RE-ENGAGING WITH JORDAN'S ISLAMISTS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 AMMAN 002053 SIPDIS NOFORN E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/03/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM KISL JO SUBJECT: RE-ENGAGING WITH JORDAN'S ISLAMISTS REF: A. STATE 85638 ¶B. AMMAN 1866 ¶C. AMMAN 896 ¶D. AMMAN 197 Classified By: Ambassador R. Stephen Beecroft for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Embassy Amman is moving forward with a strategy to re-establish political contact with Islamists in Jordan. Engagement with the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood (JMB) and its political wing, the Islamic Action Front (IAF), languished in the wake of September 11, 2001, and eventually became taboo. For the past several months, the Ambassador has discussed contact between the Embassy and Islamist political groups with Jordanian government officials. A recent chance encounter between Islamist politicians and political officers is a natural starting point for a gradual, quiet, yet deliberate process of mending our relationships with the JMB and IAF that does not alter our existing relationships with the government. Engaging with Jordan's Islamists is a calculated risk designed to expand the scope of our reporting and outreach to this legal political party whose role in Jordanian society is important to understand. End Summary. Background -------------- ¶2. (S/NF) Until the early 2000s, the political section had regular contact with the JMB and IAF. This was a reflection of the Islamists' historical position as a part of the state apparatus. The Secretary-General of the IAF would seek out meetings with the head of the political section or political officers or respond to Embassy meeting requests as officers researched cables on various topics. Islamists were rarely granted access to the Ambassador or DCM, but this was more an issue of rank -- across the board, political party leaders in Jordan rarely rise to the level of meriting high level contact. ¶3. (S/NF) In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, an unofficial decision was made to cut off our relationship with the Islamists. The political section no longer sought meetings with the JMB or IAF. Requests for meetings from Islamists were quietly shelved and phone calls were not returned. The cutoff of relations between the USG and the Islamists came at the same time as the Muslim Brotherhood was drifting away from its status as part of the Jordanian establishment and towards its current outsider position. It also coincided with the rise of Hamas, the invasion of Iraq, and the dissolution of parliament. The combination of a shrinking arena for political expression in Jordan, new geopolitical realities in the region, and the absence of a working dialogue with the USG led to a hardening of the policy positions and public rhetoric of the JMB and IAF. ¶4. (S/NF) Even as the Embassy's relationship with the Islamists cooled, in the intervening years the JMB and IAF have attempted several times to re-establish contact, both directly and through intermediaries. Then-IAF Secretary General Zaki Beni-Irshaid sent a congratulatory letter to the Embassy following the election of President Obama in which he called for "debate with the political forces that represent the Islamic world" (Ref D). Journalists who have regular contact with Islamist politicians have repeatedly told us that they are willing to re-establish relations with Embassy personnel. During a chance meeting in August, Islamist politicians mentioned that several attempts had been made in recent years to re-establish contact with the Embassy, all of which had failed (Ref B). Ruhail Gharaibeh, a member of the JMB Shura Council, told us that his February visit to the United States for a conference was designed to demonstrate the Islamists' willingness to talk. Opening The Door -------------- ¶5. (S/NF) During the tenure of GID director Mohammed Dahabi (2007-2009),Jordan's Islamists were carefully monitored and their political activities constrained by state action. In such an atmosphere, breaking the Embassy's practice of non-engagement with Jordan's Islamists would have been difficult politically. Following Dahabi's departure, however, the King ordered a general relaxation of political red lines and an end to direct intervention in the political sphere by intelligence officials. This policy change has opened the door for the resumption of contact with Islamist groups. ¶6. (S/NF) For several months, the Ambassador has engaged in a dialogue with Royal Court Chief Nasser Lozi about Embassy AMMAN 00002053 002 OF 003 engagement with the JMB and IAF. While not designed to seek official Jordanian permission to re-establish ties, the discussions have gradually introduced the concept of talks in order to allow the government time and political space to get used to the idea. Lozi has not discouraged us from pursuing a relationship with the Islamists. He has asked us to be cognizant of timing issues and the political context, requesting that we wait until the end of parliament's summer extraordinary session and Ramadan before proceeding. ¶7. (S/NF) The reaction from GID is harder to predict. There are factions within GID which will object to our engagement with Jordan's Islamists. In the past, GID officers have attempted to block our efforts to probe sensitive areas of Jordanian political life. In September 2007, a meeting with a group of imams in Zarqa resulted in GID warnings of a non-counterable threat against the Embassy's Deputy Political Counselor which we now believe to be fabricated (Ref C). In April, GID planted negative stories in the online press about a political officer's meeting with the mayor of Ma'an, a city known as a traditional stronghold of radical Islamists in Jordan (Ref C). ¶8. (S/NF) These incidents are a sober reminder of the tactics some Jordanian officials are willing to use in order to keep the de facto prohibition of Embassy engagement with Islamists in place. Yet they may also be the price to pay for re-establishing our ability to pursue the full range of normal diplomatic relationships in Jordan. While our attempts on the margins to gather information about Islamists and their allies have occasionally resulted in strong reactions, other Embassies in Amman maintain regular contacts with the JMB and IAF. The British, German, and French Embassies meet occasionally with both hardline and pro-accomodation leaders of the Islamist movement in Jordan. Such routine meetings are not reported in the official or Islamist press -- a subtle indication that the Islamists and Jordan's government view these meetings as normal. A Strategy For Engagement -------------- ¶9. (S/NF) Our chance meeting with moderate Islamist leaders in August presents us with an opportunity to gradually and quietly begin the process of resuming our relationships with the JMB and IAF (Ref A). The Islamists have clearly indicated to us their willingness to talk as long as we were sincere in our pursuit of regular contact. Now that the ice has been broken, it is incumbent on us to demonstrate our willingness to follow up and engage on matters of substance. ¶10. (S/NF) In the coming months, Post will reach out to known moderates within the JMB and IAF. We will start by meeting again with Ruhail Gharaibeh and Nabil Kofahi, our previous dinner companions, who are members of the JMB Shura Council but remain largely out of the public eye. As trust builds, we will begin to expand our contacts to IAF mayors and members of parliament who are willing to engage with us. ¶11. (S/NF) Internal rifts within the Islamist movement in Jordan between those who favor more engagement with the government and those who favor confrontation have grown in recent years. As we re-establish our relationship with the JMB and IAF, it will be important for us to remain as neutral as possible in this conflict. The so-called "doves" are more likely to welcome contact with us, and it is logical to start with them in our efforts to re-connect. Once our relationship normalizes, however, it will eventually become necessary to expand our contacts to other factions of the Islamist movement. Breaking The Taboo -------------- ¶12. (S/NF) The ultimate goal of re-establishing contact with Jordan's Islamists is to maintain a broader range of contacts which will allow us to report on the full range of political issues facing this country. It will also open the door to activity in the public diplomacy arena -- a possibility which the Islamists themselves raised as a move they would welcome. Re-engaging with Jordan's Islamist community is a calculated risk. The benefit will be a more complete and accurate view a legal political organization that is recognized as a priority in the National HUMINT Collection Directive (Ref A). Talking with Jordan's Islamists will also allow us to correct their perceptions on American policy in Jordan and the region. Political Islam in Jordan need not remain a blind spot. Through careful cultivation of contacts within the Islamist movement combined with occasional reassurance of our intentions with the Jordanian government, the taboo surrounding contact with the JMB and IAF can be broken. Breaking that taboo will allow us to reinstate the AMMAN 00002053 003 OF 003 politically important series of relationships which will in turn improve our knowledge and understanding of Jordanian political life. Beecroft