JORDAN-U.S. JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION SCENESETTER

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 AMMAN 002493 NOFORN SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2019 TAGS: MOPS PREL PGOV PINS JO SUBJECT: JORDAN-U.S. JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION SCENESETTER Classified By: Ambassador R. Stephen Beecroft for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (S//NF) SUMMARY: This Joint Military Commission comes at a time when Jordan is increasing its contributions both in Afghanistan and to broader regional security, offering Syria an Arab alternative to Iranian influence, and maintaining its focus on a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Jordan has redoubled its efforts to develop solid ties with Baghdad. At the same time, Amman perceives U.S. military financial support as not keeping pace with the level of Jordanian contributions. Despite the 2008 Memorandum of Understanding on foreign assistance, Foreign Military Finance (FMF) in 2009 fell below 2008 levels (when 2008 supplemental appropriations are considered). Supplemental appropriations in 2009 were forward-financed, directly reducing our FMF commitment for 2010. Jordan has so far been disappointed with our lack of commitment to leave behind or store military equipment redeploying through Jordan from Iraq. End Summary. Middle East Peace -------------- ¶2. (S//NF) Jordan continues to play a central role in fostering Middle East peace and a two-state solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Both the King and his Foreign Minister Naser Joudeh maintain steady pressure on other Arab states to offer modest deliverables to Israel. The King's efforts, which have met with some success, seek tangible steps such as overflight permission for Israeli air traffic, linking telecommunications networks with Israel, and reducing restrictions on travelers who have transited Israel. ¶3. (S//NF) Given his public backing of U.S. attempts to restart Middle East Peace negotiations, the King views the lack of progress as damaging to his credibility. This damage could limit his ability to play a constructive role in the future. At the same time, Jordanian officials consistently express concern that Jordan will be asked to assume a degree of guardianship over the West Bank, a move which many believe would alter Jordan's demographic makeup in ways that ultimately threaten its Hashemite rule. Iraq -------------- ¶4. (C) Jordan has been a leader in engaging with Iraq, using engagement to promote bilateral trade and encouraging Iraq to build stronger ties with Arab states rather than with Iran. As evidence of the proactive Jordanian position the King became the first Arab Head of State to visit Baghdad, in July 2008, and has named an Ambassador to Iraq. The King supports Prime Minister Maliki and sees progress as slow, but moving in the right direction. Senior Jordanian leaders have become concerned that increasing tensions between the central government and the Kurdistan Region will erupt in violent conflict and are skeptical that Iraq can maintain stability as U.S. forces withdraw. ¶5. (S) In response to a request by General Odierno to provide capacity-building assistance to the Iraqi Ministries of Defense and Interior, Jordan has hosted visits of Iraqi officers to learn about border security operations on the Syrian border and observe military cooperation through joint exercises with CENTCOM. Jordan has hosted Iraqis at two recent seminars aimed at building the Iraqi capacity to manage their own Foreign Military Sales workload. Jordan has also said it will send a Defense Attach to Baghdad, but has not yet made plans to do so. ¶6. (S) Jordan signed a Technical Agreement with CENTCOM in July, laying the groundwork for redeployment of U.S. forces and equipment from Iraq through Jordan. In November, the first set of U.S. Brigade Combat Team (BCT) equipment redeployed through Jordan, signaling an appreciable increase in throughput. Over the course of the next eight months, nine additional BCT sets of equipment will transit Jordan en route to the port of Aqaba and ultimately to the U.S. Redeployment represents a significant boon to the Jordanian economy: $15.1M in 2009. The military and political leadership of Jordan has been disappointed that the U.S. has so far not committed to leave much equipment behind in Jordan to be donated, refurbished, or stored. Iran -------------- AMMAN 00002493 002 OF 004 ¶7. (S//NF) Jordan is concerned about Iranian influence in the region, particularly the potentially destabilizing effect of an Iranian nuclear program, support for Hizballah and Hamas, and Iran's links with Iraq and Syria. The King believes that the recent post-election violence in Iran exposes deep fissures in the Iranian polity that "makes the Supreme Leader look a bit less supreme," forcing Iran's leadership to turn inward on domestic issues and limiting their freedom and resources to act internationally. Fear remains that Iran will try to counter these perceptions with a dramatic act. ¶8. (S//NF) Jordan's senior leadership draws a direct link between the willingness of Arab states to counter Iran, and progress on Middle East peace, saying that Israeli and Sunni-Arab interests are perfectly aligned with respect to Iran. Arab governments are restricted in their ability to deal with Iran, they say, so long as Iran is seen as supporting the Palestinians against Israel. Realization of the two-state solution would consolidate the regional consensus against Iran, Jordan believes. Syria -------------- ¶9. (S/NF) Jordan has increased its engagement with Syria in the last few months in an attempt to provide it with an alternative to its alignment with Iran. The King and Syrian President Bashar Al Assad met at the Arab League Summit in March 2009. Reciprocal visits in March and April were followed by the King's Ramadan (September) visit to Syria. The meetings led to further working level meetings that produced agreements on a number of initiatives, including border demarcation, customs procedures, and commercial transport. ¶10. (S) Jordanian leadership assesses that although Syria has been vocal in its demand for a return of the Golan Heights and in its opposition to Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories, its most salient goals at this time are to secure economic assistance and political rehabilitation in the region. Jordan is pressing the U.S. to engage Syria in bilateral discussions in hopes that direct talks will challenge Damascus to make measurable changes and simultaneously allow Washington to determine whether Al Assad is serious about progress. Domestic Politics -------------- ¶11. (S/NF) King Abdullah's political reform efforts have stalled in recent years due to the conservative political establishment, a recalcitrant bureaucracy, a dysfunctional Parliament, and a dearth of tangible successes in Middle East Peace. Conversely, progress along the Middle East Peace process would create much-needed political and social "cover" for the King's reform program enabling him to pursue broad changes with less distraction from Palestinian issues. We have been urging the Jordanians to re-invigorate reforms, expanding political space for civil society, pressing electoral changes aimed at a more representative, inclusive system, and further loosening of state control over the economy. The King's economic and political changes face domestic opposition from tribal leaders and an array of entrenched East Bank interests that include many in the military, security services and bureaucracy. The King still has the power to initiate change across the spectrum, but only if he is fully determined to pursue it. ¶12. (S//NF) Jordan made progress on the economic front: buying back debt, eliminating subsidies, and promoting a trade-based, market-oriented economy. The positive effects of those measures are starting to wane, in part, a ramification of the global financial crisis, but also due to poor budget management and poor management of its limited water and energy resources. Jordan is one of the world's most water-poor nations and is moving aggressively on independent and regional initiatives to address its water needs. GAMA, a Turkish company partially owned by General Electric was awarded an $800 million contract to pump water from Southern Jordan's Disi aquifer to Amman. Jordan also announced in May, the unilateral $10 billion Jordan Red Sea Development Project to convey water from the Red Sea to the Dead Sea to generate hydropower, operate a desalination plant, and provide potable water for Jordan (and potentially for Israel and the Palestinian Authority, according to AMMAN 00002493 003 OF 004 Jordan),although it is unclear whether Jordan can secure the requisite funding to begin the project. ¶13. (S//NF) Jordan's economy is also affected by its energy needs. Jordan is a net importer of energy and thus subject to market fluctuations for oil prices. It imports fuel from Iraq but poor infrastructure limits import quantities, which must travel overland by tanker truck. Consequently, the discount offered barely offsets transportation costs. Jordan sees nuclear energy as its future and the King has placed a priority on developing a civilian nuclear energy program. The GOJ is anxious to sign a Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (NCA) with the United States, required for U.S. companies to provide nuclear reactors, fuel or materials. NCA negotiations are currently stalled however, with the Chairman of the Jordan Atomic Energy Commission objecting to assurances sought by the U.S. that Jordan will not refine or enrich Uranium in Jordan. Meanwhile, the GOJ continues to advance its nuclear energy program and has signed either MOUs or NCAs with the United States, China, France, the UK and a number of other co untries. Military Assistance and Cooperation -------------- ¶14. (C) The U.S.-Jordan mil-to-mil relationship is among the most extensive in the region. In September 2008, an MOU on Foreign Assistance was signed with Jordan that included a commitment to $300 million annually in Foreign Military Finance (FMF) through 2014. This year Congress allocated $150 million (of the $300 million) in forward-financed FMF to Jordan through the Supplemental Appropriation (which will reduce the FMF commitment for 2010.) Although these assistance levels are substantial, Jordan is sensitive to decreases in FMF from the height of the war in Iraq when Jordan received large supplemental appropriations. For example, combined FMF was $497 million in 2008, $307 million in 2007, and $305 million in 2006. Our currently baseline commitment to FMF for 2010 is $150 million. Individual Military Education and Training (IMET) funding remains at $3M per year, one of the largest IMET budgets worldwide. The program pays immense dividends, developing strong professional bonds between U.S. and JAF officer corps. ¶15. (C) Jordan makes significant contributions to U.S. regional security priorities. In July 2009, Jordan deployed a 712-soldier Ranger Battalion to Logar Province in Afghanistan to provide election security (TF 222). The JAF has approved the second six-month battalion deployment in support of OEF, despite the cost (pay entitlements) and risk to their soldiers' safety. JAF leaders have intimated that they would advocate even larger-scale deployments (a brigade),if the pay/entitlement expense were not so burdensome. In October, Jordan deployed the second rotation of a Special Operations company (TF 111) that conducts combat operations alongside U.S. Special Forces. In May, Jordan completed a donation of 10 M60 tanks to Lebanon. Lebanon has requested an additional 55 tanks. Earlier this month Jordan signed an agreement with Yemen to provide 25 M113 Armored Personnel Carriers. Jordan has offered to assist with other deployments, counter-piracy missions, and to host training courses and exercises for I raqi, Lebanese, and other forces, but remains dependent on external financial support to fund its contributions. Jordan continues to supply forces to U.N. sponsored Peace-Keeping Operations around the world. ¶16. (S) Despite the high levels of FMF and other security assistance, Jordan continues to request additional financial resources from external sources to make each contribution to regional security possible. For example, the Lebanon and Yemen donations were financed with funds from the UAE. Training programs for regional forces are financed through U.S. Anti-Terrorist Assistance (ATA) funds or the U.S. Security Coordinator (USSC). In addition, Jordanian law stipulates that its soldiers deployed overseas are entitled to approximately $1,700 monthly in combat pay, which has been financed through the United Nations for peacekeeping operations. Jordan has not yet identified a source of combat pay funding for its Afghanistan deployments but is hopeful NATO will contribute. ¶17. (S) Jordan has used its FMF to improve its border security and defensive capabilities remaining cognizant of interoperability with U.S. forces. We are concerned that AMMAN 00002493 004 OF 004 Jordan has focused too heavily on acquiring expensive new technology and needs to place more emphasis on the training and maintenance needs of existing programs. Beecroft