KING ABDULLAH HAS MOMENT IN THE SUN, BUT WILL IT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 AMMAN 001113 SIPDIS FOR NEA/ELA AND NEA/IPA E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV KPAL IS EG SA SY JO SUBJECT: KING ABDULLAH HAS MOMENT IN THE SUN, BUT WILL IT LAST? REF: A. AMMAN 887 ¶B. AMMAN 914 Classified By: Ambassador R. Stephen Beecroft for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Jordanian contacts saw King Abdullah's visit to Washington as a success, focusing on how it enhanced his standing among his Arab peers more than on the substantive outcome of his conversations with President Obama. Most thought the King returned from the United States newly empowered and motivated to push his moderate line on peace among the Arabs. Our contacts were pleased by the new direction in U.S. policy, but they remained unsure of USG commitment in the coming weeks and months. End Summary. King Is The Messenger for Arab Plan -------------- ¶2. (C) While seeking a strong public U.S. commitment to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict topped King Abdullah's Washington agenda, he also hoped the trip would help establish him as first among Arab equals on peace matters (reftels). Indeed, many of our contacts dwelt more on what they saw was a tacit Arab acknowledgment that the King was their conduit to the White House than on the substantive outcome of his tete-a-tete with the President. From that perspective, the trip was seen here as an unmitigated (if perhaps fleeting) win, particularly given the flak the King has taken for his stalwart moderation in the face of Israeli intransigence and continued Palestinian suffering. As Senior Columnist in the leading government-owned Al-Rai newspaper, Sultan Al-Hattab, assessed, Washington's symbolic support for Jordan's leading role in the region was a much-needed vote of confidence after a period of perceived marginalization early this year when the rejectionist camp sought to hijack the Arab debate during Israel's Gaza operation. ¶3. (C) Former UN Ambassador and peace negotiator Hassan Abu Nimah was pleasantly surprised that key Arab Foreign Ministers came to Jordan in advance of the King's trip. He thought it significant that Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Arab League were willing to effectively cede pride of place to the King. "This was great for Jordan," he told PolOff. Public Affairs TV and radio host Mohammed Al-Momani similarly saw the most noteworthy aspect of the King's visit as the lead up to it, when the Arabs came calling and gave the King their mandate. Fakhry Abu Shakra, who heads the Arab Center for Democracy and Peace Studies, speculated that the Egyptian regime was unhappy that Husni Mubarak was not the first Arab leader to go to Washington. (Note: The local Egyptian PolCouns laughed at the suggestion that King Abdullah had represented Egypt -- or other Arab countries -- in Washington, though he acknowledged that this was the Jordanian line. Asked whether Mubarak anticipated reflecting Arab views in Washington, the PolCouns demurred, saying he would discuss bilateral issues. But it was evident he expected Mubarak would bear a more expansive regional message. End Note.) ¶4. (C) Chatting with PolOff at Israel National Day festivities on May 5, MFA Policy Planning Director Omar Nahar evinced pride in Jordan's ability to "lead," if only for a brief moment. However, he recognized that Jordan's time in the sun was limited, expecting that once Mubarak and others descended on Washington, Jordan's exclusive claim to the President's ear would fade. Still, Nahar said the May 4 visit of the Syrian FM for a readout of the King's visit was significant, as Walid Al-Mu'allim rarely came to Jordan. (Comment: Foreign Minister Nasser Judeh informed Ambassador on May 5 that Mu'allim was reluctant to come and that Jordan had to dangle a possible visit by the King to Damascus as a sweetener. According to Judeh, Mu'allim indicated that he was constrained in what he was authorized to say while in Jordan, but that when the King visited Syria, President Bashar Al-Asad could prove to be more open about what Syria might offer in exchange for closer engagement with the U.S. End Comment.) ¶5. (C) An outlier among our interlocutors was the Jordan Institute of Diplomacy's Yasar Qatarneh, who mocked the local media narrative that "Jordan is now the most important country in the Arab world." Skepticism aside, he allowed that the King had returned from Washington with a new spirit and greater confidence, having been reassured of U.S. backing. He predicted the peace process would become the government's focus to the exclusion of other issues and thought a new Prime Minster might be in the near-term offing -- citing Foreign Ministers past and present, Abd Al-Ilah Al-Khatib and Judeh, as leading candidates to replace Prime AMMAN 00001113 002 OF 003 Minister Nader Al-Dahabi. (Note: Post sees no compelling indicators that another government reshuffle is in the offing. Moreover the King has, in the past, privately suggested he was skeptical of the leadership qualities of either of those mentioned. End Note.) Putting the Best Arab Face Forward -------------- ¶6. (C) Contacts saw the King as uniquely suited to serve as the Arabs' peace spokesman given his comfort with the U.S. political idiom. Some viewed this as necessary to counter what they saw as Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's vaunted PR skills. In Hattab's view, with the King as their mouthpiece, the Arabs had conveyed their views and desires in their clearest fashion to date. The King presented the Arabs as serious partners in the pursuit of peace as part of an effort to head off any Israeli attempt to stymie progress by denying there was anyone to talk to. ¶7. (C) Senator Marwan Dudin, formerly Chairman of the Upper House Foreign Affairs Committee, thought the King was the best positioned to make a positive first impression on the new Administration. While the Arab vote of confidence did not hurt, Dudin insisted the King did not need their stamp of approval given his eloquence, youth, and chemistry with President Obama and the Congress. The King did not provide the easy target for the pro-Israel lobby that other Arab leaders might have, in Dudin's view. In this, he echoed fellow peace negotiator Abu Nimah, who saw the King as having been unlikely to indulge in harsh words about Israel that would turn off the President and waste a precious opportunity. ¶8. (C) Dudin was concerned that the upcoming visits of Mubarak and Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas might undermine some of the King's good work. Mubarak, Dudin worried, could spend too much time attacking U.S. criticism of Egypt's human rights and religious freedom records, rather than sticking to the Arab talking points on peace. Abbas, while a palatable and authentic moderate, risked being undermined if he arrived in Washington without the backing of unified Palestinian polity. "We need to have a Palestinian leader whose being a leader is not arguable," Dudin chuckled. Follow Through Is the Question -------------- ¶9. (C) Post contacts were pleased by Washington's overall tone and focus on peace in general and during the King's visit. Several cited statements from U.S. officials in support of two states, praising the Arab Peace Initiative (API),and emphasizing that peace was in the U.S. national interest, which they saw as rejoinders to the Israeli government's recent rhetoric seeking to deflect the focus. As Abu Nimah assessed, Obama and his representatives "added something new" every time they addressed the peace issue. Abu Shakra believed it was too early to tell whether the King's message would prompt the desired policy changes in Washington, but either way he did not expect a shift until after the President met Netanyahu and Abbas later in May. ¶10. (C) Momani highlighted the President's characterization of the API as "very" constructive, calling that statement the key result of the trip. He saw this as a rebuke to an Israeli government that has been chilly toward the API. The real measure of success would come during Netanyahu's visit when the President would have, by then, consulted with all the relevant parties. Momani was confident that the Obama Administration understood the task at hand, but was concerned that it would get cold feet. Similarly, Oraib Rantawi, of the Al-Quds Center for Political Studies, was convinced the Administration was willing to do something but opined that its ability to force the hand of an obstructionist Israeli government remained unproven. ¶11. (C) As for the responsibility of the Arabs to do their part, Momani noted that they appear willing to share the burden with the United States in pushing for peace with Israel. Dudin said the King's recent meetings with Saudi, Palestinian and Egyptian leaders were not just about briefing his peers about the Washington visit, but also about keeping the Arabs in line with a unified, reasonable position toward peace. Abu Nimah supported the idea that Obama would back a series of gestures, such as Arabs taking steps to normalize relations with Israel, if Israel froze settlement growth and lifted checkpoints. ¶12. (C) Comment: The King has won local and regional plaudits for compellingly conveying the Arab position to President Obama. Thus the trip may have temporarily AMMAN 00001113 003 OF 003 mollified the Arab world's impatience over having to wait until the President meets with the Egyptian, Palestinian, and Israeli leaders. In the interim, the test of the reality of the King's new stature will be what he does with it among his regional counterparts. As much as he arrived at the White House buoyed by their backing, he returned to the region knowing that he must corral his peers to provide active, continuous, and substantive support in parallel with Washington efforts. End Comment. Visit Amman's Classified Website at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman Beecroft