TURKEY: END-OF-TOUR REFLECTIONS ON THE KURDISH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 001032

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL OSCE TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: END-OF-TOUR REFLECTIONS ON THE KURDISH
ISSUE

REF: A. ANKARA 1003 (EXDIS)

B. ANKARA 951

Classified By: Adana Principal Officer Eric Green for reasons 1.4(b,d)

INTRODUCTION: KURDS SUPPORT US, DEMOCRACY
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1. (U) This is a Consulate Adana cable. It distills my
observations on the Kurdish issue following three years
service as Principal Officer.


2. (C) I first ventured east of the Euphrates in August,

2006. Turkish grievances against the U.S. were numerous and
intensifying. The war in Iraq seemed to be out of control;
the PKK (Kurdistan Workers, Party) had found safety in
Northern Iraq; some Turks saw these developments as designed
to weaken if not divide their country. Kurds portrayed the
situation much differently: they were grateful to America for
liberating Iraqi Kurdistan and they believed spreading
democracy in the Middle East should lead to better treatment
of Kurds by Turkey. Even before tea had been served in my
first meeting with a mayor from the pro-Kurdish DTP
(Democratic Society Party),he proclaimed, "I love what
President Bush is doing in the Middle East." I never heard
this sentiment uttered west of the Euphrates.

KURDISH ISSUE AS CRUCIBLE
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3. (C) The Kurdish issue is the crucible in which Turkey's
most contested arguments take place: the roles of civilian
and military institutions in governing the country and the
nature of Turkish citizenship and identity. Because the
Kurdish issue is linked with these problems, an ultimate
resolution depends on Turkey successfully evolving into a
modern, accountable democracy. Kurds are facing an equally
important crossroads as they need to modernize a
ethno-nationalist movement whose strategy is obscure and
whose tactics appear little evolved from Maoist-style peasant
rebellion. Until Kurdish leaders behave more maturely, their
actions will retard rather than accelerate the changes Turkey
needs. Despite these problems, the GOT is making headway on
the Kurdish issue, tolerating linguistic and cultural
freedoms that were unthinkable less than ten years ago.


4. (C) As Americans, we have unique entre to both Turkish
and Kurdish players in this conflict, so we are in a position
to draw conclusions based on a variety of perspectives. The
main conclusion is that Turks and Kurds are not destined to
live in conflict. The United States, as a trusted friend to
both sides, has a role to play in helping them find peace.

DIYARBAKIR AND BELFAST
--------------


5. (C) The Kurdish problem is caused by a movement for
recognition of Kurds' distinct ethnic identity clashing with
a conservative state uses mono-ethnic nationalism as a source
of legitimacy; the movement enjoys widespread support in
southeastern Turkey and is also supported by a terrorist
organization, the PKK. Because it is a multilayered problem,
its solution requires diplomatic, economic, security and
political measures. The Northern Ireland peace process, on
which I worked for five years prior to my service in Adana,
offers some instructive parallels with the Kurdish issue.


6. (C) Ending the Northern Ireland conflict was possible
after leaders in Britain and Ireland realized their bilateral
partnership was too important to be sacrificed to timeworn
ethnic antagonisms. Thanks in great part to American
diplomacy, the GOT-Iraq relationship could play a similar
role with the Kurdish issue. Three years ago, many Turks
regarded the new Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in
northern Iraq as an existential threat and the KRG responded
by turning a blind eye to PKK activities on its territory.
The GOT and the KRG have since made remarkable progress in
setting aside dated animosities to concentrate on mutual

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interests: economic development, limiting Iranian influence
and stabilizing Iraq. The level of trust is still wanting,
but the shift has put the KRG in a position to contribute to
a resolution of Turkey's Kurdish issue by pressuring the PKK
and helping facilitate exile for its leadership. Equally
important, a pragmatic KRG that eschews notions of a "greater
Kurdistan" will give Turkey more confidence in allowing its
Kurds more rights.


7. (C) UK-supported economic support and breakneck growth in
the Republic of Ireland also contributed to the solution in
Northern Ireland -- the bigger the middle class, the more
people want stability. Economically, life for the vast
majority in southeastern Turkey is still a grind: villages
are either empty following the evacuations of the 1990s or
they are struggling to support too many people on too little
land. Aside from agriculture, which for many operates at
barely subsistence level, the region depends heavily on
government spending (including about 70,000 village guards
who support a half million family members),remittances and
illicit activity. The cities are burdened with young
populations, low levels of education and rampant
unemployment. The most remote provinces such as Hakkari will
always lag due to their inaccessible, mountainous locations;
but cities such as Diyarbakir and Sanliurfa have potential in
trade, manufacturing and tourism. Export powerhouse
Gaziantep, which is less than two hours drive west from
Sanliurfa, shows that cities once considered "peripheral" can
change their image and attract investment by encouraging
entrepreneurship. The massive Southeastern Anatolian Project
(GAP) infrastructure program addresses part of the need, but
the government should also focus on creating stable
conditions for small and medium sized manufacturers to
develop.


8. (C) The diplomatic and economic tasks are easy compared
with the political and security challenges. In the Northern
Ireland case, Britain's evolution into a post-nationalist,
post-imperial consciousness meant there was scope for
flexibility and innovation when designing new political
institutions for the province and a new relationship between
Britain and Ireland. For a lasting solution to the Kurdish
issue, Turkey as a whole needs to undergo a similar evolution
that includes modernization of Kemalism's fundamental tenets;
most critically, the definition of Turkish citizenship must
encompass multiple ethnic and religious identities.
Democratization must continue.


9. (C) Disarming the PKK also requires breaking with
entrenched Turkish practices. In Northern Ireland after the
1998 Good Friday Agreement (GFA) created new political
opportunities, the IRA became a liability for the republican
movement, which shifted focus to civilian politics through
Sinn Fein. A decade later, the IRA was effectively dissolved
and Sinn Fein is now part of the province's ruling coalition.
This shift required the UK government to live for years with
the uncomfortable ambiguity of negotiating with Sinn Fein
even as the IRA, armed and lethal, remained lurking in the
background.


10. (C) There are two obstacles, conceptual and practical, to
overcome before Turkey could begin a negotiation akin to the
GFA. Conceptually, Turkey has not yet defined itself as a
modern, multiethnic democracy; as a consequence there is no
sense of what an acceptable end-state would look like.
Intra-elite friction over normalizing relations with Armenia
-- and the ease with which nationalist chest-beating has
hijacked the debate -- shows the risks of taking on sensitive
identity problems before laying the proper groundwork.
Related to this is the very practical problem that the GOT
cannot agree on whom it should deal with, should such a
negotiation take place. The PKK is clear that it must be at
the table and has hinted it would be open to using
intermediaries or surrogates so the government would not be
negotiating with terrorists. This is soluble, but not easily
in Turkey's with-us-or-against-us political culture.

TURKISH GOVERNMENT: GRADUALLY TAKING OWNERSHIP

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11. (C) While Turkey appears some distance away from
comprehensive negotiations on the Kurdish issue, there is now
consensus that there is in fact a Kurdish problem and that
military means alone are insufficient to end PKK terrorism.
Beyond these generalities, however, policy on the Kurdish
issue is fragmented: with the Presidency, the Prime Minister,
individual ministries, the military and the judiciary all
pursuing different and sometimes contradictory approaches.
How to deal with DTP, which has elected representatives in
Parliament, shows these tensions. President Gul has met with
the DTP and said the Kurdish problem can be solved through
negotiation while opposition parties, the military and
judiciary regard the DTP as a terrorist front and thus an
unacceptable interlocutor for the government. Prime Minister
Erdogan has waffled: on one hand he has shattered several
taboos by establishing a Kurdish-language channel on state TV
and forthrightly acknowledged the Kurdish problem, but he
refuses to meet with the DTP, let alone accept them as a
partner for solving the problem.


12. (C) In sum, civilian Turkish institutions are now playing
a bigger role on Kurdish issues and they are pursuing
policies that would have been heretical less than a decade
ago. The shadowy "deep state" is no longer the sole driver
of GOT policy towards the Kurds as it was in the '80s and
'90s. The deep state has given way to a less opaque,
increasingly disputatious state in which the old guard
security/judicial establishment, which still views the
Kurdish issue through a zero-sum prism, is jockeying with
officials who embrace the logic of using the DTP to channel
Kurdish demands and work with the GOT to disarm the PKK.

KURDISH POLITICS: READY TO SAY GOOD-BYE TO CHE?
-------------- --


14. (C) Just as calcified GOT institutions need to reform
more to meet the needs of a 21st century democracy,
PKK-dominated Kurdish political institutions are even more
out of step with their community. Kurds in Turkey fall
roughly into three categories: the "incorrigibles," a small
minority who reject both the cultural and civic aspects of
Turkish identity and demand political separation; in the
southeast a large majority of Kurds accept their political
status as Turkish citizens but want the Turkish state to
acknowledge and accommodate Kurds' distinct cultural and
linguistic identity. The third group, assimilated Kurds,
fully embrace Turkish civic and cultural identities, even if
they were raised speaking Kurdish.


15. (C) Even as the vast majority of Kurds favor modest
political reform through peaceful means, the PKK
paradoxically enjoys widespread legitimacy and a virtual
monopoly on political activity in the region. The legitimacy
derives from the PKK's success at putting the Kurdish cause
on the agenda 25 years ago and its propagation of
self-serving myths such as leader Ocalan's status as a living
martyr and the PKK's role as "protector" of the weak. In
fact, poor Kurds living in the slums of Diyarbakir are in no
way protected by the PKK. Their interests are in a growing
economy, a better educational system and more accountable,
democratic government, none of which the PKK can deliver.
Iraqi President (and Kurdish icon) Jalal Talabani said it
best: "The Che Guevara era is over."


16. (C) The PKK's intransigence is so clearly counter to
Kurds' own interests that many Kurds -- even those
disinclined to believe conspiracy theories -- believe the PKK
is in overt or tacit cooperation with elements of the deep
state intent on blocking progress. Yet there are also strong
signals that the PKK leadership in Northern Iraq wants an
exit strategy. Part of a deal will include some symbolic
concessions both to justify Kurdish sacrifices and to
persuade the movement's hard-liners to go along. Saving
themselves from prison is near the top of the agenda, which
means the GOT will need to confront the politically
radioactive question of amnesty. Another unanswered question

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is to what extent the PKK's business interests (extortion,
human and narcotics trafficking, smuggling) will produce
internal resistance to efforts to end the conflict. (The
IRA's mafia-like activities also caused numerous set-backs in
the Northern Ireland process.)

CONCLUSIONS
--------------


17. (C) In the near term, we can expect the AKP government to
continue to improve its management of the Kurdish issue, even
if a comprehensive solution must wait until Turkey reaches a
new, more democratic equilibrium that embraces Kurdish and
other identities. This involves relatively low-cost
concessions to Kurdish identity (expanded broadcasting
opportunities, restoring Kurdish names to villages,
"Kurdology" departments in universities),old-fashioned
service delivery (building roads, schools, clinics) and moves
to improve PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan's prison conditions.
If the government agreed to talk with the DTP, that would
ease tensions further.


18. (C) Many Kurds believe only outside pressure will induce
progress. Until recently, reformers believed Turkey's
convergence with EU democratic norms would be the silver
bullet. But Kurds have been disappointed by growing
opposition to Turkey's goal of EU membership and frustrated
with the EU's reluctance to push the GOT harder on political
reform. They see the EU as a distant voice that only deals
with human rights in the abstract rather than as a force that
pushes for concrete reforms that would advance Kurdish goals.


19. (C) This leaves the United States. Kurds in Turkey yearn
for the U.S. to insert itself in the process and forge a
settlement as it did in Northern Ireland while the GOT is
loath to involve outside parties. Even if American mediation
is not welcome, the U.S. can help by continuing to support
bilateral (U.S. and Turkey) and trilateral (plus Iraq)
efforts to counter the PKK and by intensifying efforts within
Iraq to resolve KRG boundary issues, especially Kirkuk.
Success there would solidify the Turkish-KRG partnership and
give Turkey confidence to act more boldly on the Kurdish
issue domestically.


20. (C) Meanwhile, we should raise our voices more to urge
both the GOT and the Kurds to end the violence and adopt more
pragmatic positions. President Obama's public statements and
his meeting with the DTP, along with Ambassador Jeffrey's
June visit to Diyarbakir, have set the tone in this regard.
There may also be opportunities to support non-official
dialogue among NGOs from Turkey and international experts.
Such conferences are still too rare, in part because the PKK
often tries to block the free exchange of ideas. U.S.
sponsorship of such efforts would reinforce the message that
dialogue is needed for a solution.


21. (C) If over time these efforts create an opening to
mediate, then by all means we should seize the opportunity.
An initial goal may be to negotiate a genuine cease-fire (in
contrast to the faux cease-fires announced periodically by
the PKK); ending the violence would free both sides to
consider a broader range of options. And even if formal
negotiations did not begin immediately or were stalled, a
period of peace would provide space to ease the attitudinal
changes both sides need in order to transform this part of
Upper Mesopotamia from a region of suffering into a region of
stability.


22. (U) The Ambassador has read this cable and agrees
strongly with its analysis and recommendations, which track
closely with those of REF A paragraph 10.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

JEFFREY