Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ALGIERS514
2009-06-03 06:36:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Algiers
Cable title:  

BOUTEFLIKA: SERIOUS WESTERN SAHARA AUTONOMY IS

Tags:  PREL PBTS OREP PGOV PINR PTER PINS KNNP AG 
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DE RUEHAS #0514/01 1540636
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 030636Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7513
INFO RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0985
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1211
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 1939
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 6762
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3135
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 2773
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 7635
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ALGIERS 000514 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2034
TAGS: PREL PBTS OREP PGOV PINR PTER PINS KNNP AG
SUBJECT: BOUTEFLIKA: SERIOUS WESTERN SAHARA AUTONOMY IS
MORE THAN SOVEREIGNTY OVER GARBAGE COLLECTION

Classified By: Ambassador David D. Pearce; reasons 1.4 (b),(c) and (d)
.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ALGIERS 000514

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2034
TAGS: PREL PBTS OREP PGOV PINR PTER PINS KNNP AG
SUBJECT: BOUTEFLIKA: SERIOUS WESTERN SAHARA AUTONOMY IS
MORE THAN SOVEREIGNTY OVER GARBAGE COLLECTION

Classified By: Ambassador David D. Pearce; reasons 1.4 (b),(c) and (d)
.


1. (C) SUMMARY: President Bouteflika told Codel Burr Algeria
would consider modifying its position on Western Sahara, and
engaging the Sahrawis, if Morocco seriously implemented UN
resolutions on self-determination. While Algeria would
respect whatever outcome the Saharans chose, including
autonomy, any such autonomy would have to involve more than
the right of the Sahrawis to "collect their own garbage."
Real autonomy would entail a serious discussion of what
aspects of sovereign power an autonomous region would
actually have. Bouteflika cited Puerto Rico and Monaco as
models of real autonomy without independence. He criticized
the State Department for recently supporting what he called
false autonomy, and urged the U.S. to take a leadership role
in advancing the cause of self-determination with the same
zeal it had displayed for effort to counter nuclear weapons
proliferation. He said Algeria's border with Morocco will
remain closed until the Western Sahara issue is resolved.
Bouteflika told the Codel that Algeria remains committed to
defending the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT),but as
an NPT signatory it also supports a country's right --
including Iran's -- to develop nuclear power for peaceful
purposes. He said Algeria would review any requests to
accept non-dual national Algerian Guantanamo detainees case
by case. He described U.S.-Algeria counterterrorism
cooperation as excellent, and said he saw signs of
improvement in what has been a dormant mil-mil relationship.
He declared that he was in favor of concluding an Open Skies
agreement. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) President Abdelaziz Bouteflika met Codel Burr on May

27. He was joined by Algerian Senate President Bensalah, as
well as a notetaker and interpreter. On the U.S. side were
the Ambassador, Senators Richard Burr, Lindsey Graham, Saxby
Chambliss and John Thune, and Representative John Kline. A
photo-op with members of the Algerian press followed the
meeting, and a front-page story reporting the meeting was
published in the May 28 edition of el-Moudjahid newspaper
with photos.

WE HAVE NO BORDER PROBLEM
--------------


3. (C) Responding to a question from Senator Graham about
Algeria's border dispute with Morocco, Bouteflika quickly
responded, "There is no border problem." He said the border
is recognized by both countries, but Algeria must keep it
closed because of the issue of Western Sahara, even though
the 1994 closure had nothing to do with the disputed

territory. He said the border was closed after Morocco
claimed terrorists from Algeria had struck Marrakech and
imposed a visa requirement. Algeria reciprocated, and then
closed the border "to help protect the Moroccans from the
Algerians," the president said wryly. The visa requirements
were eventually lifted, but the border has remained closed.
He complained that Algeria had attempted to open the border
on several occasions, but each time Morocco took steps that
scuttled the plans. "It's hard for us, too," he said,
acknowledging that others, like members of the European Union
(EU),would also like to see the border reopened.


4. (C) Bouteflika described what he clearly saw as the heart
of the issue: "We could open the border," he said, "but that
would not solve the Western Sahara problem." "We are in
Africa," the president said, and because a number of African
countries have recognized the Sahrawi Arab Democratic
Republic, which he described as a founding member of the
African Union, any move by Algeria regarding the border with
Morocco would be interpreted by other Africans as a shift
away from support for the Sahrawis' drive for
self-determination.

SHIFTING SANDS ON WESTERN SAHARA POLICY
--------------


5. (C) The president told the members of Congress that
"decolonization" of the Western Sahara remains a matter for
the UN, and that Algeria cannot take on the burden of
resolving the matter if the UN does not find a way forward.
He added, however, that if he hears at least one voice
defending the right of self-determination, as he said the
United States had done in the past, he would support that

ALGIERS 00000514 002 OF 004


effort because Algeria itself became independent through
self-determination. But he also chided the State Department
for changing course from its previously "noteworthy" stand on
the Western Sahara to pursuing a policy he described as a
"false" plan for internal autonomy." He described the plan
as merely allowing the Sahrawis to "run their own garbage
collection."


6. (C) Bouteflika said that he hoped Special Envoy
Christopher Ross could find a solution to the Western Sahara
dispute based on self-determination for the Sahrawis. Asked
if the dispute would still be unsettled ten years from now,
the president said he hoped not, and urged the United States
to take a leadership role in finding a resolution. He
described the U.S. as a world decisionmaker. As such, if the
USG were to become as adamant about the global right of
self-determination as it has been on North Korea's nuclear
ambitions, results would follow on the Western Sahara issue.
Without the efforts of the United States, he opined, there
would be no international consensus on North Korea today.
"There must be a few minimum rules for the world," he said,
suggesting that, like non-proliferation, self-determination
for regions like Western Sahara should be a policy goal for
the USG.


7. (C) Bouteflika told the Codel that Algeria's position
regarding the Western Sahara was well known, and that it
would not change. Referring to Morocco's takeover of the
Sahara following the Spanish withdrawal from the territory,
he leaned toward the Senators and instructed his translator
to use his precise words when saying, "We cannot accept a
policy of Anschluss." But he then offered that if Morocco
were to make a serious effort to implement UN resolutions on
self-determination in the Western Sahara, "we could amend our
position." He lamented that an acceptable solution had been
close before, and likely would have already been reached if
for the death of Moroccan King Hassan II. He repeated
several times that the U.S. example of Puerto Rico offers a
good model for true autonomy that does not necessarily result
in independence. He pointed more generally to Puerto Rico,
Monaco and San Marino as examples of autonomous regions that
are not independent, but that can exercise authority "beyond
garbage collection." "Autonomy," Bouteflika said, "means
discussing what kinds of sovereign powers (a region) will
have." He added that Algeria does not care if the Sahrawis
choose to be Moroccan, as long as they have the power to
choose. "We have no territorial claim," he said. "Bring me
a solution like Puerto Rico, and I would be very happy," he
said, "and we could talk to the Sahrawis."

ACCEPTING GTMO DETAINEES: TRUE ALGERIANS ONLY
--------------


8. (C) Senator Graham also raised the issue of Guantanamo Bay
detainees. Graham told Bouteflika that, although all the
members of the Codel were Republicans, they wanted to help
President Obama resolve the legal status of detainees and
find places for them to go in order to improve the global
image of the United States. He noted that some were
Algerians, and asked the president if Algeria would accept
those that were, and any others that were not. Bouteflika
reiterated what he has said before, namely, that Algeria
would consider on a case-by-case basis any request to accept
an Algerian citizen. He clarified, however, that they must
be "100 percent" Algerian; Algeria would not accept, for
example, French-Algerians or other dual-nationals.

GOOD C/T COOPERATION, WAKING THE MIL-MIL RELATIONSHIP
-------------- --------------


9. (C) President Bouteflika told the Codel that he believed
our bilateral counterterrorism cooperation was "excellent,"
at least as far as he knew from what the Algerian
intelligence and military services tell him. "Please correct
me if I am misinformed," he added. He suggested that certain
"sophisticated equipment" provided to the Algerians has
helped them fight terrorists here. By contrast, he described
the military-to-military relationship as having been "fast
asleep" for many years. He added, though, that it seemed to
be waking, and felt that there were encouraging signs that
the relationship is improving. Looking backward, he noted
that Algeria was the first Arab or Muslim country to express
solidarity with the United States in the wake of the
September 11 attacks, and quoted former President Clinton as

ALGIERS 00000514 003 OF 004


first acknowledging the global threat of al-Qa'ida when he
said, "Now we know we are fighting the same kind of terror."
He also admitted the influence al-Qa'ida has in Algeria,
saying that whether one refers to Algerians traveling to
fight in Iraq, Somalia or even Pakistan and parts of Asia,
"we must admit they are part of the nebulous movement called
al-Qa'ida." He said Algeria, among North African countries,
is particularly targeted by al-Qa'ida for a greater
operational presence.

SAME-OLD, SAME-OLD ON IRAN
--------------


10. (C) Responding to a question posed by Congressman Kline,
President Bouteflika reiterated his long-standing position
that while Algeria remains committed to the nuclear
non-proliferation treaty (NPT),it also supports the right of
nations to develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
Referring to Iran and North Korea, Bouteflika said that even
Algeria considered acquiring nuclear weapons in the 1970s,
but is now a signatory and defender of the NPT. He observed
that Iran was in an "antagonistic" position vis-a-vis its
Arab neighbors, and that it might be most useful to speak of
de-nuclearization as a goal for the region. He pointed to
the Egyptians, who, he said, do not want to see Iran develop
a nuclear weapons capability. But because they believe
Israel has nuclear bombs, the Egyptians are in the ironic
situation of opposing Iran's nuclear ambition while
contemplating whether they need one of their own. Likewise,
Bouteflika said, the international community is closely
watching how the U.S. deals with North Korea's recent
provocations. "Algeria is opposed to proliferation," the
president said, "but all Arab countries will tell Iran that
they have no objection to the peaceful and non-military use
of nuclear technology."

BOUTEF WANTS OPEN SKIES
--------------


11. (C) Senator Chambliss told the president that his home
state of Georgia was home to Delta Airlines, which would
consider opening a route to Algeria if there was an Open
Skies agreement in place. Bouteflika affirmed that Algeria
is in favor of the agreement, but offered no opinion as to
how to overcome the final technical and legislative hurdles
that have kept the accord in limbo.

HOW I GOT HERE, FOR THE THIRD TIME
--------------


12. (C) The members of the Codel congratulated Bouteflika on
his "landslide" re-election victory, to which Bouteflika
responded that, as the Ambassador was surely aware, he had
only "lightweight" opposition that any incumbent could have
beaten. He described how the years of violence and terrorism
in the 1990s left the Algerian government hobbled by a
political, social and economic crisis externally, and a lack
of problem-solving skills internally. The government didn't
know how to deal with contentious issues. Bouteflika cited
the problem of language and national identity, as deeply
rooted Arab and Berber identities clashed. He said it had
been important for him to bridge that gap by means of
fostering a debate focused on national unity. A referendum
would have failed, but by casting it as an executive and
parliamentary initiative on national unity, no one objected
and Berber was accepted as a national language.


13. (C) Bouteflika said that his work to bring security back
to Algeria had started with an effort to restore a sense of
hope among people. The years of terrorism, he said, had left
many people without shelter, jobs or hope. Violence stemmed
from hopelessness. He then described the Algerian political
milieu in terms of four trends: the independents, the
patriots, the ultra-nationalists and the Islamists.
Bouteflika further described the Islamists as belonging to
three camps: those who accept violence and are not supportive
of the government, those who neither use nor condemn violence
and participate in parliament, and those who condemn violence
but want an Islamic state, whom he likened to the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt. He said he remains flexible regarding
the notion of a date-certain for national reconciliation if
terrorists are willing to surrender. Delinquents, he said,
can be pardoned, but not terrorists. He added that while
Algerian law still allows for the possibility of death

ALGIERS 00000514 004 OF 004


sentences, no execution has occurred since the early 1990s,
and said none will again, as far as he is concerned.
Ultimately, Bouteflika said, terrorism will be defeated with
a multifaceted approach involving security forces, political
will and economic assistance. Reintegration of repentant
terrorists, he said, is a challenging but necessary component
of the process.

COMMENT
--------------


14. (C) Bouteflika appeared healthy and very engaged with the
codel. His grip was firm, and he was animated throughout the
meeting, especially on Western Sahara, when he leaned forward
in his seat and coached the translator on key points. On
Guantanamo detainees, he was clear in stating that Algeria
would not accept dual nationals nor non-Algerians. As to
the rest, he was carefully noncommittal, ruling nothing in or
out, and restating the position he took last fall with
Secretary Rice, i.e. that such requests would be examined
case by case. In contrast, his comments on Western Sahara
revealed more of his thinking on the possible contours of a
final settlement that we have heard heretofore. On one
level, the mere fact that he is even thinking beyond the
current stalemate might be counted as progress of a sort.
More concretely, while he at no point attempted to defend
independence as a realistic outcome, he did speak of autonomy
as such, even if predicated on an authentic process of
self-determination. He first cited specifics on process,
e.g. the need to engage seriously on what aspects of
sovereignty would be on the table. In terms of substance, he
said it must be more than local administration, e.g. the
Saharans being allowed to pick up their own trash. In terms
of outcomes, he pointed to Puerto Rico. And, in terms of how
to get there, he explicitly said that if Algeria perceives a
serious effort, it will be prepared not only to modify its
own position but also to engage (and presumably help deliver)
the Sahrawis. All this suggests the GOA is taking the Ross
initiative seriously -- the optimists will say Bouteflika and
company are considering how to engage constructively; the
pessimists will rejoin that they are probably considering
what they can say and do in order not to be seen as an
obstacle to progress. In any case, it suggests the parties
are thinking seriously about how to deal with the impending
UN initiative, and angling for position, which hopefully will
start to provide Chris Ross with some space for maneuver.
End Comment.


15. (U) Codel Burr did not clear on this message.
PEARCE

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