WESTERN SAHARA: BOUTEFLIKA TELLS ROSS THAT ALGERIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ALGIERS 000642 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/28/2019 TAGS: PREL PBTS UN MO AG SUBJECT: WESTERN SAHARA: BOUTEFLIKA TELLS ROSS THAT ALGERIA WILL ATTEND INFORMAL TALKS Classified By: DCM Thomas F. Daughton for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: UNSYG Personal Envoy Christopher Ross met with President Bouteflika on June 24 to discuss participation in "informal" talks between Morocco and the Polisario regarding the Western Sahara. After his meetings with Bouteflika in Algiers and later with Polisario leaders in Tindouf, Ross told the Algerian press that he believed the parties were on the right track to finding a solution to the issue. Ross told us that Bouteflika agreed to Algeria's participation in the informal meetings, which Ross said he hoped to hold during the last ten days of July, possibly in Austria. Following the Manhasset model, Ross and Bouteflika agreed that the Algerians would not participate directly in the meetings but rather would be present, probably along with Mauritania, to lend support and address issues that might include them. Ross said Bouteflika underscored his preference for the autonomy approach of the Baker Plan and remarked that even Morocco's law governing local communes offered more autonomy than the latest Moroccan proposal for Western Sahara. Bouteflika saw no change in the French position and called Spain's policy confused before commenting that the process should remain under UN auspices with no role for the EU. Bouteflika did not comment on the change in U.S. policy implied in the explanation of vote made by the U.S. delegation during the MINURSO mandate vote in April. END SUMMARY. ALGERIA WILL ATTEND INFORMAL TALKS -------------- ¶2. (C) The UNSYG's Personal Envoy for the Western Sahara, Amb. Christopher Ross, briefed us immediately after his June 24 meeting with President Abdelaziz Bouteflika. Ross said he achieved his principal goal of getting Bouteflika to agree that Algeria would attend the "informal" meetings between Morocco and the Polisario, which he hoped to convene as a preliminary step toward another round of Manhasset talks. Ross told us he hoped to arrange the meetings sometime during the last ten days of July, probably in Austria, but said he did not discuss a location or exact timing with Bouteflika. Ross and Bouteflika agreed that, following the Manhasset model, the Algerians would not participate directly in the meetings but rather would be present, along with Mauritania, to lend support and address issues that might include Algeria. BOUTEF'S MANTRA ON AUTONOMY, AND IMPRESSIONS OF OTHERS -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Bouteflika told Ross that he found the Moroccan autonomy plan to be "empty" and useless as a starting point for meaningful negotiations. Bouteflika said he had read the proposal once and did not intend to look at it again. He recalled the autonomy approach of the Baker Plan, saying it offered a much better starting point. Bouteflika remarked wryly that the Moroccan law on local communes offered more autonomy than the GOM's proposal for Western Sahara. In a separate discussion, MFA Minister-delegate Messahel reiterated a previously stated Algerian position that the status of Puerto Rico might be a good model for Western Sahara. Messahel also generally agreed that a focus on process rather than on final status could help achieve progress, noting that it was time to let the people of the region get on with their lives. ¶4. (C) Ross told us he suggested to Bouteflika that resolution of the situation was long overdue, and that he worried that the Sahrawi youth may become impatient and even return to arms. Responding expansively, Bouteflika insisted that while Algeria supports self-determination for the Sahrawi, no Algerian would shed blood for the Western Sahara, adding that he believed both Algeria and Morocco would ensure that there was not a resumption of fighting. Bouteflika did not respond, however, to Ross' argument that the need for progress on regional integration was also increasingly urgent given that restive youth across the Maghreb would become an progressively destabilizing force. ¶5. (C) Bouteflika told Ross he saw no change in the French position on the Western Sahara, and that the Spanish position was confused. The EU, he said flatly, should have no role in the process; it should remain exclusively under the auspices of the UN. Ross told us he specifically mentioned the ALGIERS 00000642 002 OF 002 changed U.S. position during the recent vote on the MINURSO mandate, but Bouteflika offered no reaction other than a "nod of satisfaction." Bouteflika compared King Mohammed VI quite unfavorably to his father, but when asked by Ross if he had a message for the king, Bouteflika asked Ross to convey his friendship ("amities," in French) "without reservation." THE SPRY THIRD-TERMER -------------- ¶6. (C) Ross told us that President Bouteflika was cordial, friendly, relaxed and alert. He took no notes but referred easily to Ross' points throughout the conversation, and Ross believes Bouteflika remains the driving Algerian force on the issue, at least at the strategic level. Only MFA Minister-delegate Messahel and a notetaker were present for the meeting. Ross also met in the airport for about 15 minutes upon his arrival June 23 with FM Medelci as Medelci headed to meetings outside of Algeria. Ross indicated that Medelci did not make substantive comments about the issue, and appeared not to be particularly engaged on it. ROSS TO INFORM THE FRIENDS -------------- ¶7. (C) Ross said that he planned to write a comprehensive report upon his return to the U.S., and would also notify permreps and representatives of the Friends group of the results of his trip. Given his compressed schedule in Algiers and the fact that it was his first stop (contrary to what has been reported in some regional media),Ross opted not to brief the Friends embassies here. ¶8. (U) This cable was not coordinated with or cleared by Amb. Ross, but he acknowledged that we would send it. PEARCE