EMBASSY AMMAN ASSESSMENT OF FMS REQUEST FOR 5X

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 002554 SENSITIVE SIPDIS SECDEF FOR DSCA AND USD(P) SECSTATE FOR NEA/ELA AND PM/RSAT HQ DA FOR USASAC E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: MCAP MASS PREL JO SUBJECT: EMBASSY AMMAN ASSESSMENT OF FMS REQUEST FOR 5X AN/AAQ-33 ¶1. (SBU) The Government of Jordan has requested authorization to purchase 5 x AN/AAQ-33 Advance Targeting Pods. Jordan currently has no targeting system to deploy air to ground munitions. The acquisition of these Targeting Pods will allow Jordanian F-16 fighter jets to acquire and destroy targets with increased accuracy and give the Royal Jordanian Air Force (RJAF) night vision capability to supplement the Night Vision Goggles they already have. The enhanced capabilities will increase the range with which forces can identify and distinguish targets, reducing the risk of collateral damage and civilian causalities. These targeting pods are required equipment for air support to border security, counter-terrorism, and special operations forces. ¶2. (SBU) These defense articles will not affect the existing force structure of the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF). ¶3. (SBU) This request will enhance interoperability with partners in the Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR) and is a key objective of CENTCOM's Theater Strategy and their Theater Security Cooperation Plan. Jordan plays an instrumental role in supporting U.S. efforts in the region and merits further U.S. assistance in this key area of national defense. Approval of this request will improve Jordan's ability to provide internal national security and significantly enhance Jordan-U.S. force interoperability when deployed overseas as coalition partners. ¶4. (SBU) The request for 5x AN/AAQ-33 will support less than 10 per cent of Jordan's F-16 fleet. The remainder of the fleet will have no targeting pods. ¶5. (SBU) CENTCOM Commander's concurrence will be provided separately. ¶6. (SBU) The Embassy does not anticipate negative reaction from Jordan's neighboring countries. This action represents only a modest increase to Jordan's current capabilities and is not a technological advancement significant enough to affect the regional balance of power. This purchase will not impact the foreign policies of Jordan or of its neighbors. ¶7. (SBU) Jordan already accounts for, safeguards, operates, and maintains similar and more sensitive items without difficulty. In October 2008, Jordan received a rating of "successful" following the Defense Security Cooperation Agency's (DSCA) Compliance Assessment Visit (CAV),DSCA's highest rating. The rating was based on End Use Monitoring (EUM) compliance with their three EEUM articles, including Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM),Javelins, and NVDs. Jordan has provided assurances of its intent to provide these NVDs with the same degree of security and accountability. The Country Team assesses that Jordan will continue to be a trustworthy custodian of sensitive U.S. technologies. ¶8. (SBU) Jordan will require classified briefings, operator and other technical training from U,.S. trainers. The Country Team does not anticipate any negative reaction from neighboring countries regarding this technical training. ¶9. (SBU) The Country Team does not anticipate any negative impact of in-country U.S. presence required to provide these articles. ¶10. (SBU) Jordan is purchasing these Targeting Pods with Foreign Military Financing (FMF). ¶11. (SBU) There are no human rights considerations relevant to the proposed acquisition. ¶12. (SBU) The Military Assistance Program (MAP) in Jordan currently has an effective End-Use Monitoring (EUM) system in place for the JAF. These items will require periodic inventories while in the possession of the JAF. ¶13. (SBU) Embassy Amman recommends approval of the transfer of the AN/AAQ-33 Targeting Pods. The recommendation is based on the Country Team's assessment that the acquisition will improve Jordan's border security, internal defense, and counter-terrorism capabilities, while representing no political or technological risk to the U.S. AMMAN 00002554 002 OF 002 ¶14. (U) POC for this action is MAJ Jason E. Figueiredo (USA) at 011-962-6-590-6711 or jfigueir@san.osd.mil. Beecroft