SCENESETTER FOR JORDAN VISIT OF UNDER SECRETARY

S E C R E T AMMAN 002580 NOFORN SIPDIS FOR T AND NEA/ELA; TUNIS FOR FSI STUDENT WONG E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2019 TAGS: ECON ENRG PARM PREL KNNP JO SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR JORDAN VISIT OF UNDER SECRETARY TAUSCHER REF: A. AMMAN 2498 ¶B. AMMAN 2290 ¶C. AMMAN 1690 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: Ambassador R. Stephen Beecroft for reasons 1.4(b) and (d ) ¶1. (S/NF) Embassy Amman welcomes your December 2 visit which provides an opportunity to articulate the Administration's views on nuclear energy and nonproliferation at a time when Jordan seems to be intensifying its efforts to conclude development, investment, and cooperation agreements in the field of nuclear energy with a range of countries and companies. While little has materialized from these agreements, some officials wrongly interpret their conclusion as evidence that a Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (NCA) with the U.S. is not really needed and that USG concerns about regional proliferation and uranium enrichment are overstated. Your visit is an opportunity to reassert to Jordan's political leadership that a successful nuclear energy program encompasses more than simply building a reactor. ¶2. (S/NF) The senior policy makers that you will meet - Prime Minister Nader Al-Dahabi and Chief of the Royal Court Nasser Lozi - generally understand U.S. concerns and objectives, but have problems reconciling nonproliferation policy objectives with the reality of Jordan's future energy needs and with technical arguments from leaders in the scientific community. Your audience would benefit from a clear presentation of the Administration's policy, including how the desired, stricter assurances would not be detrimental to Jordan's economic growth, and would have a positive long-term regional impact. The meetings also provide an opportunity to share U.S. views on Iran's nuclear program and to review initiatives to boost international cooperation, such as the proposed April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, the International Nuclear Energy Framework, and efforts to ensure a reliable fuel supply. ¶3. (S/NF) The U.S.-Jordan Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, agreed ad ref in 2008, remains unsigned due to some objections to assurances sought by the U.S. that Jordan not pursue domestic enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, similar to provisions accepted by the United Arab Emirates. The opposition to such language is led by Jordan Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC) Commissioner Dr. Khaled Toukan. (Note: Toukan is expected to take part in at least one of your meetings. JAEC Commissioner for International Cooperation Dr. Kamal Araj and Jordan Nuclear Regulatory Commission Director General Dr. Jamal Sharaf will be in Tokyo to attend the sherpa and sous-sherpa preparatory meetings for the Nuclear Security Summit. End note.) Not only has Toukan seemingly convinced Jordan's leadership that such terms would encroach on Jordan's sovereignty and undermine the principles of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, but he has also, by his own admission, encouraged other countries in the region to reject such language if proposed to them. Toukan's arguments have so far been convincing because he has focused on technical issues, where his knowledge and experience are unparalleled, and has successfully concluded multiple bilateral, commercial, and technical agreements, lending surface credibility to his position that U.S. requests are excessive. The commercial and technical agreements, however, have obscured the need for Jordan to bolster its policy framework to limit proliferation risks. ¶4. (C) Based on the argument that Jordan's nuclear energy program should not be held hostage by one country, the GOJ in the past two years has signed varied bilateral agreements and memoranda of cooperation with the U.S., Argentina, Australia, Canada, China, the Czech Republic, France, Japan, Romania, Russia, South Korea, Spain, and the U.K. Jordan has also signed NCAs with Canada, China, France, Russia, South Korea, and the UK. Few agreements have resulted in tangible benefits and several countries have indicated to Post that they are waiting for the 123 Agreement before actively pursuing activities in Jordan, a subtlety lost on many within the GOJ. As a result of its multiple agreements, the GOJ's approach to developing a peaceful nuclear energy program is literally all over the map: a combination of French, British, Australian, and Chinese firms are involved in uranium mining; an Australian company is working on technology selection and a financial feasibility study; and a Belgian organization is conducting a site selection survey. ¶5. (S) Jordan may have achieved its goal of many partners and international engagement, but the approach lacks focus and financing, little has been accomplished, and each new agreement brings a change in both the number of reactors to be built and the timeline for their construction and operation. Jordan maintains that it will sell energy within the region, but only after Post insistence did it engage its neighbors. Jordan's political leaders need to hear from Washington that assurances sought with regard to uranium enrichment and reprocessing will enhance Jordan's regional leadership role on nuclear energy and that concluding the 123 Agreement will boost U.S. congressional confidence in, and help to attract the investment needed to realize, Jordan's nuclear energy plans. Visit Amman's Classified Website at: http://diplopedia.state.sgov.gov/index.php?ti tle=Embassy Amman Beecroft