JORDAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION REJECTS PROPOSED

S E C R E T AMMAN 001356 NOFORN SIPDIS STATE FOR ISN/NESS, ISN/RA, NEA/ELA E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/17/2019 TAGS: ENRG KNNP PREL PGOV JO SUBJECT: JORDAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION REJECTS PROPOSED CHANGES TO 123 NUCLEAR ENERGY COOPERATION AGREEMENT REF: A. SECSTATE 53334 ¶B. AMMAN 583 Classified By: Ambassador R. Stephen Beecroft for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Econoffs delivered ref A points on June 8 to Chairman of the Jordan Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC) Khaled Toukan and JAEC Commissioner Kamal Araj, reiterating that the U.S. hopes to conclude a 123 Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with Jordan in the near future and urging Jordan to agree to provisions similar to those contained in the U.S.-UAE 123 Agreement. Toukan responded quite vehemently that Jordan "will not accept the (U.S.) position towards the UAE," which he saw as relinquishing international rights, infringing on Jordan's sovereignty, and setting a bad precedent. In his view, Jordan's transparent approach and adherence to international obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) severely limits non-proliferation risks in Jordan, and he argued that the UAE terms would only "kill commercial opportunities" for Jordan. Despite his hard stance, Toukan welcomed the visit of a USG team to Jordan to discuss these issues further. Post also welcomes such a visit which should include interagency representation and be at a sufficiently high level to send a strong signal that this is a coordinated USG position and to conclude negotiations. Meanwhile, since the JAEC's position may reflect more the personal views of Toukan and Araj than those of the Jordanian government, Post plans to go over Toukan's head and engage the Chief of the Royal Court and the Prime Minister on the proposed changes, who both have a better appreciation of the political implications of the situation (ref B). End Summary. ¶2. (C) Toukan did not buy into the idea that Jordan could play a strong regional leadership role by agreeing to the proposed revisions that limit uranium enrichment or the reprocessing of nuclear fuel. He retorted, "we are not the UAE, and we won't be treated as the UAE." While the UAE agreement might be a model for the Gulf, he contended that other Middle East countries such as Egypt would also not agree to such provisions. Toukan reaffirmed that while Jordan does not intend to enrich uranium on its territory, Jordan will not relinquish its NPT rights. "We are a country following the rules. Do this to other countries who are not following the rules," he said. He added that if the U.S. applied this same principle to Israel, Jordan would sign the newly proposed agreement the next day. Toukan dismissed any concerns over non-proliferation risks which he said "have no grounds" in Jordan, are "exaggerated," and are not the "real issue." He argued that Jordan has been completely transparent and will continue to be open and work with western countries, pointing to the work already being done in uranium mining with the major reputable suppliers Rio Tinto and Areva. He also noted that whoever builds the nuclear reactor will have to bring an international nuclear operator, thereby ensuring transparency. ¶3. (C) Toukan continued to argue that the UAE terms would only "kill commercial opportunities" for Jordan and narrow its options for the next 30 years, despite the provision that would allow both countries to end the agreement if necessary. "Why should we forget about Canadian technology if it is in line with international safeguards?" he questioned. He also said that he hoped Jordan would one day be a main supplier of uranium. Economic Counselor responded that the agreement would not affect Jordan's ability to mine, mill, refine, and convert its domestic reserve of uranium if it chose to do so for economic reasons. ¶4. (C) Araj added that the U.S. administration was clearly "misguided" and this was just an Israeli "gimmick, not a serious policy." Given the Jordanian government's cooperation on various nuclear energy initiatives with the Department of Energy (DOE),Araj suggested that this was only a State Department policy, devised by people who did not understand nuclear energy. In particular, he believed the proposed changes were at odds with the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership and that the mechanisms in the UAE agreement for the retransfer of spent fuel to France and the UK were not practical. ¶5. (C) Toukan highlighted that the Government of Jordan (GOJ) had already signed Nuclear Cooperation Agreements (NCAs) with eight other countries, which all concluded quickly without problems. He provided copies of Jordan's signed NCAs with France and Canada, and noted that the GOJ would sign a NCA with the UK by the end of the month. Toukan said that the GOJ would continue to pursue such agreements with the goal of signing 15 in two years time, regardless of the status of negotiations on the 123 Agreement with the U.S. He welcomed any USG team to come to Jordan and discuss these issues in more detail, and Araj suggested that the team include ISN/NESS Director Richard Stratford since he negotiated the text agreed upon in February 2008. ¶6. (S/NF) Comment: Toukan was clearly surprised and annoyed that the USG maintained its position on using the U.S.-UAE Agreement as a model, having thought that the King's recent visit to Washington would have provided all necessary assurances and allowed the 123 Agreement to move forward along terms agreed upon in February 2008. Post recommends that Washington send a high-level, interagency team (State and Energy representation is essential) to conclude negotiations. Such representation, including if possible officials who negotiated the February 2008 text, would help to discredit the JAEC's belief that there is a policy disconnect within the USG and that if Jordan holds out long enough, the 123 Agreement will eventually be signed without changes. Meanwhile, since JAEC's position may reflect more the personal views of Toukan and Araj than the GOJ, we intend to further engage Jordan's political leadership and deliver the demarche to the Prime Minister and Chief of the Royal Court, who are more objective and better understand the political importance of the revised terms of the proposed 123 Agreement with the U.S. and views on the Hill in particular. Visit Amman's Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman Beecroft