EMBASSY AMMAN ASSESSMENT OF FMS REQUEST FOR NIGHT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 001550 SIPDIS SECDEF FOR DSCA AND USD(P) SECSTATE FOR NEA/ELA AND PM/RSAT HQ DA FOR USASAC E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2019 TAGS: MCAP MASS PREL JO SUBJECT: EMBASSY AMMAN ASSESSMENT OF FMS REQUEST FOR NIGHT VISION DEVICES (NVD) REF: 2008 AMMAN 3304 Classified By: Ambassador R. Stephen Beecroft for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (SBU) This cable provides additional information requested by Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) related to the FMS sale of NVDs to Jordan. The Government of Jordan has requested authorization to purchase several types of Night Vision Devices (NVDs) through Foreign Military Financing. The NVDs will increase their night vision capability to support their border security forces, counter-terrorism forces, special operations forces, and task forces being deployed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). ¶2. (SBU) These defense articles will not affect JAF's existing force structure. ¶3. (SBU) This request will enhance interoperability with partners in the Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility and is a key objective of CENTCOM's Theater Strategy and their Theater Security Cooperation Plan. The NVDs will provide Jordan with a nocturnal capability during peacetime and contingency operations. Jordan plays an instrumental role in supporting U.S. efforts in the region and merits further U.S. assistance in this key area of national defense. Approval of this will not only improve Jordan's ability to provide internal national security, but will also significantly improve Jordan-US interoperability while deployed overseas as coalition partners. ¶4. (SBU) The total number and type of NVDs being requested is justified in paragraph 14. ¶5. (SBU) CENTCOM Commander's concurrence will be provided separately. ¶6. (SBU) The Embassy does not anticipate any negative reaction from any of Jordan's regional neighbors. While this action represents a modest increase to their current combat capabilities, it is not a technological breakthrough that could affect the regional balance of power. This type of purchase will not have any impact on Jordan nor its neighboring countries' existing regional foreign policies. ¶7. (SBU) Jordan already accounts for, safeguards, operates and maintains similar and more sensitive items without difficulty. In October 2008, DSCA conducted a Compliance Assessment Visit (CAV) and Jordan received a "successful" rating, which is the highest rating, for their EUM compliance with their three EEUM articles including Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM),Javelins, and NVDs. We have already confirmed with the JAF its intent to provide these NVDs with the same degree of security and accountability the U.S. would provide. Jordan is a trustworthy custodian of other sensitive U.S. technologies and we believe they will continue to be so. ¶8. (SBU) Jordan will not require any in-country operator or technical training from U.S. trainers. ¶9. (SBU) Jordan has received these NVDs in the past and there was no impact of U.S. presence while in country. Therefore, we do expect any negative impact of any in-country U.S. presence that may be required in providing these articles. ¶10. (SBU) Jordan is purchasing these NVDs with Foreign Military Financing (FMF). ¶11. (SBU) There are no human rights considerations relevant to the proposed acquisition. ¶12. (SBU) The Military Assistance Program (MAP) in Jordan currently has an active End-Use Monitoring (EUM) system in place for the JAF. These NVDs are enhanced-EUM items and will require periodic inventories while in the possession of the JAF. If deployed, US Forces deployed with them will ensure the task force is conducting daily inventories. ¶13. (SBU) The Embassy recommends USG approval for transfer of the NVDs for the reasons described above. The acquisition of these NVDs will enhance the border security, self-defense and anti-terrorism capabilities of Jordan and additionally allow AMMAN 00001550 002 OF 002 them to be a significant participant in the Global War on Terror. This approval represents no political or technological risk to the U.S. ¶14. (S) The requested NVDs will encompasses several types including monocular, binocular, scopes for individual/crew-served weapons, and aviation goggles for helicopter pilots. The specific NVD models are Generation III and include the following: Army and Navy/Passive Vision Sight-4 (AN/PVS-4),AN/PVS-7D, AN/AVS-9, AN/PVS-14, AN/PVS-23, AN/PVS-27, AN/TVS-5 and Multi-use Minimonocular-14 (MUM-14). ¶A. (S) The list of NVDs requested is described in the following table: Model QTY FOM Purpose -------------- -------------- --- -------------- AN/PVS-9 100 1600 Special Ops Aviation Brigade(PHRB) AN-PVS 7D 130 1600 SOCOM Task Forces AN/PVS-27 115 1600 SOCOM Task Forces AN/PVS-14 980 1600 SOCOM Task Forces AN/PVS-22 20 1600 SOCOM Task Forces AN/PVS-14 3,215 1200 Conventional Forces AN-TVS-5 558 1200 Conventional Forces AN/PVS-23 100 1200 Conventional Forces AN/PVS-7D 114 1200 Conventional Forces ¶B. (S) The first four items support JAF's 71st Counter-Terrorism Battalion (CTBN) and task forces deployed in support of OEF, both organic to the Special Operations Command (SOCOM). These NVDs are required to be 1600 Figure of Merit (FOM) to be compatible with the U.S. and Coalition forces with which they routinely serve. Currently Jordan has 1200 FOM, ABCA/NATO partners have 1600 FOM and US forces have above 1800 FOM.(see additional information for PHRB and 71st CT BN justification below). The last four items listed in the table will be equally divided among JAF conventional forces in support of three special security companies, seven border security battalions, and 23 mechanized infantry battalions. ¶C. (S) The Prince Hashem Royal Brigade (PHRB) is modeled along the lines of a U.S. Aviation Brigade used to support Special Operations Forces in transportation, infiltration, and ex-filtration missions. It employs three to four man crews in 18-Blackhawks and 8-MD530 with limited Forward-Looking Infared Radar (FLIR) and door-mounted machine guns. The PHRB currently conducts extremely limited night operations. The PHRB has recently received a small number of PVS-7s and will be training for night ops in the near future. There is a potential that elements will deploy in the future in support of U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan. ¶D. (S) The 71st Counter Terrorism Battalion (CTBN) is the elite direct action unit of Jordanian Special Operations Command (JORSOCOM). As such, they are responsible for a full range of missions such as raids. Most of these missions will be conducted at night and require the best available NVG capability for every unit member. Organizational and equipment structure is consistent with U.S. direct action forces. In addition to this direct action mission they also participate in more typical Special Forces missions. ¶E. (S) Furthermore, Jordan currently has a task force of the 71st CTBN embedded with U.S. Special Forces teams and is operating jointly with other coalition partners in order to provide stability and support operations for the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. These NVDs will enable the interoperability between Jordanian Special Forces and the U.S. Special Forces in OEF. ¶15. (U) POC this action is MAJ Scott A. Hurley, USA, at 011-962-6-590-6538 or NIPR: shurley@san.osd.mil, SIPR:hurleysa@centcom.jorsao.smil.mil. Visit Amman's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman Beecroft