JORDAN SUBMISSION FOR 2009-2010 INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS

UNCLAS AMMAN 002607 SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA/ELA, INL, S/CT, AND EEB JUSTICE FOR AFMLS, OIA, AND OPDAT TREASURY FOR FINCEN CAIRO FOR ROWE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EFIN PTER SNAR KCRM JO SUBJECT: JORDAN SUBMISSION FOR 2009-2010 INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT (INCSR) PART II REF: A) PARKER/LYLE EMAIL DATED 12/2/2009 - B) STATE 114960 ¶1. Per ref B, following is the text for Part II, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes, of Embassy Amman's submission for the 2009-2010 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), also e-mailed as requested as a Microsoft Word document. Embassy point of contact is Resident Economic Crimes Advisor Joe Parker who can be reached at ParkerJE@state.gov or by phone at 962-6-590-6544. ¶2. Begin Text: Jordan is not a regional or offshore financial center and is not considered a major venue for international criminal activity. Jordan does have a well developed financial sector with significant banking relationships in the Middle-East. Jordan's long and remote desert borders and nexus to Iraq, Syria, and the West Bank make it susceptible to the smuggling of bulk cash, fuel, narcotics, cigarettes, and counterfeit goods and contraband, although there is insufficient information available from the Government of Jordan (GOJ) to quantify all of these crimes. Jordan boasts a thriving "import-export" community of brokers, traders, and entrepreneurs that regionally are involved with value transfer via trade and customs fraud. Illicit narcotics, psychotropic substances, and chemical precursors are not known to be major components of criminality in Jordan. There are anecdotal indications of use of Jordan for money laundering of illicit funds derived from narcotics and other criminal activity in the U.S. and possibly Europe via bulk cash smuggling for criminal elements involving Jordanians in those areas. However, it is thought that the major sources of illicit funds in Jordan are most likely to be related to commercial fraud, customs fraud, tax fraud and intellectual property rights (IPR) violations due to Jordan's dependence on imports and its limited natural resources and manufacturing base. A wide array of pirated or counterfeit goods is for sale on the streets of Jordan. One phenomenon that surfaced during 2008 and continued through 2009 was the use of gold in lieu of cash for movement of liquid assets. The scheme involves persons crossing into Jordan at land and seaports, making an admission of trying to enter multi-kilo quantities of gold to inspecting customs authorities, paying a fine and then re-exporting the gold at the entry point thus creating a declaration document to lend legitimacy to the movement of the high-value precious metal. The activity noted in 2009 related to smuggling of gold bars into Jordan followed by deposit into a "gold account" in a Jordanian bank with subsequent transfer to other countries like Switzerland ostensibly for the jewelry trade. Inquiries and assessments conducted during 2009 reveal that Jordan continues to be vulnerable to trade-based money laundering, bulk cash smuggling, and alternative remittance systems. Data on the prevalence of these activities was not available for two reasons: recognition of these methodologies in Jordan is relatively new; and it is a common practice in Jordan for individuals and businesses of all types to first contact the General Intelligence Directorate if suspicions of certain crimes surface. Offenses that the populace perceives as crimes relating to national security fall into that category. Money laundering and terrorist financing are categorized in this way. For example, when money services businesses had suspicions about persons using their service, their practice has been to report it to the General Intelligence Directorate and not submit a suspicious activity report to the AMLU. Details of these cases are rarely published or revealed. In 2008, there was an increase in securities-related financial crimes due to the discovery of a number of major Ponzi schemes in which thousands of investors lost investments. By year's end there were over 50,000 complaints filed relating to these schemes. By mid-2009 426,000 complaints had been filed by 115,000 victims. Prosecutors identified 334 companies and 865 individuals involved in the schemes and arrested 110 individuals in this approximately JD300,000 ($423,000) fraud. Approximately JD155,000 ($218,550) was recovered. However, since the criminal activity behind the scheme was fraud, none of the defendants could be charged with money laundering since the penalty exposure for fraud in Jordan is not more than three years of incarceration. Thus, none of the offenses are predicate offenses for money laundering. Although the GOJ has revealed no indicators of the use of hawala or other alternative remittance systems, Jordan's sizeable foreign worker population and Jordanian enclaves in the U.S., Europe, and Arabian Gulf countries are thought to use this form of cash transfer methodology to move legal and illicit funds both out of and into Jordan. In August 2001, the Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ),which regulates Jordan's 24 banks as well as its financial institutions, including money services businesses, issued anti-money laundering regulations designed to meet some of the FATF 40 Recommendations on Money Laundering. Subsequently, money laundering has been considered an "unlawful activity" subject to criminal prosecution. Jordan's banking laws prohibit registration of offshore banks or shell companies. In 2002, money laundering was criminalized related to insurance operations. On July 17, 2007, Jordan enacted Law No. 46 for the Year 2007-the Anti Money Laundering Law (AML) that criminalizes money laundering. The AML Law does not cover financing of terrorism, but it criminalizes money laundering and stipulates as predicate offenses to that crime all felony crimes or any Qime stated in international agreements to which Jordan is a party whether such crimes are committed inside or outside the Kingdom, provided that the act committed is subject to criminal penalty in the country in which it occurs. Felony crimes are those for which a penalty of three years or more of incarceration is attached. With this approach, several of the 20 crimes recommended by the FATF for inclusion in AML legislation do not meet the penalty level for major crimes and therefore are excluded as predicate offenses for money laundering under Jordan's current AML Law. The most noteworthy of these are: financing of terrorism, smuggling, extortion, intellectual property rights violations, sexual exploitation of children, trafficking in persons, trafficking in stolen property, and environmental crimes. The Banking Law of 2000 (as amended in 2003) allows judges to waive bank secrecy provisions in any number of criminal cases, including suspected money laundering and terrorist financing. The AML Law provides immunity against confidentiality sanctions for obligated entities that report suspicious transactions based on the AML Law. The effectiveness of the AML Law remains untested as there have been no prosecutions for money laundering based on either the CBJ regulations or the AML Law. The AML law created the National Committee on Anti-Money Laundering (NCAML) as well as the Anti-Money Laundering Unit (AMLU) as Jordan's financial intelligence unit. The NCAML is chaired by the Governor of the Central Bank of Jordan and has as members: a Deputy Governor of the Central Bank named by the CBJ Governor to serve as deputy chairman of the committee, the Secretary General of the Ministry of Justice, the Secretary General of the Ministry of the Interior, the Secretary General of the Ministry of Finance, the Secretary General of the Ministry of Social Development (which overseas charitable organizations),the Director of the Insurance Commission, the Controller General of Companies, a Commissioner of the Securities Commission, and the head of the Anti-Money Laundering Unit. The NCAML is responsible for: formulating general AML policy, supervising the implementation of tasks of the AMLU, facilitating and coordinating exchange of information related to money laundering, participating in international fora, proposing necessary regulations for implementation of the AML Law, coordinating and assigning competent parties to generate statistical reports related to the AML program of the GOJ, and approving and adopting a budget for the AMLU. The Ministries of Justice, Interior, Finance, and Social Development, as well as the Insurance Commission, Controller General of Companies, and Jordan Securities Commission all have a part in regulating various other nonfinancial institutions through issued regulations and instructions. The AMLU is obligated to work with these entities to ensure that comprehensive anti-money laundering/countering terrorism financing (AML/CTF) approach is undertaken in keeping with international standards and best practices. Of the regulatory entities of the GOJ, the Central Bank of Jordan, the Jordan Securities Commission, and the Insurance Commission of Jordan are best staffed and trained to conduct compliance investigations. These entities have issued implementing instructions to the regulated entities under their purview concerning AML/CTF requirements, which have the force of law. The extent of the use of the formal financial system for money laundering or terrorist financing is difficult to measure due to the lack of reporting data available that clearly identifies these offenses. Since the AML Law is still relatively new, some agencies of these cabinet level entities lack coordination in the overall AML/CTF effort in Jordan. The CBJ has a well developed bank supervision department whose procedures, until the recent past, focused almost exclusively on safety and soundness. However, the CBJ did instruct financial institutions to be particularly careful when handling foreign currency transactions, especially if the amounts involved are large or if the source of funds is in question. The AML Law requires obligated entities to: undertake due diligence in identifying customers; refrain from dealing with anonymous persons or shell banks; report any suspicious transaction to the AMLU; and comply with instructions issued by competent regulatory parties to implement provisions of the law. The CBJ drafted an AML/CTF dedicated bank examination manual in 2008 and adopted it for use in early 2009. The manual was also adopted for use by CBJ officials charged with inspecting money services businesses (MSB). Financial institutions are required under the AML Law to report all suspicious transactions, whether the transaction was completed or not, via suspicious transaction reports (STRs) sent to the AMLU. There is no threshold amount below which STRs are not required. Entities required to report suspicious transactions include: banks, foreign exchange companies, money transfer companies, stock brokerages, insurance companies, credit companies, and any company whose articles of association state that its activities include debt collection and payment services, leasing services, investment and financial asset management companies, real estate trading and development entities, and companies trading in precious metals and stones. Lawyers and accountants are not considered to be obligated entities under the law. There is no reporting threshold which requires financial institutions to report large currency transactions in the absence of suspicious activity. All obligated entities are required to conduct due diligence to identify customers; their activities, legal status, and beneficiaries; and follow-up on transactions that are conducted through an ongoing relationship. Business dealings with anonymous persons, persons using fictitious names or shell banks are prohibited. Obligated entities are required to comply with instructions issued by competent regulatory authorities as listed in the law. Disclosure to the customer or the customer's beneficiary of STRs and/or verifications or investigations by competent authorities is prohibited. They are also required to respond to any inquiry from the AMLU regarding STRs or requests for assistance from other competent judicial, regulatory, administrative, or security authorities needing information to perform their responsibilities. GOJ officials report that financial institutions have been filing suspicious transaction reports and cooperate with prosecutors' requests for information related to narcotics trafficking and terrorism cases. Most reporting is done by banking institutions which have well-developed AML compliance programs. During 2009, only a few STRs came from all the other types of obligated entities. There were no arrests or convictions for money laundering or terrorist financing in Jordan in 2009. The standard for forwarding STRs is a potential problem in the existing law and will require significant outreach resources to educate obligated entities. The banking, securities, and insurance sectors are the best regulated obligated entities and those that have been best educated regarding recognizing indicators of money laundering and terrorist financing, but there is still much to be done with the other obligated sectors. The money services business (MSB) sector is the riskiest obligated sector and lacks sufficient regulatory oversight and verification of compliance with reporting suspicious transactions of the AML Law. Real estate businesses and precious metals and stones dealers are also under-regulated and are generally unknowledgeable of their responsibilities to report suspicious transactions. Charitable associations, although not specified as obligated entities, occupy another troublesome sector, which requires better regulatory supervision and oversight. There are over 1,000 nonprofit organizations registered in Jordan, the majority of which are charitable organizations. Oversight responsibility for these rests with the Ministry of Social Development, which is understaffed and incapable of verifying the financial activities of all of the organizations. All Jordanian civil society and charitable organizations must now receive prior approval for use of funds from foreign sources. Organizations must submit the approval request to a registrar's office under the Ministry of Social Development but final approval must come from the Jordanian Cabinet. If the entity does not receive notification within thirty days of submitting the request, the organization can proceed with the funding. These changes became effective on September 17, 2009, after a multi-year effort to amend legislation governing civil society. The registrar's office is the primary regulatory body for civil society organizations and is comprised of representatives from eight different government bodies as well as four non-governmental representatives approved by the Prime Minister. The Minister of Social Development or her designate heads the registrar. All non-profit companies must also register with the registrar before December 2010. Previously non-governmental organizations had several registration options, including under the Ministries of Social Development, Industry and Trade, Culture, Justice, and Interior. The degree to which due-diligence is conducted to screen for potential money laundering or terrorist financing activity by applicants is unknown. Even with the current regulatory scheme, provisions to safeguard against abuse for money laundering andQ terrorist financing are unproven in practice. The AMLU was formed immediately upon passage and enactment of the AML Law. The financial intelligence unit is designated by law as an independent entity within the organizational structure of the Central Bank of Jordan. It is also physically located in and was operationally funded for 2009 by the CBJ. The AMLU also uses the CBJ server and database for all information technology needs. The AMLU was staffed with the same personnel that made up the CBJ's Suspicious Transaction Follow-Up Unit, in existence for several years, and is composed of a director, an outreach officer, one attorney, and one analyst. Three additional analysts were added to the AMLU staff in 2009. A comprehensive FIU development plan was informally adopted for the AMLU prior to the implementation of the AML Law. Until mid-2009 follow-through on this plan was stymied due to administrative hurdles until mid-2009 when by-laws governing AMLU administration were approved by GOJ Cabinet. A new AMLU chief was appointed by the Governor of the CBJ in his capacity as Chairman of the NCAML in August 2009. Office space in a building not owned by the CBJ was acquired in November 2009 with plans to occupy the new facility shortly after January 1, 2010. These moves should help to reduce questions concerning FIU independence and autonomy. Although the AMLU has made overtures to sponsoring countries stating its desire to become a member of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, it is unlikely that it can gain membership until 2011 at the earliest. The AMLU is organized on a general administrative FIU model and is responsible for receiving STRs from the obligated entities designated in the AML Law, analyzing them, requesting additional information related to the reported activity and forwarding the information to the prosecutor general for further action if there is sufficient cause to believe the transaction is related to money laundering or other financial crime activity. The AMLU does not have criminal investigative and/or direct regulatory responsibility, but it is authorized to require any information needed from obligated entities stipulated in the AML Law considered necessary for the performance of its duties if the needed information is related to information already received by the AMLU. Involvement of the AMLU in assisting criminal investigations is dependent on the will of public prosecutors to use it. It is authorized to request and coordinate with judicial parties, regulatory and supervisory authorities, and security (law enforcement) authorities. Suspicious transactions identified as potentially related to terrorist financing are outside of the AMLU's purview. At the end of 2009, the AMLU continued to work toward establishment of formal ties through memoranda of understanding with competent GOJ authorities possessing the necessary databases and records pertinent to pursuing financial intelligence analysis and money laundering investigations. The AMLU received approximately 170 STRs in 2009. There was no report of any STRs being forwarded to prosecutors for further action. No prosecutions for money laundering are known to have occurred in Jordan since the enactment of the 2007 AML law. Due to lack of knowledge of the AML law, uncertainty about the role of the AMLU with its limited personnel and functional capability, few prosecutors have considered using the AMLU to assist in criminal prosecutions or to charge financial crime violators with money laundering. One significant challenge facing the GOJ is determining how law enforcement entities are tasked to conduct financial investigations relating to money laundering and terrorist financing. Law enforcement agencies and public prosecutors continue to deliberate the question of whether the AML law or the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2006 provides sufficient basis for charging money laundering or financing of terrorism. There is no specific GOJ agency designated as the lead entity for investigating financial crimes. Although the AMLU is required by law to forward findings developed from STRs to the public prosecutors of the Ministry of Justice, prosecutors of the State Security court also investigate and prosecute financial crimes, particularly those that deal with national security. In Jordan, a civil law country, prosecutors lead all criminal investigations. Investigative field work needed by prosecutors for criminal investigations is shared between several GOJ law enforcement agencies dependent on the predicate offense generating money laundering activity: the Public Security Department (PSD-national police service),the General Intelligence Directorate (GID-both a criminal investigative agency and intelligence service; investigation of all terrorist activity falls to the GID),and the Directorate of Military Security (DMS) of the Jordan Armed Forces. Jordan Customs also conducts criminal investigations and has its own prosecutors, but penalties for customs violations fall below the level of a major crime (penalty in excess of three years of incarceration). Nearly all customs violations including commercial fraud are decided as administrative cases and seldom accrue criminal penalties including incarceration. The concept of forwarding large monetary value customs fraud cases to public prosecutors for criminal investigation and prosecution has not taken root in Jordan's legal system. This anomaly leaves the possibility of forfeiture of proceeds of customs related criminal activity to the Kingdom totally unexploited. Notwithstanding the lack of emphasis on pursuing money laundering or terrorism financing investigations, the GOJ has welcomed training to learn how to do so. There are six public free trade zones (FTZ) in Jordan: the Zarqa Free Zone, the Sahab Free Zone, the Queen Alia International Airport Free Zone, the Al-Karak Free Zone, the Al-Karama Free Zone, and the Aqaba Special Economic Zone (ASEZ). With the exception of Aqaba, these FTZs list their activities merely as trade. There are 36 private free trade zones, a number of which are related to the aviation industry with five more being established. Some of these FTZs list their activities as industrial, agricultural, pharmaceutical, training of human capital, and multi-purpose. With the exception of ASEZ, all free trade zones are regulated by the Jordan Free Zones Corporation in the Ministry of Finance and are guided by the Law of Free Zones Corporation No. 32 for 1984 (and amendments). State security entities regularly circulate information and names of suspected individuals and activities to the free trade zone areas and this information is always monitored and instructions are followed to ensure no abuse of the Free Trade Status of those areas. Vehicles and individuals entering the FTZ are searched by both PSD and Customs upon entry and exist. There is a full set of procedures that are implemented. Regulations state that companies and individuals using the zones must be identified and registered with the Corporation. The Aqaba Special Economic Zone is controlled by a ministerial level authority. The Aqaba Special Economic Zone Authority (ASEZA) encompasses all of the port city of Aqaba and is bounded by Saudi Arabia on the south, Israel on the west and is a short ferry ride across the Gulf of Aqaba (Red Sea) to Egypt. ASEZA has its own customs authority, which operates separately from Jordan Customs and processes all merchandise and commodities destined for businesses in the zone. It also processes all passengers entering the zone. Jordan Customs processes all shipments of goods in transit to areas outside the zone. Awareness of the methodologies and threat of trade-based money laundering and bulk cash smuggling was improved through training in 2009 for both ASEZA Customs and Jordan Customs. Both entities have taken steps to improve inspection and control procedures to detect these crimes. Thus far there have been no criminal cases involving the FTZs of Jordan that indicate they were used for trade-based money laundering, bulk cash smuggling, or financing of terrorism. The 2007 AML law requires reporting of inbound cross-border movement of money if the value exceeds a threshold amount set by the NCAML. In 2008, the threshold amount was set by the NCAML at 10,000 Jordanian Dinars but was raised in 2009 to 15,000 JD (approximately $21,150). The threshold amount was officially established and transmitted to border control authorities for enforcement. The law also provides for the creation of cross-border currency and monetary instruments declaration forms. A declaration form was adopted and printed in 2009. At year's end, Jordan Customs, in consultation with the AMLU, was working on a trial implementation plan to assess the enforcement of reporting requirements required by the AML law through use of the declaration at three ports of entry - Queen Alia International Airport, Aqaba Ferry Terminal, and Jabar land crossing(Syria). The declaration requirement applies only to the entry of money into the Kingdom and not exiting. Jordan Customs is responsible for archiving the declaration forms once implemented. In December 2004, the United States and Jordan signed an Agreement regarding Mutual Assistance between their Customs Administrations that provides for mutual assistance with respect to customs offenses and the sharing and disposition of forfeited assets. Collaboration on mutual money laundering related customs cases has been sparse and has been limited mostly to minimal intelligence sharing. The AML Law authorizes Customs "to seize or restrain" undeclared money crossing the border and report it to the AMLU which will decide whether the money should be returned or the case referred to the judiciary. In all known cases of detention of undeclared funds discovered during customs processing, the money has been returned to the importer. Seizure and forfeiture of assets related to criminal activity including money laundering and terrorist financing are authorized under a combination of statutes principal of which are: the Penal Code, the Economic Crimes Law, the Anti Money Laundering Law, the Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances Law and the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2006. Jordan's Anti-drugs Law allows the courts to seize proceeds and instrumentalities of crime derived from acts proscribed by the law. The Economic Crimes Law gives both prosecutors and the courts the authority to seize from any person proceeds generated by criminal activity under that law for a period of three months while an investigation is underway. Jordan's penal code further provides prosecutors the authority to confiscate "all things" derived from a felony or intended misdemeanor. GOJ officials claim that Jordan's cornucopia of seizure laws is sufficient to accomplish the purposes of FATF Recommendation 3 regarding authority to "confiscate property laundered, proceeds from money laundering or predicate offences, instrumentalities used in or intended for use in the commission of these offences, or property of corresponding value . . ." These statutes concentrate primarily on the proceeds of crime and not the means or instrumentalities used to commit a predicate offense to money laundering or the financing of terrorism. The multi-statute approach to freezing, confiscating or seizing of assets makes it unclear as to whether investigators may specifically trace and seize assets related to criminal activity. The GOJ has been advised by both Council of Europe and U.S. Government advisors that since this position is untested, it would be better to amend current or draft new legislation which clearly complies with FATF Recommendation 3. The GOJ publishes no statistics related to freezing, seizing, forfeiting, or confiscating the proceeds or instrumentalities of crime, and it is believed that there is no tracking mechanism for such since there is not a statutory provision for an asset forfeiture fund or civil forfeiture in Jordan. An October 8, 2001 revision to the Penal Code criminalized terrorist activities and the financing of terrorist acts. The Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2006 also prohibits the financing of terrorist acts. However, Jordan has no legislation that prohibits financing of terrorist organizations or groups. Guidelines issued by the CBJ state that banks should research all sanctions lists relating to terrorist financing including those issued by individual countries and other relevant authorities. The Central Bank may not circulate names on sanctions lists to banks unless the names are included on the UNSCR 1267 Sanctions Committee's consolidated list. No such assets have been identified to date. Banks and other financial institutions are required to maintain records for a period of five years in order to facilitate investigations. Jordan is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, and the UN Convention against Corruption. Jordan ratified the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime on May 22, 2009. Jordan is a charter member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF) and in 2007 Jordan held the presidency of MENAFATF. The GOJ received a MENAFATF Mutual Evaluation in July ¶2008. The report of that evaluation was accepted by the MENAFATF plenary in spring 2009. A multitude of deficiencies were detailed in the report. Of the sixteen core and key Financial Action Task Force 40+9 Recommendations, Jordan was found deficient on fourteen. Most noteworthy of these were absence of some predicate offenses for money laundering from the AML law and a corresponding requirement of obligated entities to report suspicious activity, lack of AML/CFT regulations and provisions relating to due diligence required of obligated entities, insufficient record keeping regulations, inadequate criminalization of terrorist financing, no requirement for the AMLU to receive STRs relating to terrorist financing, lack of legal procedures for freezing funds and assets of persons named pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1267, and lack of or insufficient legal basis and/or measures for competent authorities to exchange information with counterparts at the international level in the field of AML/CFT. Jordan's AML Law provides judicial authorities the legal basis to cooperate with foreign judicial authorities in providing assistance in foreign investigations, extradition, and freezing and seizing of funds related to money laundering in accordance with current legislation and bilateral or multilateral agreements to which Jordan is a part based on reciprocity. Judicial authorities may order implementation of requests by foreign judicial authorities to confiscate proceeds of crime relating to money laundering and to distribute such proceeds in accordance with bilateral or multilateral agreements. There was no indication in 2009 that these provisions of the AML Law have been used by the GOJ. In light of identified statutory and procedural deficiencies coming out of the MENAFATF mutual evaluation of 2008, the Government of Jordan should conduct a comprehensive evaluation of Jordan's capabilities in preventing money laundering and enforcing its new law in accordance with international standards and best practices. There was little advancement in the AML/CTF regime in 2009. Many of the steps in the FIU implementation plan require action or approval of the NCAML which has not steadily moved forward in addressing the necessary requirements needed for compliance with the FATF 40+9 recommendations. In spite of numerous criminal cases involving large financial value, no prosecutions of money laundering have occurred since the passage of the AML Law. GOJ prosecutorial, law enforcement and customs entities should examine forms of bulk cash smuggling relating to terrorist financing and trade-based money laundering and incorporate prevention and investigative strategies that meet the requirements of complex financial investigations. Jordan should also establish and implement a viable asset forfeiture regime. Charitable and nonprofit organizations should have better supervision and oversight. Per FATF Special Recommendation IX, Jordan's cross-border currency reporting should include outbound declarations. Jordan should draft, pass and implement legislation which meets international standards concerning the financing of terrorism as it is committed to do by virtue of its membership in the United Nations and in MENAFATF. The AML Law should be amended to include as predicate offenses to money laundering all crimes indicated by the FATF Forty Recommendations as well as any offense or act that causes a loss of revenue to the Kingdom in excess of 10,000 Jordanian Dinars (approximately $14,100). Many offenses that generate large illicit sums that are currently outside of the reach of the AML Law's definition of money laundering could be targeted. This would improve the financial sector in Jordan thus helping the Kingdom to comport with international standards. MANDEL