WESTERN SAHARA: BOUTEFLIKA TELLS ROSS THAT ALGERIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ALGIERS 000642

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/28/2019
TAGS: PREL PBTS UN MO AG
SUBJECT: WESTERN SAHARA: BOUTEFLIKA TELLS ROSS THAT ALGERIA
WILL ATTEND INFORMAL TALKS

Classified By: DCM Thomas F. Daughton for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: UNSYG Personal Envoy Christopher Ross met
with President Bouteflika on June 24 to discuss participation
in "informal" talks between Morocco and the Polisario
regarding the Western Sahara. After his meetings with
Bouteflika in Algiers and later with Polisario leaders in
Tindouf, Ross told the Algerian press that he believed the
parties were on the right track to finding a solution to the
issue. Ross told us that Bouteflika agreed to Algeria's
participation in the informal meetings, which Ross said he
hoped to hold during the last ten days of July, possibly in
Austria. Following the Manhasset model, Ross and Bouteflika
agreed that the Algerians would not participate directly in
the meetings but rather would be present, probably along with
Mauritania, to lend support and address issues that might
include them. Ross said Bouteflika underscored his
preference for the autonomy approach of the Baker Plan and
remarked that even Morocco's law governing local communes
offered more autonomy than the latest Moroccan proposal for
Western Sahara. Bouteflika saw no change in the French
position and called Spain's policy confused before commenting
that the process should remain under UN auspices with no role
for the EU. Bouteflika did not comment on the change in
U.S. policy implied in the explanation of vote made by the
U.S. delegation during the MINURSO mandate vote in April.
END SUMMARY.

ALGERIA WILL ATTEND INFORMAL TALKS
--------------


2. (C) The UNSYG's Personal Envoy for the Western Sahara,
Amb. Christopher Ross, briefed us immediately after his June
24 meeting with President Abdelaziz Bouteflika. Ross said he
achieved his principal goal of getting Bouteflika to agree
that Algeria would attend the "informal" meetings between
Morocco and the Polisario, which he hoped to convene as a
preliminary step toward another round of Manhasset talks.
Ross told us he hoped to arrange the meetings sometime during
the last ten days of July, probably in Austria, but said he
did not discuss a location or exact timing with Bouteflika.
Ross and Bouteflika agreed that, following the Manhasset
model, the Algerians would not participate directly in the
meetings but rather would be present, along with Mauritania,
to lend support and address issues that might include Algeria.

BOUTEF'S MANTRA ON AUTONOMY, AND IMPRESSIONS OF OTHERS
-------------- --------------


3. (C) Bouteflika told Ross that he found the Moroccan
autonomy plan to be "empty" and useless as a starting point
for meaningful negotiations. Bouteflika said he had read the
proposal once and did not intend to look at it again. He
recalled the autonomy approach of the Baker Plan, saying it
offered a much better starting point. Bouteflika remarked
wryly that the Moroccan law on local communes offered more
autonomy than the GOM's proposal for Western Sahara. In a
separate discussion, MFA Minister-delegate Messahel
reiterated a previously stated Algerian position that the
status of Puerto Rico might be a good model for Western
Sahara. Messahel also generally agreed that a focus on
process rather than on final status could help achieve
progress, noting that it was time to let the people of the
region get on with their lives.


4. (C) Ross told us he suggested to Bouteflika that
resolution of the situation was long overdue, and that he
worried that the Sahrawi youth may become impatient and even
return to arms. Responding expansively, Bouteflika insisted
that while Algeria supports self-determination for the
Sahrawi, no Algerian would shed blood for the Western Sahara,
adding that he believed both Algeria and Morocco would ensure
that there was not a resumption of fighting. Bouteflika did
not respond, however, to Ross' argument that the need for
progress on regional integration was also increasingly urgent
given that restive youth across the Maghreb would become an
progressively destabilizing force.


5. (C) Bouteflika told Ross he saw no change in the French
position on the Western Sahara, and that the Spanish position
was confused. The EU, he said flatly, should have no role in
the process; it should remain exclusively under the auspices
of the UN. Ross told us he specifically mentioned the

ALGIERS 00000642 002 OF 002


changed U.S. position during the recent vote on the MINURSO
mandate, but Bouteflika offered no reaction other than a "nod
of satisfaction." Bouteflika compared King Mohammed VI quite
unfavorably to his father, but when asked by Ross if he had a
message for the king, Bouteflika asked Ross to convey his
friendship ("amities," in French) "without reservation."

THE SPRY THIRD-TERMER
--------------


6. (C) Ross told us that President Bouteflika was cordial,
friendly, relaxed and alert. He took no notes but referred
easily to Ross' points throughout the conversation, and Ross
believes Bouteflika remains the driving Algerian force on the
issue, at least at the strategic level. Only MFA
Minister-delegate Messahel and a notetaker were present for
the meeting. Ross also met in the airport for about 15
minutes upon his arrival June 23 with FM Medelci as Medelci
headed to meetings outside of Algeria. Ross indicated that
Medelci did not make substantive comments about the issue,
and appeared not to be particularly engaged on it.

ROSS TO INFORM THE FRIENDS
--------------


7. (C) Ross said that he planned to write a comprehensive
report upon his return to the U.S., and would also notify
permreps and representatives of the Friends group of the
results of his trip. Given his compressed schedule in
Algiers and the fact that it was his first stop (contrary to
what has been reported in some regional media),Ross opted
not to brief the Friends embassies here.


8. (U) This cable was not coordinated with or cleared by Amb.
Ross, but he acknowledged that we would send it.
PEARCE