines were intended to make it easier for private consortia to transfer the capability to enrich to other states without transferring the enabling technology. The Ambassador was more blunt: he said that if Turkey's economic plan relies on a country sharing enrichment technology with it, then it does not have a viable plan. If Turkey is seen as opposing new safeguards, the Ambassador continued, then Western firms may well feel uncomfortable in making bids which would commit them to a long-term relationship with Turkey. ¶7. (C) Energy Ministry Undersecretary Mehmet Kilci was clearly least involved in the NSG decision process, but stressed Turkey's need to develop its nuclear power industry and that this had been a political goal for years. This goal had grown in importance as Turkey's energy dependence on Russia had increased. He reiterated that Turkey was committed to the NPT and was a leader in several non-proliferation regimes. Kilci said that the U.S. approaches had prompted the GOT to re-consider its position at the NSG and that a decision should be ready by November. PM Advisor Open to U.S. Proposals -------------- ¶8. (C) Hakan Fidan, PM Erdogan's foreign policy advisor and Turkey's Governor at the IAEA, a key player in the NSG decision, was open in discussing how Turkey had come to its current position in opposition to new ENR guidelines. Turkey's nuclear industry is still in its infancy, and very few at the policy level understood fully what was being asked of Turkey at the NSG. Decisions therefore were being taken at the working level, where officials tended to look at the "worst case" scenario. Fidan appreciated the new U.S. commitments to ensure supply of nuclear fuel and said that they would "help Turkey move toward your position." Turkey needed a new level of comfort and assurances, Fidan concluded, and may approach the U.S. with further questions. MFA "Almost Convinced," But Will Wait For Interagency View -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) MFA Deputy Undersecretary Unal Cevikoz expressed deep appreciation for the U.S. delegation's visit and its readiness to engage with the Turkish inter-agency. He described in broad outlines Turkey's objections to the proposed guidelines, and was frank about the fact that some of them seemed based not merely in the text of the guidelines. "Turkey does not want to be considered in the same basket of countries as Iran," Cevikoz explained, and said that Turkey did not want to be hindered in its relations with Allies if it chose to pursue enrichment technology. Cevikoz said that a significant difference between Turkey and other NSG states was its relative ignorance in nuclear power issues. This uncertainty made decisionmakers cautions. Kang and Stratford presented a strong case, with Kang dismissing out of hand any suggestion that Turkey would be considered at any time with Iran. Stratford again laid out how the U.S. would make sure that - should the market fail - the U.S. was willing to make a written commitment to ensure that Turkey had access to nuclear fuel. Cevikoz appreciated the U.S. proposals and said that while he found them persuasive, he would need to engage with the rest of Turkey's inter-agency before any decisions were taken. ¶10. (U) DAS Kang and ISN Director Stratford cleared this telegram. JEFFREY "Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.s gov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey"