THE BATTLE OVER JORDAN'S ISLAMIC CENTER SOCIETY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 AMMAN 002216 SIPDIS NOFORN E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2019 TAGS: PGOV KISL KDEM KJUS JO SUBJECT: THE BATTLE OVER JORDAN'S ISLAMIC CENTER SOCIETY REF: A. 06 AMMAN 5222 ¶B. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH - "SHUTTING OUT THE CRITICS" (2008) Classified By: Ambassador R. Stephen Beecroft for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: The Islamic Center Society (ICS) was the charitable wing of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood (JMB) until it was seized by the government in 2006. Legally questionable corruption allegations against members of the ICS board allowed the government to appoint a "temporary" board that has run the organization ever since. The takeover stripped the JMB of its politically effective patronage and services network. Subsequent Islamist complaints about the government administration of ICS charities may have some basis -- the organization is reportedly running short of cash. In spite of frequent missives from the JMB urging the government to return the ICS to Islamist control, contacts within the movement tell us only a broader political deal with the government could make this happen. In the absence of such a deal, the ICS will likely remain in legal limbo. End Summary. The Islamic Center Society -------------- ¶2. (C) The Islamic Center Society was founded in 1963 as the charitable wing of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. One of the largest NGOs in the country, the ICS takes care of over 20,000 orphans, runs 55 schools, and has over 3,500 employees. The flagship charitable concern of the ICS is the Islamic Hospital in Amman, which in turn oversees more than thirty smaller clinics. The ICS has large property holdings, largely as a result of bequests and zakat donations (charitable donations required of all Muslims) over the years. Islamist press statements have put the value of ICS assets at over 1.5 billion dollars. Hostile Takeover -------------- ¶3. (S/NF) In 2006, the Ministry of Social Development dissolved the ICS board of directors and brought charges of financial corruption against several board members under orders from Prime Minister Ma'arouf Al-Bakhit (Ref A). It has been widely recognized since then that the charges were political in nature and were used as an excuse to liquidate the ICS board for political reasons. None of the corruption cases have been followed through to completion -- a small number are still being appealed, others have been reported in the media as not moving forward due to lack of evidence, and some have not been filed by prosecutors in the hopes of an out of court settlement. The lack of movement on ICS corruption cases has been criticized by Human Rights Watch and other activist groups (Ref B). ¶4. (S/NF) The corruption cases gave the government legal authority to appoint "temporary" directors to manage the society's operations in the absence of an elected board. While the government takeover brought in a new management team, the legal mandate caused by the corruption allegations did not extend to the ICS general assembly, which in normal circumstances selects the board of directors. The ICS assembly, still dominated by members of the Muslim Brotherhood, has been effectively sidelined in its oversight role over the organization since the 2006 government takeover. ¶5. (S/NF) Bassem Al-Umush, a one-time member of the Muslim Brotherhood who broke with the group in 1997, was appointed by then-PM Bakhit to head the temporary administration of the ICS in 2007. At the request of the government, Umush changed the ICS bylaws to expand the general assembly's membership from 350 to 500 members. This allowed the government-controlled board to appoint a wave of new pro-government members into the general assembly in an effort to water down Islamist influence, even if the ICS eventually was taken out of government hands by the courts. Many of these newly appointed general assembly members are reportedly part of the Islamic Center Party, a pro-government political party which features several former JMB stalwarts who broke with the party in the 1990s. According to Umush, some in the Bakhit government wanted to make even more radical changes in the organization's leadership structure and bylaws which would permanently change the nature of the institution. When Umush refused to implement those changes, he was forced out after only seven months on the job. The Takeover's Impact -------------- AMMAN 00002216 002 OF 003 ¶6. (C) The Islamic Center Society was a key part of the Islamists' political strength before it passed into government hands. Beyond the use of ICS facilities and personnel to dispense patronage and services to its target populations, the JMB used the ICS as an employment agency for its supporters. Even though the connections between ICS jobs, ICS services, and the political goals of Jordan's Islamists were rarely overt, it was widely acknowledged in Jordan that medical care in the Islamic Hospital or a job in an ICS charity came with the expectation of a vote for the Islamists at election time. ¶7. (C) According to Umush, the government takeover of the ICS caught many JMB members off guard as they were using the organization as a way to avoid taxation. By signing over property and other assets to the ICS as charitable donations, members of the JMB lowered their tax bill. Yet there was an implicit understanding that members would still be able to use these assets even after they had technically passed into legal possession of the ICS. When the government took over the organization, many JMB members effectively forfeited large amounts of property which appeared on the ICS asset sheet. A Sore Point -------------- ¶8. (C) The undetermined fate of the Islamic Center Society is an ongoing source of tension between Islamists and the government. The subject is a mainstay of press releases and interviews that come from JMB and IAF officials. In July, IAF Secretary General Ishaq Farhan told the Al-Dustour newspaper that while he supported anti-corruption efforts, the case of the ICS amounted to "prosecuting an institution." In a June interview with Islamist daily Al-Sabil, Farhan said that the organization was the victim of "political targeting" by the government. Privately, JMB Shura Council member Ruhail Gharaibeh told poloff that most Jordanian Islamists see the ICS takeover as part of a regional campaign by Arab governments against Islamist-affiliated charities. He predicted that the Islamists would continue to raise the issue in the public arena, but would gain little traction with the government until Jordan's underlying perspective on political Islam changed. Is The Government Running The ICS Well? -------------- ¶9. (C) Islamists frequently complain that ICS operations have suffered under government administration. In particular, the JMB often mentions a decline in quality of care at the Islamic Hospital, along with a rise in prices. Farhan has said that the increasing cost of care has caused the Islamic Hospital to "lose its message...to the extent that a patient would practically find no price difference between going to the Islamic Hospital or any other hospital." In a July press release JMB head Hammam Sa'id said that the government administered ICS was transforming the Islamic Hospital into a business rather than keeping it as a charitable organization. ¶10. (C) According to Umush, the Islamists have a point on rising prices, but fail to take into account the context of health care in Jordan. Umush claims that for years, the Islamic Hospital operated on the low end of both quality and price. Since the government takeover, services and infrastructure at the hospital have improved, necessitating a rise in prices to account for increased costs. ¶11. (C) Umush agreed with Islamist critiques of the government's financial management of the ICS. JMB chair Sa'id has publicly raised questions about financial management of the ICS and its "lack of liquidity" while IAF MP Hamzah Mansour told the Jordan Times newspaper in June that "financial records and reports are rubber stamped by the new management despite irregularities." Umush said that the ICS will face financial insolvency unless its operating strategy changes in the near future. While the assets of the ICS are extensive and valuable, the operating expenses for ICS facilities are growing rapidly. Rather than invest the organization's revenue into capital improvements, Umush said that the government-run board has chosen to buy new properties which will incur larger maintenance costs in the future. Will The Islamists Ever Get It Back? -------------- ¶12. (C) The general consensus among our contacts is that the Islamist movement will never regain operational control of the ICS in the same form as before the takeover. Changes to the organization's management structure are unlikely to be AMMAN 00002216 003 OF 003 reversed, especially in light of government attempts to further dilute the strength of Islamist representation in the general assembly. The official JMB line is that the status quo ante should be restored, although contacts within the movement tell us that they have little hope that this will ever happen. Islamist contacts believe that the ICS will only be removed from government control in the context of a package deal in which the Islamist-government relationship is fundamentally redefined. ¶13. (C) In spite of the surface level stalemate on the status of the ICS, informal proposals are occasionally traded between the government and the JMB. Contacts within the JMB tell us that the government has periodically offered to return the ICS to them, but often with unpalatable strings attached. As recently as two months ago, the government told the JMB that they would release the organization from government control in exchange for changing the structure of the executive board so that it was split evenly between Islamists and government representatives. The Islamists refused that formulation, and continue to hold out for a better deal. Comment -------------- ¶14. (C) The ICS has turned into a valuable bargaining chip for Jordan's government. ICS services were a key part of the Islamists' appeal before the takeover -- they served as an alternative to inefficient state-run institutions and proof that the JMB was more adept than the government in meeting popular needs. Without the ICS at its disposal, the JMB has few avenues to deliver the patronage and services that average Jordanians expect from their politicians. While there seems to be little incentive for the government to return the ICS back to the Islamists in its original form, there are also few indications that the government intends to formally and permanently absorb the ICS into its existing health and charity network either. In the absence of a concrete plan to reconcile Islamist political control over the ICS with the government's political concerns, the organization will likely remain in legal limbo. Beecroft