NEA A/S FELTMAN MEETING WITH ALGERIAN FOREIGN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ALGIERS 000973 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ECON ETRD KPAL KWBG IS AG SUBJECT: NEA A/S FELTMAN MEETING WITH ALGERIAN FOREIGN MINISTER MEDELCI ALGIERS 00000973 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: Ambassador David D. Pearce. Reasons: 1.4 (b),(d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) In an October 20 meeting with Algerian FM Medelci, visiting NEA A/S Feltman said we wished to deepen counterterrorism and regional security cooperation with Algeria. Medelci focused on the economy and the Middle East. Algeria was an open economy that needed foreign and U.S. investment, within and outside the energy sector. He claimed that recent laws imposing conditions on investors and traders would not undercut foreign investor management control of their investments. Algeria hoped for USG support in its effort join WTO and to revive discussions under our bilateral Trade and Investment Framework Agreement. Medelci welcomed the new U.S. approach to Middle East peace and urged it to play an active mediating role in the process. At the same time, he expressed skepticism that PA President Abbas could pursue negotiations absent a complete settlements freeze and a PA accord with Hamas. Algeria would not move to normalize relations with Israel before a peace settlement, but neither would it do anything to make this more difficult. Medelci said we should follow up on the DASD Huddleston visit by standing up a more comprehensive counterterrorism and military cooperation program. End Summary ¶2. (C) NEA Assistant Secretary Jeffrey Feltman met Algerian Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci at the MFA October 20. MFA Americas Department Director General Fatiha Bouamrane Selmane, MFA U.S. Desk Director Ali Drouiche, and an MFA contract translator also attended. Feltman was accompanied by the Ambassador, staff assistant Schwedt, and Embassy Pol/Econ Chief (notetaker). A/S Feltman stressed the Obama administration's foreign policy emphasis on partnership and touched on the themes of the U.S. relationship with Algeria. Algeria was the only country he was visiting in the region and the main purpose of the trip was to establish additional links between our two governments. A/S Feltman described as fruitful our counterterrorism cooperation with Algeria in Africa. We should follow through on the recent meeting between AF A/S Carson and Algerian Minister Delegate for Africa and the Maghreb Messahel in New York and the visit of DASD Huddleston to Algeria. We supported Algeria's regional CT efforts, which we hoped would lead to the planned summit of regional leaders in Bamako. In bilateral relations, the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) was creating new initiatives in terms of social and economic development, including with programs specifically related to women. Our commercial relationship was good but should expand. He thanked Medelci for the GOA's decision to authorize Air Algerie's purchase of Boeing aircraft. Another opportunity in this regard was the bid by the Harris Corporation to invest in an Algerian production facility that would produce radios for the military. Economy Opening Up, Needs Investment -------------- ¶3. (C) Medelci led off by discussing our strategic economic relationship centered in energy. Yet achieving sustainable development required diversification within and beyond the energy sector. Algeria's long experience as a "closed economy" still affected Algerian behavior. Nevertheless, the private sector was now active everywhere, even in energy. Outside energy, Algeria had to make itself attractive to foreign investment. It had channeled oil receipts to infrastructure development, including in the areas of water, railroads, roads, telecommunications, and training. Conditions for investment were more favorable than ever. He rated Algeria a good location for U.S. firms to use to export to Europe, the Maghreb, and the rest of Africa. ¶4. (C) Algeria was knocking on the door of WTO, but so far it had been barred. Nevertheless, areas of disagreement have been identified, and the GOA hoped Europe and the U.S. would support Algeria's accession. "We are now in a position to go much faster," he said. "We have settled some issues and can go fast on others. There are some bilateral issues. We will make proposals, and we hope the US response will be positive." ¶5. (C) Medelci averred that conditions were favorable for ALGIERS 00000973 002.2 OF 004 advancing economic ties. The politics of national reconciliation was now in its final phase in Algeria after the domestic conflict of the 1990s. "We want a stable, democratic country, open to all," he declared. The measures the government had just implemented allowing foreign investment only with 51-percent Algerian ownership would still leave the investor in control, because the Algerian share would be split among two or more entities. "We will come to you," he said. "We will invest 51 percent, but you will be the manager, and we will provide access to financing." Algeria needed investment and technology transfer, such as oil and gas exploration software and know-how to build a solar energy industry. It also needed investment in pharmaceuticals and agriculture, two sectors in which it was vulnerable and imported three-quarters of its needs. Algeria would particularly like to see US pharmaceutical companies develop their products in Algeria and make it their base for Africa. ¶6. (C) He acknowledged the need to make progress on some legal conventions, including a Customs agreement. But Medelci noted that we were close to concluding both the Customs accord and a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty. Although there were two or three issues to resolve on an Open Skies agreement, we should pursue that as well. This would open the way for direct air service between Algiers and New York, and that would be a very good sign. 7 (C) A/S Feltman responded by emphasizing that the USG theme of partnership extended to the economy. He said that, in this spirit, he could say we want to be supportive of Algeria's WTO accession, but this was an area in which the USG could indeed be a tough negotiator. We should revive talks under our Trade and Investment Framework Agreement, which could touch on all trade and investment issues affecting WTO accession. The recent changes in the law have raised some questions; TIFA could be a bilateral forum to discuss this. There are U.S. companies that want to invest in Algeria; Harris Radio is a case in point. But U.S. investors look for both political and legal stability. Middle East -------------- ¶8. (C) Medelci said we should exchange information on counterterrorism more frequently. On the Middle East, Senator Mitchell's phone call to him had initiated U.S.-Algerian consultations. After the Gaza war, we had to improve relations between Gaza and the West Bank and allow Palestinians to reestablish their national cohesion. This would be nearly impossible as long as Gaza remained cut off from imports of goods such as construction materials and pre-fab housing needed for reconstruction. Demonizing Hamas would not work. It was not associated with al-Qa'ida. There needed to be acceptable and durable teams representing both the Palestinians and Israelis. Medelci believed it would be even harder to unite the Israelis than the Palestinians, and he recalled he had made this point to Senator Mitchell. Medelci professed ignorance of Israeli internal politics but claimed that Israel's public positions were counter to U.S. efforts. President Obama and his readiness to talk to all sides, however, had improved the overall climate. Due to its own internal situation, Algeria could not play with fire and move to normalize ties with Israel before negotiations had yielded a real result. However, Algeria could perhaps help in other ways. ¶9. (C) A/S Feltman related our strategy and tactics on Middle East peace to the President's overall message on partnership and building credibility. He said we hoped such actions as ending combat operations in Iraq, joining the Human Rights Council, and closing Guantanamo would have enhanced U.S. credibility. Another factor is the decision to engage with Iran in the G3 plus 3 format; this too is related to the peace process in that it enhances our overall credibility. We are trying to build an atmosphere in which negotiations can actually succeed, and all of these factors play into it. We sought to be transparent with our Arab partners. The U.S. administration had engaged Syria from the beginning, in a track complementary to the Israeli-Palestinian track. Medelci noted that Palestinian Authority President Abbas was ready to enter negotiation but beginning where previous talks ALGIERS 00000973 003.2 OF 004 with the Olmert government had left them, not from square one. He also required a halt in settlements. The foreign minister observed that Abbas was being forced to jettison these conditions. If he entered negotiations without preconditions, however, he would lose the upcoming Palestinian elections. ¶10. (C) Feltman said we want to be sure that Palestinian institutions remain functional, so that they can inherit a state. We therefore appreciated Algeria's very important role earlier this year in making available $26.2 million of its contribution available early to the Palestinian Authority. We now ask that it consider making available the rest of its $60 million pledge. This cash support will help ensure that Palestinian institutions exist when statehood comes. Another way that Algeria can help is in international institutions. We are trying to build the right atmosphere for negotiations; there are a lot of resolutions and decrees in international fora that make that task more difficult. We could use Algeria's help in ensuring that some of these things don't happen. This should be politically easier to do than an overt gesture on normalization, but nevertheless important. We noted, for example, the very positive work of Algeria at the Human Rights Council in working with us and Egypt to secure a positive statement on freedom of expression. ¶11. (C) Feltman signaled, however, that the U.S. position on Hamas was unlikely to change. Unless Hamas accepts the Quartet Principles, we will not be engaging Hamas; the U.S. Congress would not be with us if we attempted to do so. Another important issue is the status of the Palestinian security services. We don't want to see the West Bank turn into Gaza. If Hamas were to gain control of the security services it would not make the job of getting to peace easier; on the contrary. We will not be able to make progress with Israel if Hamas takes over security on the West Bank. ¶12. (C) Medelci said that he had no doubts about the Obama Administration's position but still doubted Abbas would enter negotiations absent a halt in settlements. The U.S. influence was centrally important, but the Arabs had no confidence in Israel. He claimed that every time we came close to resolving the conflict, Israel pulled back. In the wake of the Gaza war, it would be difficult for Abbas to negotiate over the status of a territory being progressively eroded by settlements. Medelci complained that UN Security Council resolutions were not enforced. The international community acted in the peace process as if there were no UN. We were asking the main actors to solve the conflict without any constraints. ¶13. (C) FM Medelci went on to say that the only new and positive element in the mixture was President Obama's public positions. Israeli policy was only toughening. The October 25 Arab ministerial might produce an inner-Palestinian accord and might bring Senator Mitchell back to the region. There was no other road to peace except negotiations, but these could bear fruit only under the right conditions. Medelci was skeptical Israel would respect commitments it made on settlements. The U.S. plays an important role. It needs to be the arbiter. Otherwise, there are no rules. He pledged that Algeria would not change its policy of support for the Palestinian Authority and it would not express public hostility to Israel. Guantanamo Detainees -------------- ¶14. (C) Medelci expressed satisfaction that the USG was working on closing Guantanamo. Algeria would treat the case of every Algerian detainee in the spirit of justice and taking into account the will of the individual to return to Algeria. Counterterrorism, Western Sahara -------------- ¶15. (C) Medelci said we should follow up on the DASD Huddleston visit to create a program of counterterrorism cooperation program. Algeria would try to follow the suggestions of UN Personal Envoy Chris Ross on the Western Sahara. ALGIERS 00000973 004.2 OF 004 ¶16. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. ¶17. (U) A/S Feltman has cleared this message. PEARCE