Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09AMMAN2767
2009-12-22 07:53:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Amman
Cable title:
EMBASSY AMMAN ASSESSMENT OF FMS REQUEST FOR IMAGE
how-toVZCZCXYZ0001 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHAM #2767/01 3560753 ZNR UUUUU ZZH R 220753Z DEC 09 FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6568 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC INFO RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1981 RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 2259 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
UNCLAS AMMAN 002767
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SECDEF FOR DSCA AND USD(P)
SECSTATE FOR NEA/ELA AND PM/RSAT
HQ DA FOR USASAC
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: MCAP MASS PREL JO
SUBJECT: EMBASSY AMMAN ASSESSMENT OF FMS REQUEST FOR IMAGE
INTENSIFIER TUBES
REF: A. AMMAN 1550
B. 08 AMMAN 3304
UNCLAS AMMAN 002767
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SECDEF FOR DSCA AND USD(P)
SECSTATE FOR NEA/ELA AND PM/RSAT
HQ DA FOR USASAC
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: MCAP MASS PREL JO
SUBJECT: EMBASSY AMMAN ASSESSMENT OF FMS REQUEST FOR IMAGE
INTENSIFIER TUBES
REF: A. AMMAN 1550
B. 08 AMMAN 3304
1. (SBU) The Government of Jordan requests authorization to
purchase Image Intensifier Tubes (IITs) for Night Vision
Devices. The purpose of this acquisition is to stock an
inventory of key spare parts for NVDs in procurement through
Foreign Military Sales (FMS). The acquisition of NVDs has
already been approved, staffed, and offered to Jordan as FMS
Case JO-B-WCJ (reftels).
2. (SBU) These defense articles will not affect JAF's
existing force structure.
3. (SBU) Jordan plays an instrumental role in supporting
U.S. efforts in the region and merits further U.S. assistance
in this key area of national defense. Approval of this CTA
will enhance Jordan's ability to maintain NVDs under
procurement and allow Jordan to sustain interoperability when
deployed overseas as a coalition partner.
4. (SBU) The total number and type of IITs being requested
is outlined and justified in paragraph 14.
5. (SBU) CENTCOM Commander's concurrence will be provided
separately.
6. (SBU) The Embassy does not anticipate any negative
reaction from Jordan's neighboring countries. This
acquisition represents no real increase to Jordan's current
capabilities beyond what has already been approved in Case
JO-B-WCJ and does not affect the regional balance of power.
This purchase will not impact the foreign policies of Jordan
or of its neighbors.
7. (SBU) Jordan already accounts, safeguards, operates, and
maintains similar and more sensitive items without
difficulty. In October 2008, Jordan received a rating of
"successful" following the Defense Security Cooperation
Agency's (DSCA) Compliance Assessment Visit (CAV),DSCA's
highest rating. The rating was based on End Use Monitoring
(EUM) compliance with their three EEUM articles, including
Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM),Javelins,
and NVDs. The Country Team assesses that Jordan is a
trustworthy custodian of sensitive U.S. technologies.
8. (SBU) Jordan will require classified briefings,
operator, and other technical training from U.S. trainers.
When Jordan has received associated NVDs in the past there
has been no impact of U.S. presence while in country. The
Country Team does not expect any negative impact from
in-country U.S. presence that may be required in providing
these articles or technical training.
10. (SBU) Jordan is purchasing these components with
Foreign Military Financing (FMF).
11. (SBU) There are no human rights considerations relevant
to the proposed acquisition.
12. (SBU) The Military Assistance Program (MAP) in Jordan
currently has an active End-Use Monitoring (EUM) system in
place for the JAF. These NVDs are Enhanced-EUM items and
will require periodic inventories while in the possession of
the JAF. If deployed, US Forces deployed with them will
ensure the task force is conducting daily inventories.
13. (SBU) The Embassy recommends USG approval for transfer
of the IITs for reasons listed above. This recommendation is
based on the Country Team's assessment that the acquisition
represents no political or technological risk to the U.S.
14. (SBU) Item requested:
A. (SBU) Jordan requests spares of the Image Intensifier
Tubes for the following NVD models:
-- Army and Navy/Passive Vision Sight-4 (AN/PVS-4)
-- AN/PVS-7B
-- AN/PVS-7D
-- AN/AVS-9
-- AN/PVS-14
-- AN/PVS-23
-- AN/PVS-27
-- AN/TVS-5
-- AN/TVS-5A
-- AN/TVS-5B
-- Multi-use Minimonocular-14 (MUM-14)
B. (SBU) The list of NVD IITs requested is described in the
table below in the following format: Model, Supplier,
Quantity
-- XX2040 PT, Photonis, 50
-- XX2050 NZ, Photonis, 100
-- XX2050 PG, Photonis, 50
-- XX1470X, Photonis, 200
-- F9800C, ITT, 10
-- XX1441, Photonis, 10
15. (U) POC this action is MAJ Scott A. Hurley, USA, at
011-962-6-590-6538 or NIPR: hurleysa@state.gov, SIPR:
hurleysa@centcom.jorsao.smil.mil.
Beecroft
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SECDEF FOR DSCA AND USD(P)
SECSTATE FOR NEA/ELA AND PM/RSAT
HQ DA FOR USASAC
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: MCAP MASS PREL JO
SUBJECT: EMBASSY AMMAN ASSESSMENT OF FMS REQUEST FOR IMAGE
INTENSIFIER TUBES
REF: A. AMMAN 1550
B. 08 AMMAN 3304
1. (SBU) The Government of Jordan requests authorization to
purchase Image Intensifier Tubes (IITs) for Night Vision
Devices. The purpose of this acquisition is to stock an
inventory of key spare parts for NVDs in procurement through
Foreign Military Sales (FMS). The acquisition of NVDs has
already been approved, staffed, and offered to Jordan as FMS
Case JO-B-WCJ (reftels).
2. (SBU) These defense articles will not affect JAF's
existing force structure.
3. (SBU) Jordan plays an instrumental role in supporting
U.S. efforts in the region and merits further U.S. assistance
in this key area of national defense. Approval of this CTA
will enhance Jordan's ability to maintain NVDs under
procurement and allow Jordan to sustain interoperability when
deployed overseas as a coalition partner.
4. (SBU) The total number and type of IITs being requested
is outlined and justified in paragraph 14.
5. (SBU) CENTCOM Commander's concurrence will be provided
separately.
6. (SBU) The Embassy does not anticipate any negative
reaction from Jordan's neighboring countries. This
acquisition represents no real increase to Jordan's current
capabilities beyond what has already been approved in Case
JO-B-WCJ and does not affect the regional balance of power.
This purchase will not impact the foreign policies of Jordan
or of its neighbors.
7. (SBU) Jordan already accounts, safeguards, operates, and
maintains similar and more sensitive items without
difficulty. In October 2008, Jordan received a rating of
"successful" following the Defense Security Cooperation
Agency's (DSCA) Compliance Assessment Visit (CAV),DSCA's
highest rating. The rating was based on End Use Monitoring
(EUM) compliance with their three EEUM articles, including
Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM),Javelins,
and NVDs. The Country Team assesses that Jordan is a
trustworthy custodian of sensitive U.S. technologies.
8. (SBU) Jordan will require classified briefings,
operator, and other technical training from U.S. trainers.
When Jordan has received associated NVDs in the past there
has been no impact of U.S. presence while in country. The
Country Team does not expect any negative impact from
in-country U.S. presence that may be required in providing
these articles or technical training.
10. (SBU) Jordan is purchasing these components with
Foreign Military Financing (FMF).
11. (SBU) There are no human rights considerations relevant
to the proposed acquisition.
12. (SBU) The Military Assistance Program (MAP) in Jordan
currently has an active End-Use Monitoring (EUM) system in
place for the JAF. These NVDs are Enhanced-EUM items and
will require periodic inventories while in the possession of
the JAF. If deployed, US Forces deployed with them will
ensure the task force is conducting daily inventories.
13. (SBU) The Embassy recommends USG approval for transfer
of the IITs for reasons listed above. This recommendation is
based on the Country Team's assessment that the acquisition
represents no political or technological risk to the U.S.
14. (SBU) Item requested:
A. (SBU) Jordan requests spares of the Image Intensifier
Tubes for the following NVD models:
-- Army and Navy/Passive Vision Sight-4 (AN/PVS-4)
-- AN/PVS-7B
-- AN/PVS-7D
-- AN/AVS-9
-- AN/PVS-14
-- AN/PVS-23
-- AN/PVS-27
-- AN/TVS-5
-- AN/TVS-5A
-- AN/TVS-5B
-- Multi-use Minimonocular-14 (MUM-14)
B. (SBU) The list of NVD IITs requested is described in the
table below in the following format: Model, Supplier,
Quantity
-- XX2040 PT, Photonis, 50
-- XX2050 NZ, Photonis, 100
-- XX2050 PG, Photonis, 50
-- XX1470X, Photonis, 200
-- F9800C, ITT, 10
-- XX1441, Photonis, 10
15. (U) POC this action is MAJ Scott A. Hurley, USA, at
011-962-6-590-6538 or NIPR: hurleysa@state.gov, SIPR:
hurleysa@centcom.jorsao.smil.mil.
Beecroft