S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001310

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON ETRD ENRG AM AZ IS IR TU
SUBJECT: CODEL WEXLER URGES TURKISH ACTION ON MIDDLE EAST
PEACE, ARMENIA, IRAN

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Doug Silliman for reasons 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) Summary. Rep. Robert Wexler met August 26-27 with a
wide array of top-level Turkish officials to discuss the
current state of U.S.-Turkish relations and to urge them to
push for greater regional support for President Obama's
initiatives on Middle East peace and his willingness to deal
with Iran. Wexler argued that if Turkey wants to play the
role of mediator in the Middle East peace process, it needs
to work to restore credibility with Israel. He also urged
the GOT to show positive movement on the Armenian
normalization talks. In addition, he discussed the GOT's
recent "democratic initiative," intelligence sharing,
U.S.-Turkish commercial relations, energy, and the status of
EU accession talks. End summary.


2. (U) In a whirlwind visit to Ankara August 26-28,
Congressman Robert Wexler met with President Abdullah Gul,
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, newly-elected Speaker of
the Turkish Grand National Assembly Mehmet Ali Sahin, Foreign
Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, National Defense Minister Vecdi
Gonul, Energy Minister Taner Yildiz, and State Minister for
EU Affairs Egemen Bagis. He also held a roundtable event
with leading Turkish intellectuals organized by the German
Marshall Fund. Rep. Wexler delivered the same consistent
messages to all interlocutors.

Middle East Peace Process
--------------


3. (C) In all his meetings except Yildiz, Wexler stressed the
need for urgent action on Middle East peace and encouraged
Turkey to use its influence with the Arab world to convey
this sense of urgency. He observed that Israeli PM
Netanyahu's recent move toward freezing settlements is a
major shift brought about by the new U.S. position, but there
has been no corresponding movement on the Arab side, which
seems to feel that it does not have to budge at all from the
Arab peace initiative. Turkey can p

lay a key role in pushing
the Arab world to action, he argued, but if it wants to play
an active role in mediation, it needs to regain its
credibility with the Israeli public and do more to repair the
damage wrought by the Davos incident.


4. (C) Gul noted that he has consistently pressed regional
leaders to take advantage of the opportunity presented by
President Obama and to support him. He also has stressed
that a solution to the issue cannot come from the U.S. alone,
but that the region has a responsibility to participate.


5. (S) Davutoglu promised that he would share Wexler's
concerns with the Arab world during an upcoming regional tour
to Egypt, Jordan, and possibly Saudi Arabia and the
Palestinian territories. He noted that the three months
leading up to the Palestinian elections will be critical and
that Turkey supports President Obama's initiative without
reservation.

Armenia
--------------


6. (C) Wexler expressed his appreciation for the courageous
moves the GOT has taken in starting the normalization process
with Armenia. He noted his concern, however, that the lack
of apparent progress since April has given ammunition to
Turkey's opponents. Wexler urged the GOT to "declare" to the
Parliament the progress made to date and show forward
momentum.


7. (C) Erdogan responded that he "will do this" when
Parliament reconvenes in October. Gul admitted that
negotiations with Armenia have not been as successful as
hoped. He expressed his hope that President Sargsian would
accept his invitation to the soccer match in Bursa on October

14. Gul also stressed the importance of Russia's support to
resolution of the issue, saying that it can effectively veto
any solution. He noted that he had personally spoken with
both Putin and Medvedev and received assurances that they do
want to see the situation resolved. Davutoglu stressed that
the normalization is part of Turkey's "zero problem" foreign

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policy with its neighbors, not a response to U.S. pressure,
and that Turkey is committed to a resolution to meet its own
interests. He observed that just as Armenia is constrained
by Russia, Turkey cannot ignore Azeri interests and Armenia
needs to understand that normalization with Turkey is not a
card it can play in the Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations.

Iran
--------------


8. (C) Wexler underlined the resolve of President Obama to
prevent Iran from being a nuclear power and urged Turkey to
convince Iran that it should reach out and accept the
President's outstretched hand. Gul noted that Iran is going
through a complicated internal power struggle and that the
leadership is confused about what to do with the U.S. During
a visit to Tehran in March, Gul met with Supreme Leader
Khamenei and Ahmedinajad and urged them to accept President
Obama's offer. He claimed that they did not refute any of
his points, but were also unsure about how to proceed. On
the nuclear issue, he said that it is no longer just a
program of Ahmedinajad and the mullahs but rather a goal of
many Iranians. He felt, however, that President Obama is
supported by a majority of Iranians so there is an
opportunity for action.

Intelligence Sharing/Counterterrorism
--------------


9. (C) Erdogan expressed his gratitude for the intelligence
sharing against the PKK, but indicated a desire for still
further cooperation in eliminating this terrorist threat. In
the meeting with the National Defense Minister, Gonul echoed
the PM and said the cooperation to date has made Turkey's
fight against PKK terrorism much more successful. Gonul told
Wexler that Turkey sought to procure UAV systems from the
U.S., and said that Secretary Gates had warned him that while
the Administration supported the sale in principle, the U.S.
Congress might not support the sale of an armed UAV to
Turkey. Gonul expressed hope that Wexler would be a strong
proponent of this transfer. Wexler said he recognized how
important these systems would be to Turkey's efforts, but
pointed out that the best way to speed passage of these
systems through Congress would be for Turkey to take action
on improving relations with Armenia and on re-opening Halki
Seminary.

Democratic Opening
--------------


10. (C) All interlocutors mentioned the GOT's recent
Democratic (Kurdish) Initiative, and Wexler expressed his
support for the courageous move. Gul described it as a
"wholescale effort for higher democratic standards" while
Erdogan asserted it is both an anti-terror initiative and an
original goal of the AKP. He noted that the project aims to
provide not only expansion of minority rights, but also
education, health services, energy, roads, and urban
transformation to the underserved eastern region. He
expressed his disgust with the "ugly accusations" of the
opposition that it is a U.S. project, and emphasized that
this is a Turkish plan for Turkish citizens.


11. (C) Wexler pointed out that the opening also provides
space for dealing with the rights of other minorities, and as
an example emphasized the positive benefits that could result
from addressing the concerns of the Greek Orthodox community.
Bagis indicated that he would consider a private meeting
with the Greek community during a future visit to DC to
discuss these possibilities.


12. (C) During the German Marshall Fund event, the angst of
the opposition parties over the plan was clear.
Representatives from several smaller parties complained less
about the nature of the project and more about the way the
government simply announced it without consulting them.
Wexler noted that there is room for legitimate disagreement
on the tactics of the opening, but that the opposition needed
to be credible and rational in its approach and not resort to
the politics of fear and prejudice to lower the level of

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discussion, as with allegations of U.S. involvement or plans
to dismember the Turkish state.

U.S.-Turkish Commercial Relations
--------------


13. (C) Erdogan, Gul, Davutoglu, and Bagis all made reference
to the need to increase U.S.-Turkish commercial relations and
the commitment of President Obama to form a task force to
address this need. Bagis and Davutoglu both speculated that
there was a secret executive order to restrict Turkish trade
as the only explanation for why trade with the U.S. has not
tripled as it has with Russia (Note: This argument ignores
both geographical differences and the fact that Turkey's
trade with Russia is almost entirely imported hydrocarbons,
which tripled in price. Turkish exports to Russia in 2009
are only marginally higher than exports to the U.S. End
note.) Both also raised the perennial idea of Qualified
Industrial Zones in Turkey as a quick way to increase trade.


14. (C) Wexler dismissed the idea of a secret executive
order, but agreed that the economic leg of the relationship
needs to be strengthened. He argued that this will need to
be driven by the private sector, but that there seem to be
opportunities especially in clean energy and in
pharmaceuticals.

Energy
--------------


15. (C) Energy Minister Yildiz told Wexler that Turkey has
fulfilled its responsibilities with regard to Nabucco by
hosting and signing the Nabucco IGA and thus has done its
part for EU energy supply security. In the past several
months, Turkey has been examining other possible energy
projects to see which are feasible, including the recent
deals with Russia, a deal with Georgia on electricity, deals
with Syria on electricity and gas, talks with Qatar on gas
supplies, and work with Greece and Italy on the
Interconnector for Turkey-Greece-Italy (ITGI). He said
Turkey has "reached the signing stage" on a gas agreement
with Azerbaijan.


16. (C) In response to Wexler's questions about areas for
increased business cooperation between the U.S. and Turkey,
Yildiz suggested oil and gas exploration in the Black Sea and
joint ventures in third countries such as Iraq. He said
Turkey also has strong potential for solar and wind power but
needs lower technology costs to speed development. Yildiz
stressed the importance the GOT places on private sector
investment in the energy sector and said he would support
increased U.S. investment.

EU Accession
--------------


17. (C) Bagis admitted that progress on EU accession talks
has slowed, and that getting substantial results has become
more difficult. He argued that there has been technical
progress in reform but that he must constantly pull new
rabbits out of the hat and show continued movement to
overcome increasing resistance both in Turkey and in Europe.
He expressed his regret that Turkey had only opened one
chapter during the Czech presidency and was pessimistic about
the chances to open more during the Swedish term. He was
especially frustratedby the freeze on the energy chapter,
which complicates discussions in an area where Turkey can be
of massive benefit to Europe.


18. (U) Representative Wexler did not have an opportunity to
clear this cable.

SILLIMAN

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