Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09AMMAN2252
2009-10-08 06:30:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Amman
Cable title:  

THE JORDANIAN ISLAMIST MOVEMENT: AN ORG CHART

Tags:  PGOV KISL KPAL EFIN JO 
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VZCZCXRO5098
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHAM #2252/01 2810630
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 080630Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6071
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 AMMAN 002252 

SIPDIS
NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2019
TAGS: PGOV KISL KPAL EFIN JO
SUBJECT: THE JORDANIAN ISLAMIST MOVEMENT: AN ORG CHART

REF: A. AMMAN 2216

B. AMMAN 2196 (NOTAL)

C. AMMAN 1385

Classified By: Ambassador R. Stephen Beecroft
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 AMMAN 002252 SIPDIS NOFORN E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2019 TAGS: PGOV KISL KPAL EFIN JO SUBJECT: THE JORDANIAN ISLAMIST MOVEMENT: AN ORG CHART REF: A. AMMAN 2216 ¶B. AMMAN 2196 (NOTAL) ¶C. AMMAN 1385 Classified By: Ambassador R. Stephen Beecroft for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood (JMB) is an umbrella organization which oversees and controls the political, charitable, and spiritual activities of the Islamist movement in Jordan. The Islamic Action Front (IAF), its POLITICAL wing, is directly controlled by the JMB through governance structures and financial ties. An internal review board within the JMB enforces message discipline throughout the movement. On the financial front, the JMB uses its steady stream of membership dues to directly fund IAF activities. As the IAF lacks a core of donors independent of the JMB, fund transfers are often withheld as a way to limit the party's POLITICAL ambitions. The JMB is not wholly independent of the international brotherhood leadership, deferring to the guides in Cairo about larger questions of policy and spirituality. End Summary. Division of Labor -------------- ¶1. (S/NF) The JMB is the organizational and ideological heart of the Islamist movement in Jordan. Its members and executive board (known as the Shura Council) guide the spiritual, political, and charitable course of the movement. The JMB is officially registered as a charitable organization, yet it is widely recognized (even in government circles) that the brotherhood has a special status due to its long relationship with the government and deep roots in Jordanian society. Despite the protections afforded by its official legal status, the JMB prefers to pursue charitable and POLITICAL activities through subsidiary organizations. ¶2. (S/NF) Beneath the umbrella of the JMB lies two organizations which are akin to wholly owned subsidiaries. The Islamic Action Front serves as the organization's political wing, pursuing elected office for its members through a legally recognized party structure. Up until 2006, the Islamic Center Society served as the organization's charitable wing. Since the government takeover of the organization, JMB control over its activities has been effectively frozen (See Ref A for a detailed rundown of the society's operations and legal woes). JMB-IAF RELATIONS -------------- ¶3. (S/NF) Most of our Islamist contacts estimat
e that the membership of the JMB is around 10,000, with some placing the number slightly higher. In contrast, IAF membership is probably closer to around 4,000. (Note: The IAF is by far the largest POLITICAL party in Jordan. Most parties struggle to put together the required 500 "founding members" needed to maintain legal party status. End Note.) Almost all IAF members are simultaneously part of the JMB, but there are a few exceptions. Several Christians joined the party over the years, many out of sympathy for the Palestinian cause which the IAF champions. ¶4. (S/NF) The IAF Shura Council is composed exclusively of JMB members who are usually not concurrently on the JMB Shura Council. The IAF Secretary-General is chosen by the party's Shura Council from a list of candidates supplied by the JMB Shura Council. The JMB Shura Council has the de facto power to dismiss the head of the IAF, although it is unclear whether this is in the organization's official bylaws or not. The most recent example of JMB intervention in the leadership of the IAF is the case of Zaki Beni-Irshaid, who was forced out of the top job in the IAF in May by moderate members of the JMB Shura Council (Ref C). ¶5. (S/NF) While the JMB is currently seen as the dominant player in Jordanian Islamist circles, this was not always the case. From the return of parliament in 1989 through the mid-1990s, the IAF was the primary actor. At the time, the IAF boasted a strong plurality in the parliament and was represented by several governmental ministers. Over time, however, the number of IAF MPs diminished due to government intervention in the POLITICAL process and natural lack of support in the party's base when it failed to deliver on electoral promises. The IAF was also weakened by its financial dependence on the JMB, which increased as the party's POLITICAL clout declined and its relationship with the government soured. Disciplinary Measures -------------- AMMAN 00002252 002 OF 003 ¶6. (S/NF) Both JMB and IAF members are subject to disciplinary proceedings by an internal review board should they step out of line in their public statements or pursue actions detrimental to the movement. The review board was created in the early 1990s as the split between moderates and hardliners began to create inconsistencies in the movement's public stances (Ref B). The review board is composed of JMB Shura Council members and actively pursues cases against errant Islamists from the movement's many branches. Moderates within the JMB Shura Council recently used the threat of an internal review board (described as an "internal court" by Jordan's media) to force a debate on Beni-Irshaid's electoral tactics as leader of the IAF. Hardliners have started to use internal review boards to their advantage as well -- contacts within the movement told us that moderate leader Ruhail Gharaibeh has been banned from appearing in the press for the near term by an internal review board decision. The move came as the movement tries to paper over the increasingly public nature of its internal divide (Ref B). Financial Strengths and Weaknesses -------------- ¶7. (S/NF) The JMB receives a regular income stream from membership dues, which are levied at a flat five percent of the member's income. (Note: JMB dues come in addition to zakat, the charitable donations required of all Muslims. End Note.) The JMB also commands financial support from several large Islamist-oriented business conglomerates, many of which are owned by prominent Palestinian businessmen. (Note: The most visible example is the eponymous national furniture chain owned by Islamist Sa'ad Al-Din Zumelei, which our contacts claim provides extensive support to JMB activities and charitable works. End Note.) ¶8. (S/NF) In addition to domestic sources of financial support, the JMB also reportedly receives funds from adherents of the international Muslim Brotherhood organization. Contacts within the movement told us that these sources of funding are generally not used for the day-to-day expenses of the movement. Instead, they are generally used for special projects which will advance the JMB's position within Jordan. The most visible example of such a project is the Islamic Hospital in Amman, which was built with funds provided by MB members in the Gulf and elsewhere through a special appeal from Muslim Brotherhood headquarters in Cairo. ¶9. (S/NF) Several of our contacts commented on the relative poverty of the IAF in comparison with the JMB. The IAF does not charge membership dues and relies heavily on direct support from the JMB for most of its operating budget. Contacts within the movement told us that the JMB is often stingy with its POLITICAL wing, giving it only the support it needs to survive. Many see this as the JMB's way of keeping ideological control over the IAF and limiting the ambitions of its leadership. The IAF reportedly has occasional difficulty paying the rent on its headquarters building due to insufficient transfers from the JMB. ¶10. (S/NF) The IAF does occasionally receive funds from individual donors, but these are the exception rather than the rule. Our contacts agree that government efforts to isolate the IAF and the party's increasingly radical political stances have combined to alienate potential donors. While the JMB is a broadly respected organization whose political stances are only a part of its larger raison d'etre, donating directly to the IAF is seen as politically risky, particularly with the worldwide focus on the finances of Islamist groups. Ties To The International MB -------------- ¶11. (S/NF) It is fairly well known that the JMB tightly controls its subsidiary organizations in Jordan. What is less clear, however, is the extent to which the JMB is itself controlled by the international Muslim Brotherhood organization. Interchange between JMB leaders, the movement's guidance council in Cairo, and other brotherhood affiliates like Hamas rarely advances beyond the stage of website rumors, leaving many to speculate as to where the JMB fits in the brotherhood's organizational chart. ¶12. (S/NF) Marwan Shehadeh, an independent Islamist who covers the movement for the news website Islamouna, told poloff that the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood is "not 100% independent" from the international Muslim Brotherhood when it comes to POLITICAL matters. While the JMB has a great deal of ideological autonomy when it comes to domestic concerns, there are certain "critical issues" of AMMAN 00002252 003 OF 003 international policy and practice that are dictated from the central organization rather than the individual country branches. Shehadeh gave the example of the war in Iraq as an example of MB headquarters taking the lead on defining the movement's stance, albeit with input from members throughout the Middle East. ¶13. (S/NF) Speaking about the JMB's alleged ties to Hamas, our contacts insisted that there were no direct organizational links. They characterized the relationship as a "spiritual influence" rather than a POLITICAL alliance. As recently as September, the JMB has said the same thing in its public statements. Government-influenced media in Jordan has occasionally suggested that JMB leader Hamam Sa'id is also a member of the Hamas Shura Council, but all of our Islamist contacts deny that this is indeed the case. Comment -------------- ¶14. (S/NF) The structure of the JMB and its subsidiaries is designed to facilitate organizational harmony and impose message discipline. The division of labor and responsibility has proven quite effective over the years, keeping the often divergent POLITICAL and social currents within the JMB operating more or less on the same page for decades. While the personalities who occupy leadership positions within the JMB and its proxies may change, the JMB still derives strength from strong corporate governance designed to survive ideological threats from within, along with legal and political challenges from outside. Beecroft

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