ALGERIAN MINSTATE SAYS REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS CAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ALGIERS 000962 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2019 TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV MCAP MOPS SNAR AG ML MR NG UV, US SUBJECT: ALGERIAN MINSTATE SAYS REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS CAN COUNTER AQIM REF: A. ALGIERS 765 ¶B. ALGIERS 825 ALGIERS 00000962 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: Ambassador David D. Pearce; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Minister of State for African and Maghreb Affairs Abdelkader Messahel told Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) Ambassador Vicki Huddleston on October 17 that governments in the Sahel region have the resources to combat terrorism and criminal networks and have agreed on the need for coordinated action. He estimated there are 200 - 250 al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) insurgents active in the Sahel, including 100 Mauritanians. Algeria led the effort to hold a joint meeting of regional security and defense chiefs in Tamanrasset in July to discuss planning coordination, and a sub-regional heads of state summit in Bamako (to include Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, Libya, Niger, Chad and Burkina Faso) will take place before the end of the year to elaborate a security and development action plan. Messahel said cooperation with Tunisia, Libya, Niger and Mauritania was already strong, but Mali's commitment to fight terrorism was insufficient and too focused on the Tuareg rebellion. Messahel concluded that governments in the sub-region must take the lead in fighting AQIM and criminal networks. The international community and the United States could assist by providing intelligence, technical resources and training for capacity-building. END SUMMARY. WE HAVE THE RESOURCES TO COMBAT AQIM -------------- ¶2. (C) Algerian Minister of State for African and Maghreb Affairs Abdelkader Messahel told visiting DASD Ambassador Vicki Huddleston October 17 that regional governments have the resources to combat terrorism and share a common willingness to eliminate terrorist and criminal networks in the Sahel. Messahel noted that defense and security chiefs from Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and Niger met in July to discuss cooperation and coordination. Planning, he said, was still on track to convene a "sub-regional" heads of state summit in Bamako by the end of the year to include Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, Libya, Niger, Chad and Burkina Faso (ref A). Messahel emphasized that a number of ministerial and sub-ministerial meetings have already taken place to prepare the summit's joint declaration and action plan for the summit, which, he said, will call for increased levels of coordination, intelligence sharing and training among security forces in the region. Each country has a specific role to contribute, he said, and the meeting in Bamako will define how each country fits into the framework for coordination. ¶3. (C) Messahel attributed the delay in organizing the summit to difficulties synchronizing leaders' schedules, the slow work pace during Ramadan, and awaiting Mauritania's reinstatement in the AU. Any attempt at regional counterterrorism coordination, he said, had to consider Mauritania's crucial role. Messahel estimated that between 200 and 250 al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) insurgents were present in the Sahel, 100 of whom were Mauritanians. With its constitutional crisis resolved and AU membership reinstated, Mauritania could now participate fully. Messahel claimed that Malian President Toure had caused misunderstanding by attempting to internationalize the summit by inviting France, the United States and ECOWAS countries, further delaying summit preparations. Messahel underscored Algeria's view that participation at the summit should be limited to countries in the region, adding: "We cannot hide behind France and the United States." Despite delays, Messahel noted that governments had pressed forward with working-level coordination. He believed Mali would fix a summit date soon. ¶4. (C) Huddleston commended Algeria's efforts to fight terrorism and said we recognized Algeria's leadership in sensitizing countries in the region to this common threat. The U.S. was very concerned about AQIM's activities in the Sahel and is following events in the region closely. DASD Huddleston noted that the U.S. began to focus on terrorism in the Sahel in 2003 after the Salafist Group for Combat and Preaching (GSPC) held a group of 15 European tourists hostage in northern Mali. In 2006, the U.S. began Operation Enduring ALGIERS 00000962 002.2 OF 004 Freedom in the Trans-Sahara, part of the Trans-Saharan Counter Terrorism Partnership, which includes the seven countries invited to the Bamako summit and others. ¶5. (C) Huddleston said our countries' efforts to work with Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad and Burkina Faso have much in common. The U.S. faced the same dilemma as the AU regarding Mauritania, but USG assistance, including our train and equip program with Mauritania, was coming back on line. Human rights concerns in Chad and Niger posed similar constraints on our ability to provide assistance. We hoped to be able to work with Chad again soon, but Niger President Tandja's bid for a third term in office forced the U.S. to suspend its programs. Huddleston emphasized that the U.S. has always considered Mali a priority because hostages from the region have been held there and AQIM/GSPC has been most active in that country. Huddleston said the U.S. had conducted training exercises in Gao and Timbuktou and planned to step up training and equipment assistance to Mali's military. Huddleston underscored her hope that U.S. assistance to Mali would complement Algerian efforts. CONCERN ABOUT MALI -------------- ¶6. (C) Messahel replied that the U.S. and Algeria share the same concerns and are "targeting the same space." He agreed that Mali has to be the focus. Messahel commented that security cooperation with neighboring countries like Tunisia, Libya, Niger and Mauritania has traditionally been strong, but cooperation with Mali has been difficult. Messahel called Mali's efforts to fight terrorism insufficient and too focused on the Tuareg rebellion. Under the 2006 Algiers Accord, Algeria helped Mali "solve" its conflict with Tuareg tribes in the north by promoting integration of Tuaregs into mixed units with Malian forces and paying others to lay down their arms. "The Tuareg rebellion is no longer a valid argument." AQIM is the priority, Messahel concluded, and Tuareg and Berabiche populations can play a key role. Algeria wants Mali's leadership and the Tuaregs and Berabiche tribes to have a single agenda. "Mali is the weak link." THREATS BEYOND TERRORISM -------------- ¶7. (C) Messahel said terrorism was not the only threat to stability in the Sahel. The region's harsh climate, the delicate balance of tribal relationships and criminal networks tied to illegal smuggling were also factors. Solutions for the region had to address development as well as security. Messahel described projects for water drilling, vocational training and health centers that Algeria has supported in Mali and Niger. He said the GOA had spent USD 10 million over two years on projects in Kidal, Gao and Timbuktou to bring social balance between the Tuareg and Berabiche populations. Algeria also helped with the construction of a 4,600-kilometer road connecting Kidal to Lagos and Algiers, of which 4,200 kilometers were complete. There are 100 kilometers left to complete in Algeria and 300 kilometers remaining in Niger, he said, for which work would soon begin. Another major infrastructure project involved the construction of a Trans-Saharan gas pipeline connecting Nigeria and Algeria. Messahel said a joint Algerian/Nigerian feasibility study for the pipeline is underway. He expected a call for tenders for the project to be announced soon. ¶8. (C) In addition to development, regional governments needed to address criminal activity, specifically hostage-taking and drug smuggling. Messahel underscored the region's rising concern with hostage-taking and repeated Algeria's desire to take up the issue of ransom payments at the UN (refs A and B). He called the current UN framework on ransom payments too ambiguous and said Algeria wanted to seek a UN Security Council resolution to "criminalize" such payments by amending either the UN convention on hostage-taking or the convention on terrorist finance. Messahel said drug trafficking also increasingly threatened the region. Like hostage ransoms, drugs were a source of finance and support for terrorists. Algeria increasingly saw itself as a transit country for drugs smuggled to Europe. Messahel complained that Morocco, the largest producer of hashish in the region, was not doing enough to interdict drug ALGIERS 00000962 003.2 OF 004 traffickers. "It's no secret, and it has been made public in many UN reports, that some Moroccan officials are complicit in drug trafficking," he added. Morocco was determined, however, to combat terrorism. Messahel said Algeria coordinated with Morocco on these issues within the framework of Five-Plus-Five regional consultations involving Europe. ROLE FOR U.S. -------------- ¶9. (C) Messahel said the general trend of terrorism in the region was worrying, both in the Sahel and in Somalia because of the rise of piracy. Since 9/11 Algeria decided to put its experience fighting terrorism at the disposal of other governments in the region. Messahel noted Algeria's contribution to AMISOM, citing the transporting of troops as well as the equipment and financial assistance it has provided the transitional government in Somalia. Messahel said the international community faced the same threat and needed to work together, whether in Somalia, Afghanistan or elsewhere. In the Sahel, international partners could help most by providing intelligence, sharing technology and technical know-how, and training. He underscored the importance of the U.S. role in furnishing intelligence and in building support for Algeria's ransom initiative, which, he added, was the key to cutting off a primary source of terrorist finance. Criminal smuggling was the other source. Huddleston replied that the U.S. recognized Algeria was leading the sub-regional effort to combat terrorism and underscored the U.S. desire to coordinate. She encouraged Messahel to raise these points with General Ward of the Africa Command during his upcoming visit to Algiers. As to Algeria's efforts at the UN, Huddleston noted that it might be difficult to get support for a resolution that criminalizes ransom payments but said that, in general, the U.S. welcomed an initiative that would address this critical source of funding for groups like AQIM. ¶10. (C) Asked how we might coordinate our activities in the region, Messahel replied that Algeria had no apprehension about meeting with representatives from U.S. Africa Command. President Bouteflika had authorized such meetings, and Algerian officials were expecting General Ward's visit. Messahel emphasized that Algeria's only red line vis-a-vis international cooperation was sending Algerian troops to a foreign country. However, Messahel said, this policy was evolving. Algeria planned to contribute two battalions of police and gendarmerie units to the AU Standby Force. He added that Algeria also offered to host a logistics center for the AU Standby Force in Jijel. Messahel complained that the French were pressuring the AU to select a site in Cameroon for the base and stressed that the AU force should involve no "foreign elements." VIEW ON AFRICA -------------- ¶11. (C) Messahel remarked that, with respect to assistance, Algeria and the U.S. were on the same wavelength, noting, "the coup d'etat is an eternal headache in Africa." Messahel said the key debate in Africa was about democracy. Algeria, he contended, was convinced that democracy was the right solution for the continent, but sometimes the process drifted off track, as had happened with Zimbabwe, Kenya, and Ghana. Africa, he argued, needed to go at its own pace and "make its own revolution at home." Africa's colonial legacy hindered democracy's emergence on the continent, Messahel said, noting that for generations leaders in Francophone Africa were products of former colonial institutions, e.g., the French military or the French national assembly. Only recently have homegrown African elites emerged from national civil society movements. The problem of political power in Africa was critical. Africans had to take charge of their own national decision making, and that is why President Obama's message in Ghana was so well received. Messahel said Algeria had an interest in better understanding the United States' approach to Africa and planned to invite A/S Johnnie Carson to Algeria in 2010 for that purpose. He noted that the Department of State included Algeria in its Near Eastern Affairs Bureau. Algeria, however, considered itself more a part of Africa than a part of the Middle East. Messahel preferred that foreign governments view Algeria first as part of the Mediterranean region, second as part of the Maghreb and third ALGIERS 00000962 004.2 OF 004 as part of Africa. Africa, he said, cannot be divided between Saharan and sub-Saharan. "There is only one Africa." ¶12. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED PEARCE