TURKEY'S NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY STILL WON'T BUDGE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000113 E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2019 TAGS: ENRG ETTC KNNP MNUC PARM TRGY TU SUBJECT: TURKEY'S NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY STILL WON'T BUDGE ON NEW NUCLEAR ENRICHMENT RESTRICTIONS REF: A. ANKARA 73 ¶B. STATE 3077 Classified By: DCM Doug Silliman for reason 1,4 (b, d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Turkish Atomic Energy Administration (TAEK) Chairman Okay Cakiroglu told the Ambassador that, with its exponentially increasing energy demand, Turkey was not now ready to exclude any options or any technology from its consideration. Turkey needed time to decide whether it could accept restrictions on acquiring enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technology currently proposed by the Nuclear Suppliers Group. He described the price offered in the Russian nuclear power plant bid as "ridiculous" and called on the U.S. to develop a state policy to help Turkey achieve energy independence through nuclear power. Cakiroglu repeated previously-expressed doubts about whether Turkey needed U.S. help to develop technologies to protect its borders from nuclear smuggling, but agreed to consider the NNSA's invitation to travel to the U.S. The Ambassador pressed Cakiroglu to recognize that agreeing to the new NSG guidelines would not restrict Turkey's development of peaceful nuclear power, which the U.S. fully supported. End Summary. Cranky TAEK Chairman Not Willing to Compromise -------------- - ¶2. (C) The Ambassador met with TAEK Chairman Okay Cakiroglu on January 20 to follow up on an approach he made to the MFA on January 14 (ref a) to encourage Turkey to join consensus on new guidelines intended to restrict the transfer of ENR technology. It was clear from that meeting that TAEK was the primary source of Turkey's late-breaking objections. Cakiroglu, who can be antagonistic and even insulting with visitors, was on his best behavior with the Ambassador, but still projected his deep-seated nationalism and suspicious nature. ¶3. (C) The Ambassador said that approval by the U.S. Congress of the "123" agreement on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy showed that the U.S. supported Turkey's drive to acquire nuclear power production capacity. Cakiroglu briefed the Ambassador on the current uncertain status of Russia's bid to build a plant in Turkey due to the "ridiculous" price per kilowatt hour it proposed (see septel for details),and said that Turkey would prefer a direct relationship with the USG in developing nuclear power. If it was a U.S. priority for Turkey to be a strong, reliable partner in the region, then the U.S. should consider Turkey's energy security and independence a top policy issue and get its nuclear power companies involved. ¶4. (C) The Ambassador said that the USG had little control over what private firms might do, but agreed that Turkey should pursue a program of nuclear power. He explained that this was one of the main reasons the U.S. sought to establish within the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) a new regime to make it possible for states to acquire the capability to produce nuclear fuel while at the same time establishing clear limits on how the technology itself could be acquired. "Turkey Needs Unrestricted Supply of Technology" -------------- --- ¶5. (C) Cakiroglu said that he understood the U.S. views, but underscored that Turkey needed an "unrestricted supply of technology and energy" and would oppose anything that could restrict that flow. Turkey is "suspicious" of the current text and did not want to take any decisions before being fully convinced that what was to be signed did not constrain Turkey's goal of energy independence. "We do not know what technology our grandchildren might need 50 years down the road." Cakiroglu sought to assure the Ambassador that Turkey had "no hidden agenda" and that it supported the U.S. goal to restrict the spread of ENR technology; it just did not want to give up an option which it might need at some point in the future. Cakiroglu also raised more bluntly than the MFA had done previously (ref a) Turkey's objection to what it termed "subjective" criteria in the text of the current draft guidelines: "We are real allies. Turkey does not want to be put in a box with countries under suspicion." ¶6. (C) The Ambassador sought to reassure Cakiroglu: Turkey is a reliable, mature ally; there are clear ways built in to the current guidelines which would allow Turkey to acquire the capability to process nuclear fuel. As Cakiroglu remained unconvinced, the Ambassador said that we would be ready to engage with TAEK, both here in Ankara and in Vienna, to allay Turkey's concerns with the current draft guidelines. ¶7. (C) The Ambassador reiterated an invitation from the National Nuclear Security Association for Cakiroglu to visit the United States to review U.S. progress in developing and deploying portal monitors for radiation detection at our borders. Cakiroglu said that he found objectionable the suggestion that Turkey was not capable of developing its own indigenous monitors, but agreed to re-consider the U.S. invitation. Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) Cakiroglu is clearly a key source of Turkey's objections to the proposed regime to limit transfer of ENR technology. He has broad autonomy on all issues related to nuclear power; while TAEK is technically subordinate to the Ministry of Energy, he has an independent power base and an approach to the Minister to circumvent Cakiroglu would be unlikely to work. We will need to take the time to persuade this curmudgeonly, nationalistic technocrat that what we propose is in Turkey's long-term interests. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey Jeffrey