TURKEY: ANKARA BRAVES OPPOSITION TO ARMENIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001328 SIPDIS EPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/SE E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV TU AM SUBJECT: TURKEY: ANKARA BRAVES OPPOSITION TO ARMENIA PROTOCOLS REF: ANKARA 1310 Classified By: POL Counselor Daniel O'Grady, for reasons 1.4(b,d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Opposition parties continue to object vigorously to the Turkish MFA's August 31 announcement of the agreement between Turkey and Armenia to begin consultations on bilateral protocols on establishing diplomatic relations and opening the border. Given the opposition's pre-existing rage against the government's Democratic (Kurdish) Initiative, the GOT has shown noteworthy resolve in launching another chapter in the Armenia rapprochement effort. As it unfolds, the key may lie in how Ankara is able to portray developments on Nagorno-Karabakh as forward movement. END SUMMARY. The Opposition Mobilizes -------------- ¶2. (C) Although not as vocal in their criticism as they were after the release of the April public statement on the Turkey-Armenia normalization process, the main opposition parties, CHP and MHP, continue to insist that resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) precede normalization of relations with Armenia. Onur Oymen, CHP Vice Chairman, told us that, while he in theory wants normalization with Armenia and the border to open, there is no way he and CHP can support the protocols without Armenia withdrawing from Azeri territory. He criticized the protocols for not even mentioning N-K and quoted a past statement by Prime Minister Erdogan asserting that normalization could happen "only" after N-K was resolved. He said he would hold the ruling party to this. MHP Deputy Group Chairman Oktay Vural said his party would, in principle, favor normalization, but only after Armenia withdrew from Azeri territory, abandoned its territorial claims on Turkey, and renounced its effort to portray the events of 1915 as genocide. The last item was a shared theme among most of our interlocutors. Academics and Think Tanks Weigh In -------------- ¶3. (C) Sinan Ogan of the Turkish Centre for International Relations and Strategic Analysis said the timing of parliament's consideration of the protocols could be especially problematic for the government. Two controversial agenda items will come before parliament simultaneously: the Armenian protocols and the Democratic (Kurdish) initiative. This, Ogan argued, will make the government's management of public opinion and progress on N-K even more critical. Kaan Soyak, the President of the Turkey-Armenia Business Council lauded the government's courage and said problems with opposition groups and blowback from Azerbaijan would be manageable, but only if N-K is resolved. He said some CHP members could be brought around but that Oymen will continue to bring the focus back to N-K, and he predicted that MHP will cite the murder of Turkish diplomats by the terrorist Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenian (ASALA) to arouse MPs and the public against the protocols. Still, Professor Kemal Cicek and Dr. Bestami Bilgi, members of the Turkey Historical Society (and likely members of the proposed Turkey-Armenia Historical Commission) said they expected the Turkish parliament to ratify the protocols as long as the government asserted discipline over its MPs. View from the Border -------------- ¶4. (C) In the province of Kars, adjacent to Turkey's border with Armenia, those we spoke with were less focused on Azerbaijan and NK, and more on which border gates might be opened to their economic benefit. Ihsan Karayazi, a UN Development Program project manager said the general feeling in Kars toward the protocols is positive. People are encouraged, he said, but fear parliamentary ratification will be difficult. He said he expects local Kars politicians to fall in line with their parties' positions. He predicts that, if the protocols are ratified, the Akuryan passage would be opened. The former mayor of Kars, Naif Alibey, said the gate to open should be the one in Kars, not in Igdir, because "Igdir has two border gates" (one is currently open to Azerbaijan) whereas Kars only has one, and it is the only rail and highway gate for the province. He also said that the nationalists in both countries continue to be against the process, and that the public must be well-prepared to support the process. ANKARA 00001328 002 OF 003 Media Reaction -------------- ¶5. (U) The announcement was the top story in all Turkish media. Coverage was generally positive with the caveat that progress in N-K is essential. Numerous papers reminded readers of both the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister's statements that Turkey would keep Azerbaijan's interests in mind, and that the border opening rests on "ending the occupation" of Nagorno-Karabakh. Milliyet columnist Semih Idiz described the protocols process as courageous. He said the ruling parties in both parliaments have the majorities necessary to ratify the protocols. Abdulhamit Bilici in Islamist-oriented "Zaman" argued pragmatically: "Imposing a strong precondition on the Karabakh issue fails to benefit Turkey or Azerbaijan. Therefore Ankara is NOW pursuing a different approach by not closing the negotiation door with Armenia at the beginning. This method will pave the way for creating reconciliation between Baku and Yerevan as well." Fehmi Koru wrote in Islamist-oriented "Yeni Safak": "Ankara and Yerevan are taking very important diplomatic steps that will help resolve the conflict between Baku and Yerevan eventually. Thus the Baku administration has to be more supportive of the process than ever before." Parliament Ratification Process -------------- ¶6. (U) After the six week discussion period, during which PM Erdgoan will hold consultations with opposition parties, NGOs, academics, the media, and other relevant institutions, the protocols will be signed by the respective governments. They will then be sent to the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) for ratification. According to the Turkish legal code, international treaties are adopted by the TGNA by a law approving the ratification. The law is ratified by a simple majority, with a quorum minimum of 1/3 (184 members). At the time of voting, at least 1/4 (139 members) must still be present. Once ratified, it may not be contested and everything contained in the protocols is binding. The process will take the following steps: - After signing, the protocols will be sent to the Prime Ministry, where they will be put into the form of a ratification law. - After preparation by the Prime Ministry, the ratification law will be sent to parliament. In parliament it will first go to the "Research Office" where it will be checked for compliance with the Turkish legal code. - It will then be sent to the Laws and Regulations department, which decides which committee of parliament it should go to (in this case, to the Foreign Affairs committee). - The Foreign Affairs committee will prepare a report with input from relevant subcommittees, and then it will be cleared again by the Laws and Regulations department. - It will then be distributed to all parliament members. Forty eight hours after distribution, it will be put at the bottom of the TGNA agenda. - The Prime Ministry can urge any particular item be moved up on the TGNA agenda calendar. The current legislative facilitator is from the ruling AK Party. - When the TGNA takes up the ratification law/protocols for discussion and voting, the voting will be open (all vote records are public.) Each member can vote either yes, no, or abstain. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) Prime Minister Erdogan's AKP enjoys a sizeable majority (338 seats) in the 550-seat Parliament, with the two major opposition parties holding only 97 seats (CHP) and 69 seats (MHP). If party discipline is imposed, the protocols will certainly be ratified. Nevertheless, given the considerable outcry from the opposition, and the pre-existing rage over Ankara's unfolding Kurdish initiative, the Government has shown significant resolve in opening this chapter in the Armenia rapprochement effort. Some of our contacts have suggested that the distraction over the Kurdish issue gives the Government more lattitude on the Armenia issue, which actually has broad appeal in Turkish society. ANKARA 00001328 003.2 OF 003 The key may lie in how Ankara is able to portray any developments on Nagorno-Karabakh as forward movement. SILLIMAN "Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.s gov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey"