EMBASSY AMMAN ASSESSMENT OF FMS REQUEST FOR NIGHT

UNCLAS AMMAN 002346 SENSITIVE SIPDIS SECDEF FOR DSCA AND USD(P) STATE FOR NEA/ELA AND PM/RSAT HQ DA FOR USASAC E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: MCAP MASS PREL JO SUBJECT: EMBASSY AMMAN ASSESSMENT OF FMS REQUEST FOR NIGHT VISION DEVICES (NVD) REF: AMMAN 1550 ¶1. (SBU) This cable provides additional information requested by Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) related to the FMS sale of NVDs to Jordan. The Government of Jordan has requested authorization to purchase several types of Night Vision Devices (NVDs) through Foreign Military Financing. Case # JO-B-WCJ has been staffed and offered to Jordan. Jordan has requested some spare parts and technical training related to this case. ¶2. (SBU) These defense articles will not affect JAF's existing force structure. ¶3. (SBU) Jordan plays an instrumental role in supporting U.S. efforts in the region and merits further U.S. assistance in this key area of national defense. Approval of this CTA will not only improve Jordan's ability to maintain and sustain these NVDs, but will enable them to rapidly return them to support internal national security and Jordan-US interoperability while deployed overseas as coalition partners. ¶4. (SBU) The total number and type of NVDs being requested is justified in paragraph 14. ¶5. (SBU) CENTCOM Commander's concurrence will be provided separately. ¶6. (SBU) The Embassy does not anticipate any negative reaction from any of Jordan's regional neighbors. This action is not a technological breakthrough that could affect the regional balance of power. This type of purchase will not have any impact on Jordan nor its neighboring countries' existing regional foreign policies. ¶7. (SBU) Jordan already accounts for, safeguards, operates and maintains similar and more sensitive items without difficulty. We have already confirmed with the JAF its intent to provide these NVD components with the same degree of security and accountability the U.S. would provide. Jordan is a trustworthy custodian of other sensitive U.S. technologies and we believe they will continue to be so. ¶8. (SBU) Jordan has received these NVDs in the past and there was no impact of U.S. presence while in country. Therefore, we do no expect any negative impact of any in-country U.S. presence that may be required in providing these articles or technical training. ¶10. (SBU) Jordan is purchasing these components with Foreign Military Financing (FMF). ¶11. (SBU) There are no human rights considerations relevant to the proposed acquisition. ¶12. (SBU) The Military Assistance Program (MAP) in Jordan currently has an active End-Use Monitoring (EUM) system in place for the JAF. These NVDs are Enhanced-EUM items and will require periodic inventories while in the possession of the JAF. If deployed, US Forces deployed with them will ensure the task force is conducting daily inventories. ¶13. (SBU) The Embassy recommends USG approval for transfer of the NVD components for reasons listed above. This approval represents no political or technological risk to the U.S. ¶14. (SBU) Item requested: -- Jordan requests 10 percent spares of the Image Intensifier tube, GEN III Auto-Gated (Pinnacle),for the following NVD models(and include five of which are Generation III): Army and Navy/Passive Vision Sight-4 (AN/PVS-4), AN/PVS-7D, AN/AVS-9, AN/PVS-14, AN/PVS-23, AN/PVS-27, AN/TVS-5 and Multi-use Minimonocular-14 (MUM-14). -- The list of NVDs requested is described in the following table. (Table format is Model, Quantity, Figure of Merit, Spare Quantity) 1, AN/PVS-9, 100, 1600, 10 2, AN-PVS 7D, 130, 1600, 13 3, AN/PVS-27, 115, 1600, 12 4, AN/PVS-14, 980, 1600, 10 5, AN/PVS-22, 20, 1600, 2 6, AN/PVS-14, 3215, 1200, 32 7, AN-TVS-5, 558, 1200, 6 8, AN/PVS-23, 100, 1200, 10 9, AN/PVS-7D, 114, 1200, 11 ¶15. (U) POC this action is MAJ Scott A. Hurley, USA, at 011-962-6-590-6538 or NIPR: shurley@san.osd.mil, SIPR:hurleysa@centcom.jorsao.smil.mil. Beecroft