TURKEY: A PERSPECTIVE ON THE KURDISH ISSUE FROM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001295 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2019 TAGS: PGOV PTER PHUM TU SUBJECT: TURKEY: A PERSPECTIVE ON THE KURDISH ISSUE FROM THE SOUTHEAST Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Jeremiah Howard; Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). This is a Joint Embassy Ankara - Consulate Adana Cable. Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Adana Principal Officer Daria Darnell, accompanied by Embassy Poloff and a locally-employed political advisor, engaged local political and NGO leaders on the Democratic (Kurdish) Initiative during a trip to six provinces in southeastern Turkey from August 17-21. Turkish Kurds expressed cautious optimism about the Government of Turkey's (GOT) recently announced initiative. They argued violence (both PKK-initiated and military operations) must end, and most believe the PKK needs to be brought down from the mountains and into the mainstream. Many viewed jailed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan as a legitimate leader, and believe the GOT must allow him to play a role in the negotiations. They say the GOT should begin with short-term goals to build confidence among the people, followed by medium-term and long-term efforts. Many interlocutors expressed a desire for devolution of centralized government power to the local level. As restrictions on freedom of expression are relaxed, Turkish Kurds have begun to debate their political future among themselves openly for the first time. Continued collaborative dialogue with all parties is seen as vital for the success of GOT initiatives. There was a strong sentiment the U.S. should play a role in the solution, but there was no clear agreement on what that role should be. End Summary. Optimistic and Excited... -------------- ¶2. (C) During a trip to southeastern Turkey, local Turkish Kurd political and NGO leaders said they were optimistic and excited about the GOT's recently announced Democratic Initiative. Many mayors in the region described the situation as the most positive they had seen in the past 25 years. Expectations across the region were high, and our contacts expressed the hope the GOT might be able to solve the issue once and for all. The Mayor of Siirt, Selim Sadak, said even though he had been "beaten, detained, and thrown in prison," he was still hopeful for the success of the current initiative. ...But Cautious -- Very Cautious -------------- ¶3. (C) Almost everyone tempered their optimism with heavy doses of caution and, at times, fear. Most Kurdish leaders in the region stated the GOT had made forward-leaning statements in the past that caused them to feel hopeful for a solution, only to have their hopes dashed. Most leaders believe the GOT is sincere in its efforts to reach out to the Kurdish population as evidenced by expanded linguistic rights for Kurds. That said, the state continued to arrest political leaders who spoke Kurdish at political rallies, causing some to question the reach of the initiative. The mayor of Eruh, Mehmet Melih Oktay, said there were five outstanding cases against him for speaking Kurdish at public functions or meetings, and he feared he would be sent to jail after his trials. Sahismail Bedirhanoglu, a business leader in Diyarbakir said, "We think that things are changing, but we are scared that things will not." Kurds had been burned too many times in the past, he said, to trust the GOT without reservation. Violence Should End, and the PKK Wants a Role -------------- ¶4. (C) Leaders on all sides of the issue agreed that violence needed to end immediately. Governors in the region stated that the PKK should lay down their weapons and return to civilian lives. Kurdish officials insisted military ANKARA 00001295 002 OF 003 operations against the PKK needed to stop first to build the confidence needed to convince PKK fighters to lay down their weapons. They feared that, without some type of acceptable amnesty law, PKK fighters who gave up violence would be arrested and possibly tortured in GOT prisons. Many Kurdish leaders felt that past PKK activity was a justified response to the GOT's oppression of Kurds. Mayor Sadak said if the GOT wanted to bring the PKK down from the mountains, it was going to have to negotiate with the PKK. Ocalan's Involvement Critical to Success -------------- ¶5. (C) Kurdish mayors and NGO leaders generally agreed that Ocalan's involvement in the process was critical to its success. Mayor Sadak stated that jailed PKK leader Ocalan was "chosen by us as the leader of the Kurdish people in Turkey," and mayor Oktay noted that without Ocalan's participation, any negotiations would be meaningless. Seyhmus Ulek, a human rights lawyer in Sanliurfa who was vehemently anti-PKK and anti-Ocalan (he called Ocalan a "dictator"),agreed that Ocalan's participation was necessary, but thought the GOT was already doing such negotiations behind the scenes. Most Turkish Kurd leaders expressed hope in the upcoming release of Ocalan's "road map" for the future of the Kurdish issue in Turkey. (Note: Ocalan's road map was to be released on August 15, but, because his lawyers have been unable to travel to his Imrali island prison due to weather and "mechanical" problems with GoT boats, the road map's release is now tentatively scheduled for September first. End note.) Interestingly, while GOT officials were loath even to utter the name of Ocalan, Turkish Kurd leaders referred to him respectfully as "Sayin Ocalan" or more familiarly as "Apo." Short- and Long-Term Goals -------------- ¶6. (C) Across the southeast, there is a general recognition that both short- and long-term efforts are necessary for the GOT's initiative to be successful. However, it was difficult to get most Turkish Kurd leaders to focus on short-term goals; they insisted on immediate completion of longer-term goals that require constitutional reform. Most interlocutors grudgingly admitted that short-term efforts such as allowing Kurdish language use in politics and education, changing village names back to their old Kurdish names, dropping language-based charges against Kurdish leaders, and a cessation of military operations against the PKK would build enough trust and confidence in the people of the region to allow for debate and negotiation on long-term goals. Long-term changes could include legal provisions for amnesty for former PKK fighters, changes in the military and police structures and activities, an end to the Village Guard program, devolution of central government power to local officials, and changes in the Turkish Constitution to remove references to Turkish ethnicity. All the mayors, regardless of political party or ethnic affiliation, spoke of the need for the central government to devolve authority to local governments so that they could control roads, airports, traffic police, and other essential services. Dialogue Necessary: Even the Kurds Do Not Agree -------------- -- ¶7. (C) Most interlocutors agreed that a collaborative dialogue would be key to the success of any GOT initiative. They praised the Justice and Development Party's (AKP) consultations with many different groups, from opposition parties to NGOs, from bar associations to Chambers of Commerce. There was also a sense that, for the first time, Turkish Kurds were freely discussing the issues -- and in Kurdish, something not permitted in the past. Sezgin Tanrikulu, a human rights lawyer in Diyarbakir, stated he had recently attended a meeting in the city where Kurdish leaders from different parts of society came together to discuss the GOT's initiative. He said they were surprised because "we ANKARA 00001295 003 OF 003 did not even agree among ourselves as to what was needed for the future." He, and many others, stressed the importance of continuing the dialogue not only between Kurds and the GOT, but among Kurds themselves. The Road is Long -- and Patience is Necessary -------------- ¶8. (C) There was a distinct split among Turkish Kurd leaders in the region about how long the process should last. There were many mayors, NGO leaders, and lawyers whose rhetoric would not allow for anything short of a new constitution -- immediately. These leaders, when pushed, would admit there were short-term options but insisted they did not want to wait long for bigger changes. Other leaders recognized the solution would take a long time to implement; the governor of Sanliurfa, Nuri Oktan, stated the process could conceivably take 15 to 20 years. These leaders feared public patience might run out before the bigger reforms could be enacted. They also worried the GOT, the military, or the PKK might engage in some sort of provocation, attempting to sabotage the peace process before it ever got off the ground. Most believed, however, the process could weather setbacks, given the strong public support for the initiative. Kurds Want U.S. Involvement -- But are Unsure How -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) Most of our interlocutors spoke of the importance of U.S. involvement in the process between the GOT and its Kurdish citizens. When pressed for details, they explained the U.S. could play a role in helping PKK fighters leave northern Iraq to return to Turkey (or to a third country). Some also suggested the U.S. could play the role of a non-biased interlocutor in negotiations between the GOT and the Turkish Kurds. Many leaders in the region suspected the U.S. was already playing a role in the process. Comment -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Relieved of the more onerous restrictions on their freedom to associate and express themselves, we expect to see an increase in the diversity of Turkish Kurds' opinions about their political future. That diversity may complicate the efforts of current Turkish Kurd leaders, who purport to represent themselves to the government as the authoritative voice of their ethnic group. Competing voices among Turkish Kurds may also complicate the government's laudable effort to reduce its Kurdish citizenry's alienation from Turkish society. JEFFREY "Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.s gov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey"