TURKISH MFA: CYPRUS SETTLEMENT MUST HAVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 001018 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/SE E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/2019 TAGS: CY PREL TU UNFICYP US SUBJECT: TURKISH MFA: CYPRUS SETTLEMENT MUST HAVE TRANSITION PERIOD REF: NICOSIA 456 Classified By: Ambassador James Jeffrey for reasons: 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. MFA Undersecretary Apakan told DAS Bryza and the Ambassador July 13 that Turkey: -- continues to support the Cyprus negotiating process; -- is committed to a solution if there is a referendum; -- views the guarantee system as "vital"; -- insists on genuine bizonality; -- believes any solution must entail a significant transition government that could last as long as 36 months. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) In a July 13 meeting with DAS Bryza and the Ambassador, MFA Undersecretary Apakan underscored that Turkey continues to support the Cyprus negotiating process "to the end of this year" and that this would be reiterated to Turkish Cypriot leader Talat in bilateral discussions. Talat had arrived in Ankara earlier that day. Apakan said that Turkey would also support a solution if there is a referendum. He added, however, that the "vital" system of Treaties of Guarantee must remain in place. The MFA could not bring a "wrong solution" to the GOT, let alone to the Parliament. The guarantee system would be Turkey's only bond to the island when both sides become an EU country. Apakan then went into detail on the somewhat mumbo-jumbo but very serious Turkish position of principle about maintaining the Hellenic-Turkic balance in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the guarantees being the final part of the "Lausanne System" to secure Turkish rights, establish links to the Turkish community, and protect Turkish rights (presumably to high sea access). ¶3. (C) Apakan said that the post-settlement Cyprus must also be "genuinely" bizonal, which means that the process by which it emerges is important (reflecting Turkey's view that the new constituent state will not be a continuation of the Republic of Cyprus). Therefore, a transition period is needed. This period would allow Turkey to withdraw its troops and hand over territory. This transition government would led jointly by ROC President Christofias and Turkish Cypriot leader Talat. Ushering in a "real peace" requires going step by step, he said, as laid out in the Annan Plan. The economy needs to be balanced and harmonized. The transition period could be 36 months or 20 months, as proposed in Annan, but possibly shorter. ¶4. (C) Increasingly animated, Apakan asserted that he was not trying to "create difficulties," but believed strongly that a well-planned transition would smooth out potential problems. It was not a new idea. We could check previous UN documents. The island would need to find new homes for those persons who would be required to move. If there were no new residences, the resettlement could not take place. DAS Bryza questioned whether sorting out these transitional arrangements would take considerable time, and asked if this means an additional new round of negotiations on a set of governance issues for a new political entity, keeping in mind that negotiations on governance issues for a new constituent state had already proven lengthy and difficult. Negotiating a whole new set of governance provisions seemed incompatible with Apakan's expressed desire to secure a Cyprus agreement by the end of 2009. Apakan replied flatly that "if there is no transition, there is no settlement." This had been told to Talat. If both sides say "yes" to a referendum on December 10, then Talat and Christofias could govern the settlement -- as Cypriots. But they need time. ¶5. (C) DAS Bryza said we understand that the Turkish Cypriot goal remains a new constituent state with a distinct and new international personality, and that Talat seems to have full room to negotiate except for the guarantees. Apakan replied that territory and guarantees must be considered at the very end of the negotiations, so that the proposed power-sharing arrangement could be seen. This has been true since the 1980s, he said. He added that a new EU Protocol is needed to replace Protocol 10, to ensure the new constituent state will enjoy derogations from EU law to protect Turkish Cypriot interests in ensuring the new state is bizonal. We also need a meaningful answer to the question of what happens if the referendums fail, he noted. What would be the role of the Turkish Cypriots? Bryza noted that the U.S. was working with its European allies to plan for a successful outcome of the negotiations. Apakan expressed Turkey desire for a reference to UNSYG Kofi Annan's 28 May 2004 report on Cyprus, which outlined the whole talks and the Annan Plan's fate -- which the UNSC had failed to adopt. DAS Bryza pointed out that this report had been vetoed by the Russians. He urged that Ankara help change the Russian view. "They want a lot from you," he said. Apakan emphasized that the Turkish Cypriots felt cheated by the EU and must not be cheated by the U.N. as well. The USG is a leading country, with the U.K., he said. "You can find a way." ¶6. (C) DAS Bryza said he had asked Christofias to consider not holding a referendum in the Greek Cypriot community, because so many G/C's now seem inclined to vote "ohi" (no), regardless of the actual content on the settlement agreement, and instead allow himself to be judged by Cypriot voters in the next election for the settlement that emerges. Christofias did not support that idea, and said he was confident of a "yes" vote. Apakan noted that if AKEL and DESY both support the referendum, then it would pass. ¶7. (C) Apakan said he was in favor of a speeded up process. He said Ankara supports arbitration and wants "a calendar." Bryza said there may be a point at the end of negotiations when some mechanism may be needed to bridge final differences. Such a mechanism should not apply pressure, but should instead provide creative ideas. During Bryza's visit, DISY Leader Anastasiades had proposed the appointment of a US envoy who could lead a team of wise people who could generate such deadlock-breaking ideas. Apakan gave no comment but said the ultimate settlement must entail genuine power-sharing and equality. This is the reason there has not been a settlement to date, he said: the Greek Cypriots "don't like to share." Bryza said the Greek Cypriots are looking to the Annan Plan more than they admit in public, and that Christofias has been making an effort to ensure that Turkish Cypriot interests are protected. ¶8. (C) Apakan asked if the USG would appoint a Cyprus Coordinator. Bryza was noncommittal but commented that he liked the idea of an envoy who could provide ideas to the negotiators during the endgame. Bryza said he had found the mood on Cyprus more positive during his visit the previous week to the island, largely because of the opening of Yesilirmak (Limnitis) crossing. In addition, the Greek Cypriots feel an incentive to negotiate seriously, as they look ahead to Talat's election next April. ¶9. (C) COMMENT: Apakan has been appointed as Turkey's permanent representative to the United Nations, and is not expected to remain in his current position past mid-August. Accordingly, he may have seen this as his parting shot on the Cyprus issue and felt compelled to emphasize that getting to "yes" would not be as simple as agreement on the design of a united Cyprus -- but must build in a transitional framework as well. He also seemed intent on flagging for us that Ankara believes the negotiations need to wrap up within this calendar year, contrary to some projections that extent well into 2010. Negotiating a transitional government and wrapping up negotiations by 2009 are probably incompatible goals. ¶10. (U) DAS Bryza has cleared this message. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey JEFFREY