PARLIAMENT: "THE SCUM OF JORDAN"

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 AMMAN 002097 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2019 TAGS: PGOV KDEM JO SUBJECT: PARLIAMENT: "THE SCUM OF JORDAN" REF: A. AMMAN 1804 ¶B. AMMAN 1317 (NOTAL) ¶C. AMMAN 378 ¶D. 08 AMMAN 1917 ¶E. 08 AMMAN 1856 ¶F. 08 AMMAN 1834 Classified By: Ambassador R. Stephen Beecroft for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) Summary: Following an early end to parliament's extraordinary session, many in Jordan are again questioning the professionalism and drive of MPs. Jordan's media, political leadership, and public opinion are united in their condemnation of legislators, whose gaffes only add to the widespread calls for parliament's dissolution. The conservative tribal representatives who dominate the 110-seat parliament are there because of Jordan's electoral system. Gerrymandered districts, disproportionate representation, and direct government interference all combine to produce MPs who focus on service provision rather than policy. Despite frequent and increasingly urgent calls for electoral reform, the identity politics surrounding the East Banker and Palestinian gap stand in the way of real change. End Summary. Whither Parliament? -------------- ¶2. (SBU) At the request of Jordan's government, an August 10 royal decree declared a premature end to parliament's extraordinary session (Ref A). While the approach of Ramadan was ostensibly the reason for the session's early conclusion, it is clear that many government bills were not progressing through the legislature as planned. While several of the statutes presented by the government were poorly written and presented, the inability of legislators to push through the government's agenda is prompting a new round of criticism of parliament in the media and political salons. What A Bunch Of Losers -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Parliament has never enjoyed a stellar reputation among Jordanians. A series of tracking polls conducted by the Center for Strategic Studies at Jordan University consistently demonstrates that Jordanians have little faith in parliament as an institution or in individual MPs to represent their constituents. In the most recent poll, compiled in June, 71% of Jordanian opinion leaders said that they were unhappy with the performance of the Jordanian parliament. Only one-third of respondents said that parliament adequately enacted appropriate legislation and held the government accountable. An online poll posted on the websites of Jordan's four largest newspapers in August found that 94% of respondents believed that the current parliament should be dissolved. ¶4. (SBU) Media commentators frequently publish diatribes which paint parliament as incompetent and ineffective. Influential Al-Arab Al-Yawm columnist Fahed Al-Khitan lamented in a September 7 editorial that no more than "two or three" MPs in the current parliament are worthy of gaining the speaker's chair, and none are worthy of inclusion in the government. During the summer extraordinary session, editorials used a wide range of negative adjectives to describe parliament and its membership: vindictive, moody, barbaric, shameless, failed, myopic. ¶5. (S) Our interlocutors in government frequently express open contempt for parliament and the personalities that occupy it. Royal Court Chief Nasser Lozi and PM Nader Dahabi have both talked about their wish to dissolve parliament altogether (a subject that will be covered septel). Cabinet members, many of whom are trying to get their pet bills through parliament, can be even more critical. Finance Minister Bassem Salem told the Ambassador that he considered MPs to be "the scum of Jordan." Minister of Political Development Musa Ma'ayta has publicly stated on several occasions that the current parliament should be dissolved as part of a comprehensive electoral reform. The dominant view of parliament in Jordan's government is one of obstructionism, extreme tribal conservatism, and unprofessional behavior. Parliamentary Shenanigans -------------- ¶6. (C) MPs have done little to advance the argument that they should be trusted with more formal power. The train of petty incidents and squabbles that demonstrate MPs' incompetence or lack of professionalism seems endless. The brother of Farhan Al-Ghweiri, a Zarqa MP, was recently caught using a vehicle with parliamentary plates to smuggle drugs AMMAN 00002097 002 OF 003 into Syria. Ali Dalaeen, a representative from Karak, recently came to blows with a policeman who stopped him for speeding. Amman MP Khalil Atiyyeh assaulted a journalist on the floor of parliament, fracturing his skull. During the Israeli bombardment of Gaza in December 2008, Atiyyeh burned the Israeli flag during a parliamentary debate. Lower house speaker Abdulhadi Majali directed the parliament's secretary-general to bring libel charges against a journalist whose online editorial recommended the dissolution of parliament. One session of parliament in February ended with a large scale scuffle in which MPs of various factions threw water bottles at each other. Following the incident, a former PM told us that Jordan's parliament is "worse than Zimbabwe's" (Ref C). The Root Cause: Jordan's Electoral System -------------- ¶7. (C) The lack of professionalism in Jordan's parliament is directly related to the electoral system that produces it. Gerrymandered electoral boundaries ensure the overrepresentation of rural districts in which East Bank tribes are politically dominant at the expense of heavily Palestinian urban areas. Going by 2004 census data, the Amman governorate is home to 38% of Jordan's population, it is only represented by 24% of the seats. Similarly, Zarqa claims 15% of Jordan's population, but only 11% of the seats. The rural East Banker town of Karak, on the other hand, has just 4% of Jordan's population, but 11% of its parliamentary seats. If seats in parliament were truly representative, Amman would gain thirteen seats and Zarqa would gain four, while Karak would lose up to seven seats. ¶8. (SBU) The system of parliamentary quotas for women, Chechens/Circassians, Christians, and bedouins exacerbates the problem. Some estimates put Jordan's Christian population as low as 1.4% of the population, yet they command 8% of the seats in parliament. While the parliamentary numbers for Chechens/Circassians are relatively consistent with their portion of the overall population (around 2%),the placement of these seats in urban districts further dilutes the input of non-minority groups in these areas. Awarding quota seats to women based on the percentage of the vote in their districts rather than the number of votes received caused the number one vote getter among female candidates to lose, while a female candidate from a small district near Karak won with only 700 votes. ¶9. (SBU) Jordan's so-called "one man, one vote" system further encourages tribal voting. Since Jordanian voters can only cast one vote in a multi-member district, tribal leaders instruct their constituents to vote for certain candidates, splitting the vote so that the maximum number of representatives from the tribe are sent to parliament. By allowing tribal leaders to split the vote in this way, Jordan's electoral law encourages candidates to run as members of the tribe who can deliver services to their extended relatives rather than as issue-based candidates who will pursue the best policies. ¶10. (S) Governmental interference in the electoral process is another well-known factor that plays into the composition of parliament. Conventional wisdom among political elites has it that the General Intelligence Directorate played a direct role in the outcome of the 2007 parliamentary elections. At the time, GID was controlled by Mohammed Dahabi, brother to current PM Nader Dahabi and a conservative representative of tribal interests. Dahabi was known to have deeply involved himself in political matters, and many believe that he financed or otherwise supported candidates who would later do his bidding in parliament. After Dahabi was fired by the King in January 2009, political observers in Jordan began to see the parliament he engineered as rudderless. ¶11. (C) The combination of district boundaries which promote East Bankers over Palestinians, unrepresentative quota seats for ethno-religious minorities, an electoral law which encourages tribal voting, and government interference in the electoral process has resulted in a parliament that is dominated by tribal figures elected for who they are rather than the policies they endorse. It is hardly surprising that the parliament is filled largely with unqualified tribal leaders who favor service provision over policy -- the electoral system has made such people the most attractive candidates for election to the legislature. The few exceptions to the rule are usually members of the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Islamic Action Front -- a party which has created its own patronage networks in order to remain competitive under the current electoral system. Can The System Change? -------------- AMMAN 00002097 003 OF 003 ¶12. (C) The government complains incessantly about parliament's poor performance, but it has done nothing to alter the electoral law which brings MPs into power. The 2006 National Agenda, a royally-sponsored blueprint for reform, recommended the creation of a new electoral law based on a mixed system of proportional representation and single member districts. Yet despite the agenda's endorsement by the King and frequent media commentary on the need for a new electoral law, successive governments have failed to even start a national discussion on the subject. ¶13. (C) The primary reason that Jordan's electoral law remains in place is the issue of Palestinian identity. Government interlocutors frequently and consistently tell us that without a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Jordan will be unable to reform the structure of its internal political system. In the eyes of state officials (most of whom are East Bankers),allowing Jordan's Palestinian-origin majority to take its rightful share of the electoral pie would amount to Jordan becoming a Palestinian state. This is an unthinkable scenario for East Bankers who jealously guard their control of Jordan's political system and security apparatus. ¶14. (C) While the desire for a strong, effective, representative parliament is strong in Jordan, all signs point to a maintenance of the status quo as long as the regional environment remains constant. Barring some unforeseen domestic political earthquake or royal intervention, only a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will produce the necessary environment for a new electoral law that could usher in a truly representative parliament of professional legislators. Septel will examine what may emerge as the only other option for political change in the absence of a solution: dissolution of parliament. Beecroft