SCENESETTER FOR KING ABDULLAH'S VISIT TO THE U.S.

S E C R E T AMMAN 000887

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/IPA, AND NEA/FO
ALSO PASS TO NSC FOR SHAPIRO AND KUMAR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2029
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPAL IS IR IZ SY JO
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR KING ABDULLAH'S VISIT TO THE U.S.

Classified By: Ambassador R. Stephen Beecroft for reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d)


1. (S/NF) Summary: King Abdullah is extremely pleased to be
the first Arab leader to meet with the President in
Washington. He wants to show his skeptical public and the
wider Arab street that his moderate approach gains him access
to (and, he hopes, influence with) the White House. The
visit also enhances his standing among his fractious peers.
Jordanians question, however, whether the necessary pressure
will be exerted on Israel to bring about a two-state
solution. The King has high expectations that he will come
home with tangible evidence.


2. (S/NF) The King may offer Jordan as a conduit for what he
sees as a possible U.S. approach to Hamas. He will call for
greater consultation with Arab moderates before serious U.S.
engagement with Iran and Syria. The King is likely to
express deep anxiety about Israel's perceived indifference to
Jordanian equities in Jerusalem's holy sites, which he
believes undermines his legitimacy and could be
destabilizing. He may ask for supplemental U.S. economic and
military assistance. End Summary.

Jordan and the Two State Solution
--------------


3. (S/NF) The Palestinian plight has special resonance for
the King because some 60 percent of Jordan's population has
roots in the West Bank or Gaza, including his wife, Rania.
That very population is also seen as a threat to the future
of the Hashemite Kingdom. Jordan has consistently rejected
the proposal of an "alternative" Palestinian homeland in
Jordan and called for Palestinian self-determination as part
of a two-state solution. Ongoing Jordanian anxiety about the
"alternative homeland" has been heightened by
intra-Palestinian disarray and by perceived support among
influential Israelis and even some former U.S. officials for
a "three state solution" in which Gaza would be placed under
Egyptian control and in which parts of the West Bank would be
supervised by Jordan.

High Arab Expectations for Peace
--------------


4. (S/NF) The King enthusiastically favors the Arab Peace
Initiative (API),broadened to a "57-State Solution" in which
all the Arab and Muslim States embrace Israel in exchange for
a withdrawal to the 1967 borders. But he has lost patience
for a "process" that does not bear fruit, believing continued
Palestinian dispossession undermines Arab countries at peace
with or open to peace with Israel, while extremists (i.e.,
Iran, Hizballah, and Hamas) gloat and grow fat. The King
will be keen to learn about the U.S. strategy for Palestinian
statehood.


5. (S/NF) On April 11, Jordanian, Saudi, Lebanese, Egyptian,
Qatari, and Palestinian Ministers, plus the Arab League
Secretary General, met in Amman in advance of the King's
trip. The Syrian FM, who was in Iran, phoned in his support
for the API. The King will come bearing points (to be
reported septel),which were the consensus result of that
"7 1" gathering:

-Israel must unconditionally freeze settlements and curb
"natural growth" or the Arabs will not engage on peace.

-President Obama should personally push for comprehensive
peace and present that goal as integral to U.S. national
interests.

-The U.S. must eschew open-ended talks and present
benchmarks, end parameters, and firm deadlines to the
parties, who must be held accountable.

-A Camp David-style summit overseen by the President may be
necessary to jumpstart negotiations.

-The Arabs will reward Israel with unspecified "deliverables"
in exchange for Israel's taking interim steps such as
freezing settlements and dismantling outposts.

-If there were real progress toward peace, the Arabs could
collectively face Iran and help the U.S. on issues ranging
from Iraq, to Sudan, to Yemen.

Hamas: Jordan As a Conduit?
--------------


6. (S/NF) Jordan began a roughly six-month "flirtation" with
Hamas in the second half of 2008 and defended those publicly
popular GID-led talks by pointing out that Jordan could not
afford to stand on the sidelines as Israel and Egypt engaged
Hamas and Syria and Iran were even more active. The dialogue
is now on hold, but rapprochement between the U.S. and its
regional adversaries may make reengagement with Hamas
appealing. Senior Jordanian officials have suggested Jordan
as a back channel to Hamas if the U.S. wanted a conduit.

Iran and Syria Engagement
--------------


7. (S/NF) Jordanian officials doubt Iran will agree to limit
its regional ambitions and instead argue for depriving it of
issues that make it a hero to the Arab street by reaching a
"two-state solution" and resolving other Arab-Israeli
disputes. The King has noted that Arabs worry about a
nuclear Iran as do Israelis but that a strike on Iran before
progress toward peace would compel the Arabs to support Iran.
Jordanian officials have fretted that the U.S. could permit
Iran to play a hegemonic role in Iraq and the region in
exchange for giving up its nuclear program. The King fears
U.S.-Iran engagement would deepen intra-Arab schisms and lead
some countries to defect to the Iranian camp. The GOJ
proposes that the U.S. publicly make clear that the Arabs are
full parties in any Iran policy review.


8. (S/NF) Jordanians are also skeptical that Syria is ready
to change. The GOJ believes Damascus must be made to see
that the U.S. was not "running toward it" but was rather
giving Syria a chance to return to the Arab moderate fold and
to reap the benefits. In that vein, Jordan has made its own
overtures to Syria, recently hosting President Bashar Al-Asad
for his first visit in five years. The Jordanians believe
Syria may be content to prolong talks with the U.S. for as
long as possible rather than offering any concessions up
front. (Comment: On both Iran and Syria, the GOJ wants the
U.S. to demand early deliverables to prevent them from
dragging on talks fruitlessly. Particularly with Iran, the
Jordanians may hope that setting benchmarks will keep talks
limited and short-lived. End Comment.)

Mughrabi Gate: A Ticking Bomb
--------------


9. (S/NF) The King is deeply concerned by Israel's perceived
indifference to Jordanian equities regarding Jerusalem's holy
sites, particularly in the case of Israeli plans to rebuild
the Mughrabi Gate ascent to the Temple Mount/Haram Al-Sharif.
Jordan believes that the Hashemites, as descendants of the
Prophet Muhammad, have custodianship of Muslim holy sites -
and that Israel acknowledged that in the 1994 peace treaty.
This role is taken on behalf of the entire Muslim community,
and thus the King and his advisors believe his legitimacy
would be undermined at home and abroad were he to acquiesce
to Israeli plans. Jordan wants to design, build and pay for
the new ramp and insists it will not let concern for its
relations with Israel prevent taking "every legal measure" to
block Israeli "unilateralism" in an area seen as Islamic
territory. Post repeatedly has urged Jordan to take this up
with Israel with the same urgency that they raise it with us,
but the GOJ has continued to push for the U.S. to intervene
on its behalf. Mughrabi Gate has become a competition of
sovereign claims, with Israel firmly holding the possession
card over Jerusalem, possibly complicating simple technical
or diplomatic solutions if Jordan truly considers this a
"redline." The King has warned he does not want Israel and
the U.S. "to be surprised when it blows up in their faces."

Iraq: Better, But Worries Remain
--------------


10. (S/NF) Six years after the start of Operation Iraqi
Freedom, the King and his advisors seem more optimistic about
Iraq. Jordan has embraced PM Nuri Al-Maliki, and the King
last August became the first Arab leader to visit Iraq since
OIF. He has since dispatched ministerial visitors to Baghdad
and Prime Minister Nader Dahabi is expected to travel there
soon. Jordan's leaders fear that Iran could recoup influence
as the U.S. troop presence dwindles and that violent
sectarianism could return. They urge us to assure that we do
not leave before Iraqi political and security institutions
are strong and independent enough to resist Iranian influence.

Bilateral Issues
--------------


11. (SBU) Economic and Military Assistance: In 2009, Jordan
is receiving $365 million in U.S. economic assistance and
$335 million in military aid, and has requested an additional
$300 million economic supplemental and a $200 million
military assistance supplemental. The global economic crisis
has significantly impacted economic growth and investment
levels here, making Jordan increasingly reliant on
supplemental appropriations for both Economic Support Funds
(ESF) and as a proportion of its military budget. (Note: The
U.S. and Jordan in September 2008 signed a non-binding
Memorandum of Understanding on Foreign Assistance for
2010-2014 that supports the U.S. providing Jordan $360
million per year in ESF and $300 million per year in Foreign
Military Financing. End Note.)


12. (S) JAF officials have said that the budget shortfall
threatens Jordan's participation in regional military support
missions and has asked the U.S. to press Gulf States for
financial assistance. Jordan has committed to a number of
such missions, including - for Afghanistan - a Special
Operations Force group for combat missions, an infantry
battalion for election security, military police, and combat
engineers. On Iraq, Jordan has agreed to facilitate
redeployment of U.S. forces and equipment. For Lebanon,
Jordan has agreed to upgrade and provide 10 M60A1 tanks with
funding from UAE, and another 56 if funding is found. For
Yemen, Jordan has agreed to provide 25 M113 Armored Personnel
Carriers pending third-party funding.


13. (C) Reform: The King may claim that the economic crisis
is retarding political and economic reform, but reform had
slowed in recent years given domestic opposition to the
King's largely progressive vision and global economic
challenges. We continue to urge broad-based economic, tax,
and regulatory reforms to reduce debt, tackle unemployment,
increase export competitiveness, protect intellectual
property and labor rights, and better manage water and energy
resources. While the King promotes democratization
indirectly, he has proved reluctant to spend political
capital on pressing directly for reforms which could encroach
on his power base of conservative tribal elites. We continue
to push for changes to Jordan's electoral system, increased
political space for civil society and the press, and the
promotion of women's rights.


14. (S) Nuclear Energy: Resource-poor Jordan imports over
95 percent of its energy, and the King has placed a priority
on developing a civilian nuclear energy program. The GOJ is
anxious to sign a Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (NCA) with
the United States, required for U.S. companies to provide
nuclear reactors, fuel or materials. NCA negotiations have
stalled, however, since the Chairman of the Jordan Atomic
Energy Commission indicated in March that the GOJ did not
accept U.S.-proposed changes to the NCA agreed in February

2008. The King's visit is an opportunity for the U.S. to
further engage Jordan's leadership and obtain agreement on
any final changes to the NCA needed to close the deal.
Meanwhile, the GOJ has moved forward with its nuclear energy
program by signing NCAs with Canada, China, France, and South
Korea as well as MOUs with Canada, France, South Korea,
Russian, Romania, the UK, and the United States.

Comment: Symbolism and Substance
--------------


15. (S/NF) Aside from the symbolic and political value of
being among the very first foreign leaders to meet
face-to-face with the President, the King increasingly fears
that time is neither on his side nor that of his fellow
moderates on issues ranging from Palestine, to Iran's
hegemonic ambitions, to Arab disunity. He will arrive in
Washington not only representing Jordanian perspectives, but
burdened with the knowledge that his peers are scrutinizing
him from afar and expect him to represent their collective
ambitions. The King's advisors fervently hope that the King
can return with something concrete. They note that so
tainted is the term "moderate" that they prefer he not be
referred to as such during his visit. End Comment.

Visit Amman's Classified Website at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman
Beecroft